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Economic Transformation in Poland 
and Ukraine
When Poland and Ukraine introduced their political, social and economic 
system reforms at the beginning of the 1990s, both economies were at a 
similar level of economic development (GDP $9,500 per capita). However, 
in 2018, Ukrainian GDP per capita had remained at the same level since 
1991, while in Poland, it had increased significantly, to more than $27,000 
per capita.
This book assesses the reasons for the growing gap between the level of 
economic development in Ukraine and Poland. It examines the course of 
events and evaluates the effectiveness of the system transformations, both 
in the context of the economy, as a whole, and in individual regions (Polish 
‘voivodeships’ (provinces) and Ukrainian ‘oblasts’). It also analyzes the con-
sequences of the 2008–2009 Ukrainian-Russian gas conflict and 2013–2014 
Euromaidan events for the Ukrainian economy. Additionally, the authors 
offer an insight into the migration movements, which have recently been 
observed in Poland and Ukraine.
This is the first comprehensive, comparative analysis concerning the spa-
tial diversification of economic development in these two countries, and 
the authors highlight the ways in which these reforms have proved effective 
in Poland and hardly effective in Ukraine. This analysis helps to identify 
the basic interrelations between the core macroeconomic variables at the 
regional level and the impact of political events from both a national and 
regional perspective.
The book will appeal to academics, researchers and policy makers in-
terested in the economic and political changes in these two countries, in 
a comparative setting and on national and regional levels, as well as those 
working on issues of EU integration.
Rafał Wisła is Professor at the Department of Economics and Innovation 
of the Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland.
Andrzej Nowosad is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Journalism, Media 
and Social Communication of the Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland.
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Poland and Ukraine are the two most important economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe, not counting the Russian Federation. Ukraine as a member 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics gained independence in August 
1991 as a result of the collapse of the USSR, while Poland transformed from 
1989 as a satellite country of the USSR, and in October 1991 held its first 
completely free parliamentary elections since World War II (1939–1945). In 
both countries, 1991 marked the beginning of the transformation of the po-
litical and economic systems as well as a metamorphosis in the social fabric 
of both nations. The Ukrainian GDP per capita (in PPP, at constant prices 
from 2011) in 1991 amounted to 9.5 thousand USD, just as in Poland. In 
1999, it fell to 4.5 thousand USD per capita. In 2017, it still did not return to 
the level of 1991 (7.9 thousand USD per capita). By comparison, in Poland, 
the GDP per capita has grown by nearly 190% over the last 27 years, from 
9.5 thousand USD in 1991 to 27,000 USD in 2017. In 2018, the Polish GDP 
per capita was three times higher than in 1991 (The World Bank, 2019).
Both countries, although significantly different in terms of territory (Po-
land, 312,696 km2; Ukraine, 603,700 km2), have a similar population as of 
2019 (Ukraine, 37,289,000;1 Poland, 38,386,000), which places Poland on the 
36th and Ukraine on the 37th place in the world in terms of population, 
taking into account the disputed territories.
Poland, in the early 1990s, had at its disposal several basic relatively schol-
arly institutions: its own currency, a central bank, the spirit and pragmatism 
of the free market, a limited form of private property, its own state budget, 
a solidarity-intellectual elite based on the working class and dissident intel-
ligentsia, capable of developing and carrying out reforms with the help of 
foreign professionals.
Ukraine, in 1989, was one of the republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, whose independent economy was part of an inefficient Soviet 
economic organism. At the beginning of the 1990s, Ukraine did not have 
any experience in building market economy institutions, or the institutions 
of parliamentary democracy. Ukrainian society, brought up in a totalitar-
ian system, had to face the extremely difficult task of creating market econ-
omy institutions and implementing democratic principles of the rule of law, 
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in a post-soviet sphere of socio-economic development. The collapse of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was associated with a violent break in 
the Soviet supply chain, and economic connections. Internal imbalances 
(hyperinflation, rapidly rising unemployment, declines in production vol-
ume) and external factors (imminent depreciation of national currencies, 
rapidly growing balance of payments deficit and rising costs of foreign debt) 
were the macro-characteristics of the first years of systemic changes, not 
solely in Poland and Ukraine.
The development potential of both economies and the diversification of 
the level of social and economic life in the regions were examined.
The image of modern Europe is a combination of many processes. Their 
research turns out to be a problem, so complicated and complex and occur-
ring in so many spheres of political, economic and social life that under-
standing this issue requires identifying individual areas of its occurrence. 
The complexity of the problem and the need to separate research areas and 
tasks in this area require constant returns to research, as well as their con-
tinuation in subsequent years. This publication is a continuation of the re-
search interests of a team associated with the Faculty of Management and 
Social Communication of the Jagiellonian University in Krakow (Poland), 
and the Department of Mathematical Economics working under the guid-
ance of prof. Tomasz Tokarski. A similar editorial body conducted research 
in 44 European countries; the results of which were published in Polish in a 
book entitled Developmental Diversification of Contemporary Europe, edited 
by A. Nowosad, R. Wisła, Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press, 2016.
This book is part of the world research of regional economies, such as 
the USA (Cox 2016), China (Girardin, Kholodilin 2011; Goodman 2016; Wu 
2016), Australia (Coombs 2001), Mexico and Brazil (Alonso, Martin 2019), 
and especially areas bordering on the European Union, such as the Bal-
kan Region (Duman, Obralić 2016), the Black Sea and Georgia (Zakaradze 
2019), Turkey (Berber et al. 2014; Karakılçık 2014) and Russia (Kramorenko 
2014; Maksimets, Bukatina 2016). The purpose of this book is to provide 
research on the regional development of Poland and Ukraine, located in 
Eastern Europe.
In the methodological layer, the book is an invitation to discuss the 
methods and techniques for the reader to become acquainted with the 
 economic-political phenomena and processes and mechanisms analyzed 
from a macro- and meso-regional (regional) perspective. This type of re-
search employs the Estimating and Forecasting with a Dynamic Spatial 
Panel Data Model methods (see, for example, Longhi, Nijkamp 2007; Girar-
din, Kholodilin 2011; Baltagi et al. 2016), and other types of spatial research 
methods and techniques.
In the cognitive layer, it is not only a diagnosis but also an answer to 
contemporary questions about the condition of Eastern Europe and its op-
portunities in the global economy. For the authors – representing various 
academic centers and scientific specialties in the field of economics and 
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political science – the book should provoke and inspire further discussions 
on the economic potential of Europe in the global economy.
This monograph opens with a chapter devoted to the institutional condi-
tions essential for the functioning of the Polish and Ukrainian economies as 
a key factor for economic growth and development (Nowosad A., Wisła R., 
Turanli U.). Recognition of the properties of the institutional order of both 
countries provides the basis for further analysis. Important issues addressed 
in the first chapter are the aspect of constitutional economic and political 
freedoms and real possibilities of exercising them, the multivariate institu-
tional structure, the conditionality of the political and social order and their 
relationship with features of the respective national cultures, recognized 
forms of business and consequently with the structural changes of the entire 
economy and the dynamics of its growth. The authors use the methods of 
the new institutional economy (see: North 1995; Harris, Hunter, Lewis 1995; 
 Lecours 2005; Staniek 2017).
The problem of the emergence of market economy institutions is contin-
ued in Chapter 2 (Chugaievska S., Wisła R., Nowosad A.), which aims to 
discuss selected institutional charts of changes in the period of economic 
transformation in Poland and Ukraine. The formation of private property 
and the capital market – a mechanism supporting privatization – is the main 
area of analysis in this chapter, using the institutional economics approach 
(see: Williamson 1985, 2000; North 1993; Richter 2005; Staniek 2017).
A diagnosis of institutional development conditions and an assessment 
of the level of maturity of market economy institutions assist the reader to 
understand well the consequences of the institutional immaturity of the 
state – both in Poland and in Ukraine (see: Lowndes, Roberts 2013).
Poland and Ukraine are very good subjects for this type of analysis. Pol-
ish and Ukrainian society had to face the exceptionally difficult task of cre-
ating market economy institutions practically from scratch, where the main 
brakes on GDP growth are the established and stable, informal, non-market 
institutions which are not conducive to free competition (interest networks 
of the former political elite groups, clans, oligarchy and an acquiescence for 
corruption and an autocratic political elite). This hypothesis is tested in the 
following chapters.
In Chapter 3 (Wisła R., Chugaievska S., Nowosad A., Turanli U.) the di-
rection and dynamics of structural changes in the Polish and Ukrainian 
economies against the background of other eastern European countries are 
assessed from a macroeconomic perspective. Poland and Ukraine are ob-
served from the viewpoint of systemically transforming countries (see: Lin 
2012; Webster, Dunning 2013; McMillan et al. 2016).
Chapter 4 (Chugaievska N., Kelebaj O., Tokarski T.) opens a regional 
standpoint for the conducted research. In this chapter, Polish and Ukrain-
ian administrative regions and their groups are discussed and have been 
analyzed from the angle of their demographic potential (population density, 
geographical structure of the population and urbanization rates).
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In turn, in Chapter 5 (Chugaievska N., Kelebaj O., Tokarski T.), the eco-
nomic potential of the regions and their groups, as indicated in Chapter 4, is 
analyzed in Poland, which is already in the EU, and in Ukraine, which is a 
candidate for membership in the EU (see: Liebscher et al. 2005).
Chapter 6 (Filipowicz K., Tokarski T., Ferenc T.) is a continuation of 
the analyses carried out in Chapters 3–5. This chapter describes the evo-
lution of gross value added in agriculture, industry, construction and ser-
vices in Polish voivodeships (in 2004–2015) and in Ukrainian oblasts (in 
2004–2016).
The main purpose of the analyses carried out in Chapter 7 (Dykas P., 
Misiak T., Tokarski T.) is to present the spatial diversity of the situation on 
regional labor markets in Poland and Ukraine in 2004–2017, demonstrating 
its specificity (Blien, Wolf 2002; Ganesch 2018). These analyses relate to the 
diversity and dynamics of economic variables such as labor productivity, 
wage levels and unemployment rates. Determinants of the spatial difference 
of labor markets are used.
In Chapter 8 (Chugaievska S., Filipowicz K., Tokarski T., Wisła R.), the 
authors analyze the spatial diversity of characteristics such as capital- labor 
ratio and the so-called gravity growth model and labor productivity in the 
Ukrainian oblasts. These analyses are conducted on the basis of the gravity 
growth model. The chapter also presents 8 variants of numerical simula-
tions of trajectories for increasing labor productivity in circuits by 2050.
The last in the series of analyses of the labor market is Chapter 9 
(Chugaievska N., Szczepaniak D.) devoted to the differentiation of migra-
tion inflows and outflows as well as factors affecting these flows – i.e., rela-
tive wages and relative unemployment rates.
The book closes with Chapter 10 (Bolińska M., Chornenka O.). The main 
purpose of this chapter is to assess the spatial diversity of the economic 
development of voivodeships and oblasts in 2004–2016. The measures of the 
spatial diversity of economic development of voivodeships and oblasts are 
made by calculating and analyzing the taxonomic indicators of economic 
development for these regions.
The level of economic development of the Polish and Ukrainian regions 
is significantly diversified in both space and time. The results of the anal-
ysis conducted in this book show significant disparities in the economic 
development of these regions. Can they give an answer as to what is their 
scale, direction and dynamics? What place do Ukraine and Poland occupy 
in the global and European economy today? The answers are contained in 
this book.
Unfortunately, based on existing data, we limited our forecasts for these 
economies to variants of numerical simulations of trajectories of labor pro-
ductivity growth. The reason is that we began to write the book in rela-
tively stable times, and we are publishing it now, during the global pandemic 
of Coronavirus (COVID-19). In both countries, strict measures have been 
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introduced to prevent the spread of the virus, and in both countries, this 
situation has a huge impact on the condition of the economy and society, 
and thus on the potential increase in the wealth of the countries, regions 
and markets analyzed here. Product markets and labor markets found them-
selves in a crisis, and supply chains were broken.
The analyses carried out in this book can be very helpful material for 
further comparative research.
An important part of the efforts to establish policies for regional devel-
opment should be focused on the safety and security in the region. Also, 
the development of intraregional policies (i.e., trade, employment, market) 
should be prioritized as compared to outer-regional ones, especially in the 
short term.
This book points out the need for regional economic development policies 
for the west European region and brings together insights from academics 
on various economic and social aspects of regional development.
Note
 1 On January 23, 2020, the Ukrainian government team for assessing the popu-
lation of Ukraine presented the results of their research, according to which on 
December 1, 2019, the number of residents of the country (excluding Crimea and 
parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts not controlled by Kyiv) was 37.3 mil-
lion. On the same day, the State Statistics Service (Derzhstat) announced that 
the number of residents of Ukraine (excluding Crimea) on December 1, 2020, 
was 41.9 million.
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Today’s direction and dynamics of economic development play a key role 
in shaping economic development, not so much traditional cost or resource 
factors, as qualitative ones as human capital, the innovation capacity of the 
economy and, above all, the quality of the institutional environment, that is, 
of the social, political, economic and communication processes.
Institutions in the economy reduce uncertainty by introducing patterns 
into everyday life. They bring to business a factor of sustainability, continu-
ity and stability through the creation of conditions ensuring the predictabil-
ity of the results of a particular set of actions and communication patterns. 
They become a model of human interaction (North 1990: 4). Institutions are 
also instruments used by individuals to maximize benefits in their efforts 
to increase individual prosperity and should, according to North, reduce 
uncertainty and background noise in communication and transaction costs 
(North 1992: 447–449).
Institutions can be understood not only as dominant ways of thinking, 
taking into account individual social conditions, individual and community 
functions (Veblen 1899) but also as collective activities to supervise individ-
ual activities (Commons 1934). Institutions are usually referred to as any 
permanent, organizational or customary condition for repetitive human be-
havior and human interactions (Pejovich 1995), as well as conventions and 
social communication. In systemic terms, institutions are evolutionarily ed-
ucated standards and rules of action often transformed into a set of formal 
or legally binding restrictions (through legal provisions or constitutions) to-
gether with the related mechanisms of their enforcement (WEF 2015).
Institutions are usually divided into formal and informal. The state cre-
ates formal institutions by setting out forms of economic activity and eco-
nomic relations by law, which must also be classified by rules for registration, 
affiliation and trade union activities, amongst others. It also creates a stim-
ulus system; social impact institutions in terms of functioning institutions 
can be defined as effective, where the adopted principles are respected and 
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enforced, and inefficient, when institutional principles are not respected, as 
North writes:
Institutions and ideology together shape economic performance. Insti-
tutions affect economic performance by determining (along with the 
technology used) the cost of transacting and producing. Institutions 
are composed of formal rules, informal constraints, and characteris-
tics of enforcing those constraints. While formal rules can be changed 
overnight by the polity, informal constraints change very slowly. Both 
are ultimately shaped by people’s subjective perceptions of the world 
around them; those perceptions, in turn, determine explicit choices 
among formal rules and evolving informal constraints (…) Institutions 
are the rules of the game in a society; more formally, they are the hu-
manly devised constraints that shape human interaction. Thus, they 
structure incentives in exchange, whether political, social, or economic. 
Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and, 
hence, is the key to understanding historical change.
(North 1992: 447)
While formal institutions are easy to create and change, informal institu-
tions are often resistant to change. These are the usually unwritten rules of 
human behavior, ways of thinking and a hierarchy of values (Veblen 1899; 
Commons 1934; North 1992). While every person has his own system of 
values and behavior, the mere fact that a person is a social unit causes that, 
with puberty and personal development, he also adopts the characteristic 
attributes of the specifics of his surroundings and recognizes the accompa-
nying norms, principles and traditions. In other words, institutions are the 
learning matrix of human individuals and their social groups in different 
forms of education. Informal institutions therefore include not only regional 
customs, overt behavior, historically imposed by generations of mothers 
and fathers, patterns of socially and politically desirable behavior, habits 
and cultural codes, social habits, a general way of life and customs, but also 
legal usages, conventions, communication systems and behaviors.
Informal institutions endure from generation to generation and are dif-
ficult to change, whereas formal institutions can be created by the state as 
a system of impulses to the state’s desired behavior practically overnight.
Economics does not deal with matters of the functioning of the state it-
self, and yet institutionally the principles acquired by the state, or developed 
under the influence of its current and former institutions, created in a cer-
tain international environment, have an equally important impact on the 
functioning of the state and its economy as internal formal and informal in-
stitutions. After all, the state’s habits of regulating and creating institutions 
depend on the adopted political system, standards, rules of action, mecha-
nisms for the enforcement of social and economic contracts, and the quality 
of human capital – that is, the competence of those politicians who manage 
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this country. The political system of communism, which was in force in Po-
land and Ukraine until the end of the 1980s, created its own set of formal, 
legally binding restrictions and its own economic system. Its features were 
a lack of private property, the injunction-resolution system, central plan-
ning, all power monopolized by one political party, a totalitarian ideology, 
full control and supervision of society in all aspects of public and private 
life and finally, a propagandistic and one-way form of political communi-
cation. All economic, communication and ownership initiatives were killed 
in the individual person, as a separate entity. Since the 1990s the Polish and 
Ukrainian economies have undergone a systemic transformation. The aim 
was to create a country with a market economy, characterized by political 
and economic freedom, and the free exchange of human thoughts in the 
public and private sphere – a concept which still faces difficulties and cre-
ates economic and social problems.
The institutional conditions for the functioning of the Polish and Ukrain-
ian economies are diverse, but in many ways they are similar. Both countries 
combine a communist heritage, system of prescriptive economy, similar 
forms of social communication, the privatization of institutions, the cre-
ation of principles of economic freedom and the functioning of the state. 
These are not identical systems. Ukraine now enjoys its own independent 
state for the first time in its history, while Poland’s statehood has been his-
torically shaped.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the basic institutional charac-
teristics, in the sense of formal and informal institutions, in Poland and 
Ukraine, which affect the functioning of the economy, and to delineate their 
specificities. It is also an introduction to this book, which, admittedly, is 
written by many authors, specialists in their own fields, but is an integral 
whole of looking at the Polish and Ukrainian economies.
1.2 Poland and Ukraine yesterday and today
Communism was the first political system which, after World War I, ex-
tracted Ukraine from the nations surrounding it (1918–1920), while Poland 
at that time regained its statehood after a hiatus of more than 100 years due 
largely to a wave of anti-communism. Ukraine failed to defend its independ-
ence against the Russian Bolsheviks, but Poland succeeded by retaining its 
statehood after winning the Polish-Bolshevik War (1919–1921). Although 
the history of both peoples has been converging for centuries and histor-
ical phenomena have occurred, sometimes resulting in direct rivalries, the 
institutional forms of state and society were different for Poles and Ukrain-
ians. Even during the occupations since 1807, Poland had a substitute for 
independence in the form of the Duchy of Warsaw, which was transformed 
in 1815 into the Kingdom of Poland, formally connected by a personal un-
ion with Russia, and therefore not a sovereign state, but since 1918 Poland 
has been a completely self-governing country. Ukraine, on the other hand, 
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has been a sovereign state since 1991. The 73-year difference plays a signif-
icant role here in shaping the institutional order of the state, its economy 
and society. For 71 years, Ukraine had been incorporated into the Union 
of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) – a communist, totalitarian state, with 
a centrally planned economy, where every manifestation of an individual 
economic initiative was treated as anti-state activity and punished by years 
of imprisonment in the gulag, or even by death. In Poland from 1918 to 1939, 
the institutions of the market economy and of the state were formed and 
strengthened, while society reacquired its national customs and recovered 
and implemented the traditions of the Polish nobility, the Church, bourgeoi-
sie and the peasantry, which in communist Ukraine was something utterly 
unimaginable. The Church was banned, manifestations of religious faith 
were punished by death or imprisonment in the glugs, and talking about 
Ukrainian traditions linked with the nobility or land-owning class was pun-
ishable by death.
The result of World War II brought peoples closer, but the course and 
events during World War II widened the separation between them. The 
Polish- Ukrainian guerrilla wars, ethnic cleansing of civilians carried out 
on both sides of the border, mutual former resentments and old animosities, 
meant that even though both countries were in the same orbit of socialist 
states after 1945 under the dictatorship of the USSR, they produced neither 
common institutions nor informally traditional attitudes. Poland was in the 
group of satellite countries of the USSR, and Ukraine was an entity within 
the USSR itself. The Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP; Polish: Polska 
Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) was a party that formed the com-
munist system of institutions in Poland from 1945 to 1990 mainly through 
the implementation of the guidelines of the Communist Party of the So-
viet Union (CPSU, Коммунистическая партия Советского Союза – КПСС, 
Kommunisticzeskaja partija Sowietskogo Sojuza – KPSS), and it did not 
treat the oppression of the citizenry entirely seriously, and certainly less se-
riously than in the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), which functioned 
in a Ukraine and was completely subordinate to Russia.
In Poland, private property was tolerated to a minimal degree, small 
farms and even small private forests were permitted, and above all, crafts-
men and artisans were allowed to carry on their trades, something which 
didn’t appear in Ukraine before 1990. In Poland, it was also not possible to 
implant in the minds of the people, the concept that the state and its needs 
were all-important. In Poland, people continued to think for themselves, 
as individuals (not collectively), about their own private affairs (not state 
matters), with an emphasis on their private consumer matters, as an ele-
ment of collective state affairs. In Ukraine, individuality was killed in the 
fields of social activity as well as in culture, art and language. Another, no 
less essential matter was the possibility of interacting with the institutions 
of other countries. In Poland, during communism, there were no problems 
with trips abroad within the Soviet Bloc of states, whereas in Ukraine, any 
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departure from the USSR was almost impossible. In addition, Poles, for 
example, when going to Bulgaria for a holiday, could always travel through 
Ukraine, while Ukrainians could not come to Poland. This was quite sig-
nificant, because already in communist times the Poles developed an in-
dividual economic initiative on an international scale. Poles practiced this 
so-called border suitcase trade – they bought goods in Poland, which were 
not in Ukraine, sold them there for rubles, and then in Romania or Bulgaria 
exchanged these rubles for dollars, thus creating capital, which then allowed 
them to build their own homes in Poland and to undertake entrepreneurial 
activity on a small scale, which was permitted by the communist authori-
ties. Ukrainians did not have such an opportunity, and from the point of 
view of economics, it was difficult for the Ukrainians to understand the 
existence of the free market, the spontaneous education of sectors of the 
economy on the basis of individual economic initiatives, individual choices, 
without any intervention, supervision or direction from the state. Today, 
nearly 30 years after regaining independence, the reasoning of the principles 
of the free market economy in Poland and Ukraine is different and barely 
comparable to each other, as are the informal institutions (paved principles 
of conduct), the functioning of economic institutions or the transactional 
principles of the open market. These are entrenched, homegrown ways of 
thinking which existed in the old system and are still present even today in 
the young generation.
Literature of the subject, especially Russian language literature, indicates 
that Ukraine’s economy cannot be subjected to comparative studies from 
the viewpoint of the guidelines adopted by Western Europe and the liberal 
economies. It would appear that these measures are incomparable, because 
there are other institutional dependencies. It has been proposed that any 
research of the economies of those countries which arose after the fall of 
the USSR should be conducted using the paradigm applied to Asian coun-
tries, since the countries of the former-USSR, at least in their institutional 
behavior, are closest to their Asian counterparts (Lipov 2012). Of course, 
from a Polish perspective, it can be considered that perhaps there is a lot of 
evidence to confirm these scientific assertions and opinions, but also it may 
be the result of the ordinary political line of Russian or Ukrainian research.
There are two main reasons behind the writing of this book. The main 
aim of this chapter is to explain the institutional behavior and possible in-
consistencies that the reader can find in literature on the subject, and re-
search regarding the economies of Poland and Ukraine.
It can be said, with a high degree of probability, that writing and talking 
about these economies – Polish and Ukrainian – is not free from the local 
policies of the countries from which the authors or commentators originate. 
The thought processes of the research plans and categories cited are also 
subject to the specific customs and habits of the respective regions.
An outstanding book published in Polish on this subject has been edited 
by Antoszewski et al. (2010), in which Poles write about Polish affairs and 
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Ukrainians write about Ukrainian affairs (translated into Polish obviously); 
however, there is one shortcoming. The authors bilaterally take up the same 
problem; they write in a different scientific code and operate in a different 
paradigm, which causes the reader to get, on the one hand, two viewpoints 
of the same things – Polish and Ukrainian – which are completely incom-
patible and even outright disharmonious, while large fragments are utterly 
incomprehensible. On the other hand, perhaps the authors really do com-
prehend the variety of paradigms and thought habits (see: Antoszewski et al. 
2010). The mere fact that the editors and authors do not even try to create a 
common paradigm-narrative for research of the Polish and Ukrainian econ-
omies may not be so much an error as an acknowledgment of the lack of one 
(common paradigm).
Regarding Russian literature, publications in the Journal of Insti-
tutional Studies (Zhurnal Institutsional’nykh Issledovaniy, Журнал 
Институциональных Исследований, from 2009) are noted.
The Journal’s editorial board states that only an institutional paradigm 
can constitute the common ground for research of the economies and states 
of the former USSR and the Western world, and on institutional assump-
tions formulates the scientific mission of the research, when they say that:
Neoclassical recipes to describe economic reforms have shown a very 
limited effectiveness in almost all post-Soviet countries as early as the 
1990s. 20th century economists began to search for a new economic par-
adigm that would be more relevant to the post-soviet reality and at the 
same time would allow them to communicate with foreign colleagues 
“in the same language”. Institutionalism (both “old” and “new”) has 
become such a new paradigm.
Wrote the Journal of Institutional Studies, https://www. 
hjournal.ru/journals/journal-of-institutional-studies. 
hthttps://www.hjournal.ru/journals/journal-of-institutional- 
studies.html, ml, access date; 2020–01–10)
The Journal of Institutional Studies highlights the importance of institu-
tional differences in the countries of the former USSR, on the one hand, 
and points to their institutional convergence with Asian countries, on the 
other. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of material concerning Ukraine in 
the Journal, and references to the institutional traditions of Poland or West-
ern Europe, in Ukraine, are not taken into account a priori.
Ukrainian researchers have not developed a common platform for ex-
changing institutional thought with Western Europe and the world. Re-
gional studies are usually not based on hard data, and their output rarely 
refers to uniform and comparable data sources. The reason, as indicated in 
literature, is the inability to carry out comparative studies, because in these 
very regions of Ukraine, different specificities of economic systems and so-
cial institutions have been created. Aggregated data by region, on the other 
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hand, is not subject to consistent econometric modeling (Duma 2017). It is 
given as effective methods of cognitive maps (Когнітивна карта, cognitive 
maps) which allow us to determine the distribution of the pulsation pro-
cess, but do not permit research of the evolution of the process itself (Vysh-
nevskyi, Dementiev 2010: 41–62; Duma 2017: 176). It has been noted that 
when simulating the evolution of the process of actual economic systems in 
Ukraine, there is a problem of time consistency and data inconsistency, and 
pulsation processes can have different delays for different model variables 
(Leontev, Ford 2012: 370–400).
In general, there is a substantial amount of literature on the Polish and 
Ukrainian economies, which enables us to conclude that there is a growing 
interest in this issue, and although the topic is not new, it is nevertheless the 
presentation of one more research perspective which can be both interesting 
and noteworthy for research purposes. A gravitational outlook is proposed 
in this book.
Many institutional documents from the first period of systemic transfor-
mation have been published in Poland (Gomułka 2013; Gomułka, Kowalik 
2011), as well as a general look at post-communism in Poland (Staniszkis 
2001). With regard to the Ukrainian economy, this type of literature is still 
lacking. However, scientific literature concerning the Polish transformation 
has been written in “waves”. The majority of works were published between 
1997 and 2000 and then 2011–2013; that is, the theme of the Polish transfor-
mation returns approximately every ten years to the area of interest of Pol-
ish academic research. No such pattern of “waves” has occurred regarding 
Ukraine. Foreign publications are usually the aftermath of literature and 
research published in Poland and Ukraine and are written mainly in English 
by Poles and Ukrainians, which also means that they are, in the majority, 
concurrent with Polish and Ukrainian views on this systemic transforma-
tion (Smalej 2016; Dolińska 2019; Fałkowski, Kurek 2019; Holubiak 2019; 
Kaźmierska 2019). A special issue of the “Qualitative Sociology Review” 
Vol 15 (2019) was published to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the 
transformation in Poland.
Studies of regional development in Poland, using quantitative methods, 
are quite well documented in the literature of the subject (see: Wisła, To-
karski 2016; Pastuszka, Tokarski 2017; Szczepaniak, Tokarski 2018), while 
in Ukraine, attention is called to the instability of the application of mathe-
matical and econometric models regarding the various regions of Ukraine. 
The unstable and fluid character of these regions is given as a barrier to 
mathematical and economic models; hence, the cognitive map model is 
proposed.
L. V. Duma writes directly:
The character of dynamics, pace and proportions of socio-economic 
indicators in Ukraine are largely under the influence of non- stationary 
conditions of operation. Some signs of non-stationary structure are 
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unstable macroeconomic processes in time, the difficulty of for- nor-
malizing their dynamics, an uncertain future etc. Ignoring these fea-
tures along with a lack of statistical data renders it impossible to make 
an evaluation, analysis and forecasting of the dynamics of these macro-
economic processes by classical methods. Therefore, this study aims at 
reviewing the nature and characteristics of the simulation for analyzing 
and forecasting the socio-economic development of the country. The 
results of the study have shown that the basis of such simulations are 
diagrams, a causality - cognitive map and study of the problem on the 
basis of a cognitive map is through the distribution of the pulsed pro-
cess. The authors have also analyzed a number of modern simulation 
(cognitive) models of regional development proposed in the research 
literature that demonstrate the use of this tool as the modeling of the 
dynamics of macroeconomic indicators and indicators of the local eco-
nomic and social development of the region (…) Applying pulse models 
can predict the development of specific situations in certain regions and 
make substantiated recommendations on measures of economic and 
social policy.
(Duma 2017: 78)
The proposed and implemented gravitational model in the book can be use-
ful for researching the various regions of Ukraine, and for conducting com-
parative studies.
1.3  The subject of this research and its specificity: 
Poland–Ukraine
Ukraine, as an independent state, was established on July 16, 1990, when 
the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (USRR) 
adopted a Declaration on State Sovereignty (Декларація про державний 
сувереренітет Украɯни). Ukraine became a successor to the USSR, which 
was part of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) from 1919 to 
1991. As part of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR, alongside the Belarusian 
SSR and the Russian SSR, was one of three Soviet republics that were a 
legal entity according to international law, were co-founders of the United 
Nations and a member of most UN specialized organizations (Osmańczyk 
1982; Wiszka 2007).
Polish statehood has a long history. The first historically confirmed date 
describing the history of Poland is 966, when Poland was baptized and be-
came a Christian state. In 1025, the Kingdom of Poland was established. 
In 1569, the Republic of Both Nations (Polish Commonwealth) was estab-
lished, which was one of the largest and most populous countries on the map 
of 16th- and 17th-century Europe. The Republic ceased to exist as a result 
of the Third Partition of Poland, in 1795, when its territory was divided 
between Prussia, Russia and Austria. Poland regained its independence in 
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1918, immediately after World War I. After World War II, from 1945 to 1989, 
it functioned as a satellite state of the USSR under the name of the Polish 
People’s Republic (Polish: Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, PRL).
The period of communism analyzed in both countries – Poland and 
Ukraine – was a command-control economy with a socialist doctrine but 
in Poland for a considerably shorter period (since 1946) and in a much more 
mild form than in the USSR, while this system lasted in Ukraine for 25 more 
years (from 1921 to 1991) and in a more repressive form.
Unlike its Polish counterpart, modern Ukrainian statehood began to 
take shape at the end of the 1980s. The 20th century, within the framework 
of the political and economic system of the USSR, was characterized by full 
market control of the economy and of public life. However, Ukraine as a 
universally recognized name first appeared in the Middle Ages and signified 
the borderlands of various geographical regions. By the end of the 16th cen-
tury, the term “ukraine” was not official and only meant the “borderline” 
(“boundary line”, “state frontier”) of individual lands under the control of 
different countries. The official name “Ukraine” was first used in 1590 in the 
title of the Sejm (Polish parliament) Constitution of the Republic (Konop-
czyński 1999: 211).
The Ukrainian SSR had quite a lot of freedom within the Soviet Union 
itself compared to other soviet republics, such as Tajikistan, Georgia and 
Moldova, but much less than Poland, during the timeframe of the opera-
tion of the PRL (Polish People’s Republic). The processes of institutional 
change in Poland and Ukraine took place at the same time, but with a dif-
ferent intensity, and went in different directions. In Ukraine in 1989, the 
social organization of the People’s Movement of Ukraine (Народний Рух 
Украɯни), formed by Ukrainian writers and dissidents, transformed into a 
political party with an independence program and in the elections of 1989 
scored 9.4%, thereby occupying second place in the local one-chamber par-
liament, the Supreme Council of Ukraine (Верховна Рада Украɯни), gain-
ing a total of about 50 seats. The LRU received the highest support in the 
regions of western Ukraine bordering on Poland. New forms of the state’s 
institutional system were created by communist activists in weak opposi-
tion to Ukrainian writers and dissidents. In the new formula of the nascent 
Ukrainian state, old communist activists introduced modernized forms of 
old and proven institutions from the soviet era; however, rejecting forms of 
total state control, the substantive power of communicating the principles 
of the functioning of a free state and its economy among Ukrainian writers 
and journalists was not significant.
In Poland, the transformation of the regime began after 1981, when under 
pressure from a wave of strikes and social protests, martial law was declared, 
after which the regime was eliminated and the Round Table meetings took 
place and elections were held in June 1989. As in Ukraine, Polish dissidents, 
journalists and writers were in opposition against the old communist insti-
tutions. However, the main role in political change and negotiations was 
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played by the trade union “Solidarity”, whose members were industrial 
workers and had a convincing instrument known, since the 1980s, as the 
general strike whereby they were able to paralyze the country and stop all 
production in state-run factories. It would be difficult to compare the power 
of the opposition in Poland and Ukraine.
In both countries, in general, all the transformations commenced in the 
1990s and were focused on the creation of a free market, civil society and 
democratization. The redevelopment of the state has covered almost all 
spheres of social life, including systemic transformation (implementation of 
parliamentary institutions and procedures), economic transformation (cre-
ation of a free market based on private property), social transformation (so-
cial change, acceptance of new rules of social life), as well as privatization in 
Ukraine, and privatization and reprivatization in Poland. In Ukraine, this 
transformation had no “shock therapy”, but in Poland, due to the huge debt 
of the state and the requirements of financial institutions associated with the 
so-called London and Paris clubs, this period took on some of the charac-
teristics of “shock therapy”, resulting in a high-speed transformation.
Ukraine adopted a new Constitution (Конституція Украɯни) on June 
28, 1996, Poland on April 2, 1997. Ukraine has established a presidential- 
parliamentary system of government (Constitution of Ukraine 1996) and 
a welfare state-oriented economy (Constitution of Ukraine 1996: Article 
13). Poland, on the other hand, has adopted a welfare state-oriented market 
economy by enshrining in Article 10(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1250/2003 
and article 20 of the Polish Constitution of 7 April 1997, that the welfare 
state-market economy is based on freedom of economic activity, private 
property and solidarity, dialogue and cooperation of social partners, and 
these pillars forms the basis of the economic system of the Republic of 
 Poland (Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Article 20). Constitutional 
records coincide, but for the functioning of the state and society, the welfare 
state-oriented economy (Ukraine) and the welfare state-market economy 
based on the freedom of economic activity (Poland) gave rise to the crea-
tion of completely different institutions and behavior during this economic 
transformation; this situation has lasted for nearly three decades, with sig-
nificantly different economic results.
Literature on the subject points out that the Constitution of Ukraine was 
written very broadly, and the exercising of the rights arising thereof was 
to a great extent impossible. In both countries, all political forces with a 
particularly large-scale involvement of the media participated in writing 
the constitution. These parties were post-communist in origin, whereas in 
Poland the Solidarity workers’ movement, whose symbol was Lech Walesa, 
elected him as the first president of an independent Poland (1990–1995). 
In Poland, Lech Walesa was an authority, a leading opposition politician 
during the communist period, co-founder and first chairman of the In-
dependent Self-governing Trade Union “Solidarity” (Polish: Niezależny 
Samorządny Związek Zawodowy “Solidarność”), and winner of the Nobel 
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Peace Prize in 1983, with strong national and foreign support. As presi-
dent, Walesa effectively blocked any moves by those who nurtured nostal-
gia for communism, and had full public support. Ukraine did not possess 
such a leader. The first President of Ukraine was Leonid Kravchuk (Леонід 
Кравчук) (1991–1994), who helped maintain communism in the USSR dur-
ing the soviet period. From 1958, he was a member of the CPSU (Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union). He had worked in the communist party’s 
department of propaganda since the 1980s. In the 20th century he was a 
member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. 
From 1988 to 1990 he served as head of the propaganda department and II 
secretary of the Central Committee, in 1989 he became a deputy member, 
and in 1990 he was a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. As president, he did not modify 
political customs which had been for him, de rigueur. While Walesa broke 
all formal and informal institutions which had arisen in communist Poland, 
in Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk (Леонід Кравчук) attempted to preserve these 
institutions by any means possible. This was significant since the constitu-
tions in both Poland and Ukraine delineated the authority of the highest 
state officials in a broad manner, without establishing the specific limits 
of these powers, which in later years resulted in an overlapping not only of 
jurisdictions and political friction between the president, parliament and 
federal government but also of the courts and local government administra-
tion units in both Poland and Ukraine. In Poland, regional self-government 
was encouraged, whereas in Ukraine, attempts were undertaken to stifle 
this local self-government.
The processes of narrowing and expanding competence were ameliorated 
in Ukraine throughout this period (from 1990 to 2019), but especially in 
the amendment of the constitution, developed by President Leonid Kuchma 
and adopted in 2004 with insufficient votes of MPs in parliament (294 voted 
for, with a required minimum of 300), alternating the adoption of the system 
from one which was on the parliamentary-presidential border to an “oligar-
chization” of power, while in Poland this became especially evident only 
in 2014–2020, when the Law and Justice (Polish: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) 
party expropriated the competence of a majority of the institutions of the 
state and transformed them into organs of (their) political party, without 
taking into consideration the rule of law, minimal electoral thresholds or 
the credibility which the voters held in parliament
In Ukraine, it was difficult to implement the provisions in the Constitu-
tion whereby Ukraine was to be a democratic state with a rule of law, in 
which society has an extensive social safety net; however, in Poland it has be-
come difficult to maintain those provisions imposing an obligation of social 
solidarity. In Poland, social solidarity materialized regarding groups of ex-
treme poverty with the 500+ package for large families, and the 13 monthly 
pension payments, which tackled the problem of income inequality, only in 
principle, since 2016.
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Poland has been part of the European Union since May 1, 2004, under 
the Accession Treaty signed on April 16, 2003. In addition, the agreement 
between Ukraine and the European Union establishing a more profound 
and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA), which is the most important 
and largest part of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the 
EU, was signed in June 2014, and entered into force on January 1, 2016. 
Under the agreement, Ukraine has pledged to secure the free movement of 
capital and create a level playing field for companies from EU countries, 
which has de facto led to the break-up of free trade agreements with Rus-
sia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (ros. Содружество 
Независимых Государств).
In 2013, Ukraine’s attempt to strengthen ties with the EU led to a Russian- 
Ukrainian trade and energy war. Ukraine has not yet become a member of the 
European Union, and the withdrawal of public authorities from an accession 
treaty to the EU in 2013 led to the tragic events known as the  Euromaidan 
(Ukrainian: Євромайдан), which began in Kyiv on  November 21, 2013. The 
reason for the Euromaidan was precisely the failure to sign the Association 
agreement between Ukraine and the European Union by President Viktor 
Yanukovych, who served from 2010 to 2014 and after the Euromaidan, was 
forced to flee to Russia.
Today’s institutional circumstances of the functioning of the Ukrainian 
economy are mainly due to its historical dependence, habits and social cus-
toms and the well-worn practices of exerting state power. For Ukraine today, 
the most important factor is the loss of territorial unity and the state’s com-
munication network, infrastructure and the breakdown of energy networks 
and other sectors of the economy, as well as the transfer of technology.
As regards the functioning of administrative units in Ukraine, Article 
10(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1250/1999 shall be adopted in accordance with 
the procedure laid down in Article 132 of the Constitution which defines 
the territorial structure of the state based on the principles of unity and 
territorial integrity, composed of: The Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
(Ukrainian: Автономна Республіка Крим), oblasti (області), districts 
(райони), cities (міста), districts in cities (райони в містах), rural areas 
(селища) and villages (села) (Official interpretation of Article 133 of the 
Constitution). The cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol have been awarded a spe-
cial status, as will be referred to later in this chapter. The military conflict 
in eastern Ukraine between pro-Russian separatists from eastern Ukraine, 
supported by the Russian Federation and forces loyal to the legitimate au-
thorities of Ukraine. Led to new administrative map. The conflict led to 
self-proclation of The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR or DNR; Russian: 
Донецкая Народная Республика) and The Luhansk People’s Republic (al-
ternatively spelled as Luhansk People’s Republic; Ukrainian: Луганська 
Народна Республіка), thereby severing political and economic relations 
with Ukraine for Russia, and also to Russia’s annexation of Crimea by us-
ing her armed forces in 2014.
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Formally, the territory of Ukraine is still divided into 24 circuits (Ukr. 
Область, Oblast), separated cities (Kyiv and Sevastopol) and one autono-
mous republic (Autonomous Republic of Crimea); in row II, Ukraine is di-
vided into 490 districts (ukr. Pайон, rayon) and 185 cities separated from 
the districts (u. місто обласного значення – misto oblasnoho znachennia). 
In March 2014, Sevastopol and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea were 
unilaterally incorporated into Russia under a provision of the Verkhovnaya 
Rada Avtonomnoy Respubliki Krym (Postanovleniye ot 17 marta 2014 goda 
№ 1745–6/14 O nezavisimosti Kryma); (Verkhovnaya Council avtonomnoy 
Respubliki Crimea, Postanovleniye ot 17 marta 2014 goda No 1745–6/14 
About the Autonomy of Crimea). However, in Ukraine and in the interna-
tional community, these regions are still considered to be a part of Ukraine. 
It is worth pointing out that Crimea was transferred to Ukraine by Russia 
in 1954 (Order of the USSR of 26.04.1954 O peredache crimea oblasti and 
sostava RSFSR v sostav Ukrainskoy SSR).
The districts in Ukraine are divided into councils: rural (two types: 
селищна рада – selishchna rada and сільська рада – sils’ka rada), and dis-
trict and urban councils.
In Poland, the country’s new territorial division was carried out on Jan-
uary 1, 1999, on the basis of a three-stage establishment of local authorities 
(regions, counties and municipalities (powiats)). Level I units are com-
posed of 16 provinces, Level II units 380 districts and Level III units 2477 
municipalities.
The general principles of the functioning of local authorities enshrined 
in the Constitution were developed in Ukraine by the Law of 24 April 1997, 
which repeats many provisions of Ukraine’s ratified European Charter of 
Territorial Self-government from November 1996. In Poland, in turn, only 
part of the local and regional tasks are carried out by governmental agen-
cies, which directly (hierarchically) are subject to the Council of Ministers, 
the Prime Minister or individual ministers. Today, in an increasingly cen-
tralized Poland, only that part of the administrative tasks, which is not of 
national importance, is carried out by the local government.
While territorial units are easily comparable in Poland, in Ukraine it 
is considerably more difficult. The dynamics, pace and proportions of 
Ukraine’s economic indicators are largely influenced by unstable conditions 
for the functioning of regions and the market, which renders an analysis 
and proper forecasting of the dynamics of macroeconomic processes for 
Ukraine by classical methods, and especially in some regions, impossible 
(Duma 2017: 174). Even without the fear of separatist regions, literature on 
the subject draws attention to the functioning of the following five differ-
ent regional systems (five classes of regions) in Ukraine based on modeling 
principles:
1  subsidized by the State with an internal potential for targeted changes;
2  chronically depressive, virtually devoid of economic potential;
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3   developed, export-oriented;
4  isolated, mainly based on import substitution strategies;
5  shadow (тіньові), whose development is determined by factors not con-
trolled by the structures of state power (see Duma 2017: 174–178).
In Ukraine, it is recommended to explore the economy in terms of survival, 
profit, earnings per share, return on investment (total or shareholders), vol-
ume of sales, growth (in sales, number of employees, capital employed or 
profit), efficiency, productivity (i.e., output per unit of some input), market 
position, product quality, product leadership, employee attitudes, employee 
morale and job satisfaction, accident rates, absenteeism and labor turnover, 
posture (i.e., ability to adapt to changing circumstances), social responsibil-
ity, and the most important points are:
1  profitability; 
2  market position; 
3  productivity
4  product leadership
5  personnel development
6  employee attitudes
7  public responsibility
8  balance between long-run and short-run goals 
(see: Emmanuel et al. 1990: 33–34; Duma 2017).
The entire area of post-Soviet countries is characterized by subsidized re-
gions, chronically depressive and shadow regions, forgotten by state au-
thorities, or which conduct economic development independently of formal 
authorities, or are subordinated to large clans of the oligarchies. Duma and 
Dement’yev write that the state government in Ukraine is incapable of di-
rectly influencing the institutions, the size of investments, social programs, 
the size of the money supply or tax rates and tax collection, in general, in 
each and every region (Dement’yev, Vyshnevskyi 2010; Duma 2017: 174).
In the case of subsidized regions, there is a decrease in production and an 
increase in external development factors; however, they are unable to fill the 
budget. Spending is increasing and industrial production is insignificant, 
while social programs are also inefficient.
In chronically depressed regions, there is a lack of practical economic 
potential. Production is low and the standard of living is also low, leading 
to the need to build external development factors, not always targeted to 
the interior of the country, but often outside its borders (Russia, Belarus, 
Poland, Turkey).
In crisis-affected regions, physical growth in production does not lead to 
an acceleration of technological progress.
External sources of development are weakening with increased produc-
tion costs, tax rates and macroeconomic risks, and this, in turn, promotes 
Institutional conditions 15
an increase in shadow structures. Investment is declining in shadow regions, 
and the region’s fiscal budget is a facade. A general feature in Ukraine is that 
companies do not have sufficient resources for innovation and development, 
and business spending on research and development is comparable, if not 
worse, than state spending, for activities regarding the maintenance of polit-
ical parties Dement’yev, Vishnevskiy 2010: 82). A more extensive explication 
of this problem is contained in Chapter 2.
In Poland, European Union support programs function in the regions, 
based on a subsidization of the sustainable development of the poorest re-
gions of the European Union.
1.4 Powerful institutions: oligarchy and network
In the transforming economies of Poland and Ukraine, exceptionally pow-
erful informal and formal institutions arose – informal, because they have 
never formally demonstrated their structure or principles of action or the 
values they are guided by, and formal, because they could usually be identi-
fied by name recognition, as the names of these companies oftentimes were 
combined with the names of politicians or businessmen. In Poland, these 
groups are not uniformly defined, whereas in Ukraine they are usually re-
ferred to by the name of their oligarchy or clan.
Oligarchies, as institutionally informal groups, were established on the 
basis of those who formally served in the soviet military or police, who 
worked “under cover” or with the quiet participation of politicians and the 
newly established security services, and they are characterized by an instru-
mental treatment of the state and society, and therefore a criminalization of 
the public sphere. In connection with these institutions, there were also insti-
tutional features of political corruption connected with these organizations, 
which fostered a lack of respect for the law, an erosion of social values and, 
most importantly, an undermining of social trust in political power from 
the public as a whole. The institutions described above were most exposed 
during the period of privatization and (re)privatization, which in Ukraine 
was conducted in one of the worst manners conceivable, the so-called mass 
privatization (coupon), which in terms of social justice was terrible, as it, on 
the one hand, allowed state property to be gradually expropriated by the 
former communist authorities, the former police and military (the KGB in 
Ukraine) and, on the other hand, permitted those criminal spheres associ-
ated with them to penetrate the state apparatus (Kolodii 2010; Nikulin 2012; 
Dolbneva 2019). In Poland, privatization was a priority for state policy, but 
no comprehensive solution to the problem of reprivatization was under-
taken. Since the fall of the PRL (Polish Peoples’ Republic), reprivatization 
has been carried out on the basis of administrative decisions and judgments. 
However, this applies only to cases where the acquisition of property was 
unlawful (e.g., lack of a legal basis or crossing the nationalization limits). 
In Poland, this has resulted in numerous social conflicts and a resort to 
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extra-legal recovery methods, as well as to the unlawful acquisition of real 
estate. Poland remains the only country of the former Soviet bloc that has 
not systematically settled the subject of compensation for private property 
confiscated by the communist system. Often, huge estates find their way 
into “unknown” hands. Social injustice is facilitated by the lack of clearly 
written provisions in the criminal codes in both Poland and Ukraine, and in 
particular regarding bribery (divesting), that is, the acceptance of material 
benefits in connection with someone’s fulfilling his public function or dis-
crepancies concerning privatization (reprivatization).
In both Poland and Ukraine, groups related to the ambiguity of reprivat-
ization have been created (Miszewski 2001; Nikulin 2012; Dolbneva 2019). 
From the level of ordinary awareness of the “oligarch” is someone who pos-
sesses a lot of capital, obtained in a manner which is not in accordance with 
the law, and has considerable political influence. The spoils are allocated 
among a chosen circle of people close to those in power, who act only in 
their own interests with the support of organized groups of people, of which 
they are the rulers. In Ukraine, groups of this type are referred to as clan- 
oligarchical, and relations formed in these groups are patronal-clientele. In 
this manner, both informal groups and officially registered associations, 
parties and even unions and parliamentary factions may be established. Oli-
garchy also appears where a specific financial and industrial group controls 
entire manufacturing industries together with the decision-making process of 
the state; that is, it becomes a financial-industrial-political group (Dolzhen-
kov 2000, 2002). In Poland, one refers rather to a group of network links. In 
both Poland and Ukraine, overt organized, special interest groups are of 
little importance (see: Lisnichuk 2002). There are, however, many types of 
pressure groups that operate in the shadows, and the four types of possible 
dysfunctional consequences from the activities of such pressure groups are 
(1) social protectionism (i.e., the tendency of groups to demand the preser-
vation of positions and rights); (2) stagnations in management when govern-
ment actions and initiatives are blocked; (3) denying collective discipline (i.e., 
when each group seeks to shift the burden of national expenditure to other 
groups); (4) changes in the balance of power, where the equality of power 
between different regions can be overturned, since each pressure group pro-
vides an unequal means of influence (Balabayeva 2015: 221).
The main areas of influence of these forces on governments are:
• influence on the government and making political decisions for them,
• influence on parties that control power and on their political decisions,
• influence on public opinion, influencing those in power and their polit-
ical decisions (mainly by concentrating the mass media in their hands) 
(Teleshun, Reyterovych 2008).
The principles arising from state policy on restructuring the economy were 
and are still unclear in Poland and Ukraine, in particular those entrusted 
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specifically for this purpose by politicians and relegated by politicians to 
agencies which in many cases have been allotted the powers of ministries. 
Numerous agencies have also received supervision regarding important 
processes for the economy. The multiplicity of such institutions and the 
transparency of legal regulations on the principles of their functioning al-
low us to pose a legitimate question even about their ordinary economic 
rationality, especially since they are quasi-market institutions operating in 
a live economic framework on an equal basis with the other participants 
of the market game, and partly supported by staff and financed by certain 
state structures or by an oligarchy or by a network. In the context of the 
current role of the state in the economic system, it seems essential to bear in 
mind that state officials who are directors of state-owned enterprises and, 
as may be assumed, are police/intelligence officers, and not necessarily from 
the highest level of power, would ever initiate a process of self-expropriation 
(Zalewa 2008: 114–115). The empowerment of the former communist elites 
is an institutionalized political process that over time has evolved into the 
empowerment of political elites in Poland regardless of political provenance 
(Jarosz 2004: 44), and in Ukraine according to regional clans and a trans- 
regional oligarchy (Szapowałenko 2010).
Countries have been created within a country with a network structure, 
whereby a group of people connected by a common interest, having a com-
mon purpose, be they a party or social and business links, are a fundamental 
element of the network (Staniszkis 2001: 94). The activities of these structures 
are also influenced by the highest authorities in the state (the president, for 
example, approves a specific person as chairman of the board of a large com-
pany, although his impact on the economic life of the country in terms of the 
system is constitutionally of minor significance). It seems, writes Zaza, that 
for the effectiveness of the economic system it is not important which party 
dominates the business-political system. More important is the progressive 
encapsulation of systems that foster the patronage-client system, with the 
patron having certain goods or leverage, and the customer is an entity who 
desires to obtain a profit through a specific transaction. It was in this way 
that the institution of political and economic clientele was created in Poland 
and Ukraine. The public interest, in theory, is supposed to be protected by 
the state. Thanks to state functionaries however, the state has been replaced 
by the sum of the interests of the members of a given structure – that is, oli-
garchy, clan, etc. (Gadowska 2002; Zalewa 2008: 117–118) – which strongly 
distorts the functioning of the political and economic mechanisms of de-
mocracy and the free market. The main conflicts and problems of individual 
groups of the network and oligarchical-clan are concentrated around those 
who will be the first to master a given segment (market) that will take over 
its character and how it is organized, all the while with shrinking resources 
at the disposal of the networks, oligarchies and clans.
There has also been a rather limited political participation and legitimi-
zation for at least ten years, by both Poles (Sobkowiak 2008) and Ukrainians 
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(Bortnikow 2010), which is caused by a lack of social faith in the functioning 
of democracy and a negative attitude towards politicians in general. In Po-
land, in the only national poll of this type, conducted in 2003, 74% of those 
surveyed said that politicians are dishonest, 76% that they were not credible 
and 82% that politicians cared only about their own interests, constitute a 
unified clique (network), linked to many common interests and were engaged 
in “various types of economic scandals” (44%) (CBOS 2003). A similar type 
of survey has yet to be carried out in Ukraine. It can only be assumed that 
the above-mentioned indicators are similar or even higher in Ukraine. In 
both Poland and Ukraine, the elections of the highest authorities are only 
the ritual of a new, emerging arrangement from a network of associations 
and of clan-oligarchic structures. Based on arbitrariness, an asymmetry of 
economic magnitude was established in Ukraine, which means that there is 
a surplus of power among some people and economic structures and a lack 
of power in others (Dement’yev, Vishnevskiy 2010: 89), which also inter-
feres with the influx of foreign investment (Nosova 2012: 14–20). In Poland, 
these problems are perhaps not quite as magnified, but they are of a similar 
nature.
The period of the Orange Revolution (2004–2010) in Ukraine is described 
as “the initial stage of an anti-oligarchical struggle to preserve the direction 
of democratic development” (Kolodii 2010: 35). During this period, there 
was an institutional expansion of civil liberties, but there was also a con-
tinuing crisis of political power that had institutional characteristics. The 
effectiveness of institutional functioning (institutional performance) was di-
minishing, the indeterminacy of the powers and responsibility of these insti-
tutions had also increased, while citizens had a sense of a lack of real power 
and of the volatility of developments. The political life was overwhelmed 
with chaos and permeated with elements of anarchy, and on the other hand, 
with neo-patrimonial relations and the aspirations of influential political 
and business leaders to usurp power. In both Poland and Ukraine, manip-
ulative democracy is growing to a greater extent than before, and there is 
no one fighting for true democracy (Kolodii 2010: 35). It may be affirmed 
that one of the causes of this situation is the passive attitude of society. In 
Ukraine, for example, protests during the Orange Revolution (in 2004), Eu-
romaidan (in 2013), or the numerous protests in Poland (from 2015 to 2020) 
mobilized many people, but the vast majority of citizens approached them 
and the values they represented, as something foreign which, only intro-
duced unnecessary chaos in the state. Poles felt the mechanisms of manipu-
lative democracy in 2015–2019, under the rule of the Law and Justice party, 
a national-conservative, Christian and right-wing populist political organ-
ization in Poland. During this period, the neo-patrimonial relations and 
aspirations of influential leaders in politics, to usurp power, were intensified 
in Poland. The opposition was weak and fragmented, while that element of 
society which was protesting heretofore was exhausted. Nearly 50% of Pol-
ish society supported the authoritarian actions of the Law and Justice party, 
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and thus expresses a need to retreat from the principles of democracy. In 
both countries, institutions of irresponsible social pluralism and the institu-
tions affirming an undemocratic regime were established (Carothers 1999: 
160–170; Carothers Th., de Gramont, D. 2013; Carothers, O’Donohue 2019).
Legislative assistance mainly consisted of programs for expanding the 
capacity of legislators and legislative staff, physical infrastructure improve-
ment and support for watchdog NGOs and the media (Carothers 1999, 177–
187). Expanding the capacity of legislators and legislative staffers involved 
training on the essence of democratic governance and its methods. Support 
for infrastructure, such as libraries and office equipment, is also necessary. 
Assistance for NGOs and the media ensures their watchdog function to 
encourage transparency and accountability in legislative bodies (Ichihara 
2017). Such an infrastructure has not been created in Ukraine.
In Ukraine, separatism took over the Crimea and eastern Ukraine on 
April 6, 2014, when the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (Донецкая 
Народная Республика) was proclaimed, and on April 27, 2014, the self- 
proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic (Луганская Народная Республика)’ 
was created, while in Poland “separatism” appears via an “internal” isola-
tion from the problems of the state and society, an “internal exile”, which 
has become especially evident in the last ten years.
Both Poland and Ukraine have adopted formal institutional arrange-
ments, which are largely at odds with informal institutions, that is, social 
customs, habits or established principles of social coexistence. What is im-
portant for one nation and less important for another was not discussed 
when establishing constitutional or state regulations, which resulted in large 
social groups being systematically excluded from the decision-making pro-
cess. In Ukraine, there were national and linguistic minorities, as well as 
less educated workers’ and peasant masses, whereas in Poland, there were 
the poorly educated and heavily religious social masses of small towns and 
villages. Today, it turns out that in both countries, the voice of the excluded 
is beginning to play an increasingly important role, causing among “inter-
nal refugees” a general erosion of trust in the institutions of the state, on the 
one hand, and nationalism and real and “internal” separatism, on the other.
It should be noted that in Poland and Ukraine, the network and oligarchical- 
state system are relatively stable. Parliamentary and local government elections 
make certain reshufflings within the system, while the various structures are 
interested in its continuance, regardless of the political outcome. The weak-
ness of state institutions leads to, amongst others, a growing interest in the 
networks of formal and informal ties and links, which thereby become one of 
the main resources of the transformative institutions of the economies of both 
those countries mentioned here.
With regard to Poland, Z. Krasnodębski writes that
the greatest threat to democracy, to our freedom and our prosperity 
flows not from the underclass of the III Republic, but from its cultural, 
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political and economic center, not from the bottom, but from the very 
top, from the post-communist and partially from the post-Solidarity 
network of “oldboys”.
(Krasnodębski 2003)
P. Zalewa writes that
the non-market nature of the Polish economic system promotes the 
maintenance of individual network nodes…. In Poland, too many areas 
of economic life depend on the “kindness” on all levels of government 
officials and too much of the state’s money is used to finance specific 
elements of the state network.
(Zalewa 2008: 123–124)
Transparency International which publishes the “Corruption Perceptions 
Index” points out that in both Poland and Ukraine, social acceptance of 
political corruption is high (Ukraine Score 32/100; Rank 120/180, Poland 
Score 60/100; Rank 36/180 in 2018) (https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018).
Poland and Ukraine are not countries with a free market economy. There 
is quite a lot of economic freedom, but there is also, at the same time, a con-
siderable lack of economic freedom. In Poland and Ukraine, the state, to a 
high degree, controls the market and its components to a great extent and 
imposes a framework for economic activities on the individual.
The legal and tax systems are not transparent, and the checks on taxpayers 
and penalties imposed on them often have a political basis. The most strik-
ing fact of the Polish and Ukrainian economies are the ambiguous legal and 
tax rules regarding the form and scope of economic activity. Regulations 
are contradictory, and sometimes the huge penalties imposed by the state 
on the taxpayer are the result of an individual interpretation of the law. The 
taxpayer is helpless in the face of the heartless state-fiscal machine, which 
oftentimes functions under the political dictatorship of party leaders or of 
officials who occupy a certain position in the state bureaucracy, and often 
don’t act in the public interest, but rather in their own interest or in that 
of the network (clan) to which they belong. Both in Ukraine and Poland, 
the tax code is often created under the auspices of a particular taxpayer, 
oligarchy or other member of the network; however, this law does in fact 
become universally applicable. Often after meeting the needs of oligarchs 
and networks, certain laws are withdrawn or become dead letters, but they 
may be brought back to life if and when another oligarch or member of the 
network requires them. In Poland and Ukraine an institution called “legal 
privacy” exists. This is where a universally binding law is created for the 
private needs of those in power, or of people linked with them. Economic 
courts are not independent, and the taxpayer feels defenseless in face of the 
state apparatus. The institution of distrust in courts and state authorities, 
as well as the volatility and contradiction of the legislation passed, does not 
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allow for long-term business strategies, without increasing transaction costs 
(including the price of corruption) (see: Kondratowicz 2013).
In 2019, Poland directly violated the standards of the European Union, 
which is a condition for Poland’s membership in the organization, concern-
ing the independence of the judiciary, including the economic judiciary. In 
the Finsberg Report (1990), the independence of the courts is indicated as 
an important and fundamental guarantee of the protection of civil rights 
and obligations.
In recent years, the aspirations of political parties to express their own 
worldview and imposing a lifestyle on society have been growing in Po-
land and Ukraine, and the intensity and scope of the political discussions 
is little related to the decision-making political policies in this regard. The 
“weltanschauung” of the Polish political elite of the Law and Justice party 
is authoritarian- conservative, based on the worldview of the conserva-
tive Catholic Church in Poland (prohibition of abortion, even after rape, 
prohibition of civil partnerships, legal and systemic protection for priest- 
pedophiles and common criminals associated with the Catholic Church). 
In Ukraine, the worldview is still ethnocentrist-nationalist and statist, in 
accordance with the principle of the “state above all”.
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2018 lists Poland 
among countries with a “flawed democracy”, but Poland, according to the 
index, is only slightly above the threshold designating a group of countries 
called “hybrid regimes”, while Ukraine is in the “hybrid regime” group, just 
slightly below the limit separating “flawed democracy” countries, where 
Poland is (Democracy Index 2018, https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy- 
index, access date: 2020–01–10). The disparity in the index between the two 
countries is not statistically significant enough to recognize this difference 
as a lack of a possibility to compare Poland with Ukraine (Ukraine (5.69) 
in 2018, Poland (6.67) in 2018), at the border between these groups 6.00, for 
our research, nevertheless, this discrepancy should not be borne in mind. 
Douglas North points out that ideology not only plays an essential role in 
political choices (North 1990) but is also a key to those individual choices 
that affect economic performance. Individual perceptions concerning the 
fairness and justice of the rules of the game obviously affect performance 
(North 1992: 479).
In both Poland and Ukraine, difficulties are observed in the implemen-
tation of state-proposed institutional attitudes, but on the other hand there 
is less and less economic freedom, greater taxation of economic activities, 
difficulties with the bureaucracy and corruption. All these factors have an 
impact on regional development.
The institutional conditions of Poland and Ukraine should be looked at 
from different points of view and according to a variety of scales. In princi-
ple, it can be considered that these are areas which are alien to each other, 
and disproportionate to homogeneously accepted research paradigms. 
Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking authors, like Japan’s Masahiko Aoki 
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and Carothers, point out the complementary conditionality of corporate, 
political and social governance in Asian states, and those countries cre-
ated after the fall of the USSR and their relationship with the features of 
their respective national cultures (Aoki 2002; Bessonova 2006; Lipov 2012; 
Carothers, Th., O’Donohue 2019). However, the research mainly deals with 
Kazakhstan and Russia, but not with Ukraine. With regard to Ukraine, 
it indicates that it has a multivariant structure of an institutional order of 
socio-political and corporate governance. There is one type of institutional 
structure in eastern Ukraine, another in the central part of the country and 
yet another in western Ukraine. It is even accepted that, indeed, this mul-
tivariant structure may have been the basis of the separatist movements, 
resulting from the fear of an unknown institutional order, put forward by 
the European Union or in the absence of EU acceptance, the institutional 
conditions of the Asian-post-Soviet structure in the countries formed after 
the fall of the USSR.
It can be concluded that three institutional and organizational cultures – 
acceptable, observed and implemented – clash in Poland and Ukraine. An 
acceptable order is the old post-Soviet order in the process of transforma-
tion and the quest for a new order. An observed order is an order which 
should be pursued but it has not been implemented. It could be an order of 
the new member states of the EU or an order of authoritarian states such as 
Russia, Belarus, etc. Once this order has been implemented, this is the kind 
that penetrates into the system in a regulated form, for example, the associa-
tion treaties with the EU, or on the basis of institutional solutions developed 
by other countries, such as in the case of Poland, by Turkey or Hungary, and 
in the instance of Ukraine, by Russia. It should be noted that the system of 
Soviet countries has been in place, at least since the 1980s, and the desira-
bility of the culture of the organizational order of the countries of Southeast 
Asia has appealingly permeated other countries, is attractively intersects, 
and on the other hand the culture of the social economy and institutional 
governance characteristic of the transaction culture of post- Ottoman states 
(mainly Turkey, Azerbaijan in the context of the order found in Iraq and 
Iran), and the least understandable in the post-Soviet countries, including 
Ukraine, is the so-called “European order”, which, in fact, has been ex-
amined, only since the 1990s within the confines of its synergies. In many 
respects, after all, in Ukraine and Poland, this order is still more declaratory 
than implemented.
The source of this contradiction lies in the very human way of thinking – 
abstract, symbolic and above all in the diverse and multivariant perception 
of the world. In Poland and Ukraine, only people who have lived and worked 
for several years in other countries can accept this multivariant world, but 
these people also create the broad depths of differences between those who 
perceive the world solely on the basis of old, traditional values (in Poland 
clericalism and networks, in Ukraine a welfare state and oligarchy) and the 
newly acquired features of individualism versus those of collectivism.
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As part of these institutional circumstances, habits, and socially worn out 
values, mankind is developing rational-logical thinking and creating its own 
cognitive alternative. Ultimately, priorities which have been established in-
stitutionally can only arise at a stage when society has attained an economic 
and political modernization, and the completion of this process may take 
several generations. It does not occur overnight. These are long-term pro-
cesses, against which there is also strong social resistance. There is no, as 
M. Friedman and F. Hayek have already demonstrated, economic freedom 
without political and social freedom, and the latter must be liberated in man 
(Friedman 1962, 1993, 2002; Friedman, Friedman 1985; Hayek 1939, 1944, 
1960). It is just as difficult to exchange worn out thinking and behavior for 
thinking and behavior which are institutionally desirable. This confronta-
tion reflects the principle of unity in the struggle of opposites. Characteristic 
features of institutional behavior are the reactions and interactions, stimuli 
and conditional reactions – when some gain strength, others loose theirs. In 
terms of political and economic freedoms, A. Nowosad writes that the lines 
of political and economic freedom in Europe are negatively tilted towards 
the east of Europe (Nowosad 2016: 166–168).
The dialectic of alternative relationships (individualism/collectivism) or 
the principles of social orientation within the framework of the structural 
complementarity of socio-economic systems implies the existence of a cer-
tain state-geared social orientation, which can be called institutional. In 
such large, culturally and systemically multifaceted and, above all, young 
countries like modern Ukraine or Poland, this targeted social orientation 
is lacking something, as evidenced by a social and economic separatism, 
which in Kyiv led to the Maidan values, in the Donbas to separatism and 
civil war, and in Poland to “internal exile”, that is, to a society becoming 
separated from state affairs. Both countries are in the process of transfor-
mation, but that does not mean that they are headed in the same or even 
a similar direction. In Poland, there is a distinct retreat from the western 
values cherished in recent years towards a more well-known authoritarian 
(which does not mean for the better) direction; however, Ukraine seeks to re-
turn to a western direction while at the same time recognizing that western 
values are considered to be unachievable.
1.5 Summary
The nature of the inclusion in the institutional system of factors affecting 
the composition of institutional elements and their interaction, as well as 
the choice of the level of analysis of institutional complementarity, suggests 
an allocation of endogenous and exogenous complementarity of economic 
systems. Endogenic complementarity reflects the interaction of institu-
tions in an institutional system, subsystem, institution and exogenous – the 
quality of the institutional system’s interaction in an external environment, 
the elements of which may be both other institutional systems as well as 
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non-institutional economic phenomena that affect the functioning of the 
whole system. A key role in them is played by the system’s social, political, 
material, technological and environmental conditions.
Freedom House in 2019 ranked both Poland and Ukraine as free electoral 
democracies, but not as liberal ones. Poland was rated at 84/100, which ranks 
it among countries such as Argentina, Panama, Mongolia, and Ghana. In 
2018, Poland had six points of freedom less than Hungary (70) and the least 
among all European Union countries, and its new institutional solutions are 
moving towards remedies already known among the countries formed after 
the fall of the USSR: Ukraine (60), Kazakhstan (22) Russia (20). In Poland 
and Ukraine, the old system of thinking still exists, in a sense. O. Inshakov 
and D. Frolov opine that where the essence of the institution is not so much 
that of change, but a perpetuation of a way of doing things, is where a way 
of thinking emanates from. This is the level of relationship between form 
and function. The specificity of the institutional form is determined by its 
assigned function. In turn, the function depends on the institutional form 
(Kidrina 2001: 57–73; Inshakov, Frolov 2010: 67; Lipov 2012: 26–40). The 
presence of a functional gap is the starting point for the creation of a new 
institution and a new way of communicating institutional, political and eco-
nomic governance. Fundamental institutions in system-transforming econ-
omies are, on the one hand, new and not known and, on the other, deep, 
historically stable and constantly reproducing social relationships. Not only 
they ensure the integration of different types of societies, but they also cre-
ate their diversity. The function of the institution is the regulation of basic 
social subsystems, increasingly used for a channeled ideology, politics and 
the economy, both on a national and regional scale.
2.1 Introduction
In August 1991, Ukraine gained independence for the first time in its his-
tory. In October 1991, the first completely free parliamentary elections since 
World War II were held in Poland. Changes to the socio-economic system 
commenced (it can be said symbolically) in the same year in Poland and 
Ukraine, and they had a common denominator – the Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP) per capita1 in both countries was at the same level (9.5 thousand 
USD, PPP,2 in prices of the year 20113). However, it is difficult to find other 
similarities.
Poland, in the early 1990s, had at its disposal several basic relatively schol-
arly institutions: its own currency, a central bank, the spirit and pragmatism 
of the free market, private ownership, its own state budget, a solidarity- 
intellectual elite based on the working class and a dissident intelligentsia, 
capable of developing and implementing reforms with the help of US profes-
sionals, and access to relatively reliable statistical data.
Ukraine, after the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (herein-
after: the USSR), in the early 1990s, had no experience in building a market 
economy institution. Ukrainian society, brought up in a totalitarian sys-
tem, had to face the extremely difficult task of creating a market economy 
institution and implementing democratic principles of the rule of law in a 
post-Soviet sphere of socio-economic development. It never possessed the 
conditions essential for the creation of democratic institutions. It is worth 
recalling that it went directly from a system of authoritarian monarchy 
(tsardom-autocracy) in Tsarist Russia – after the February Revolution 
(Russian: Февральская революция, 1917) and the October Revolution (the 
October Revolution, officially known in Soviet historiography as the Great 
October Socialist Revolution, 1917), and the killing of Tsar Nikolai II Alex-
androvich Romanov (May 18 [O.S. 6 May], 1868–July 17,1918) and the entire 
Tsarist-Imperial family, Russia (followed by Russian-occupied Ukraine) 
immediately began to build a communist state. At a time when these events 
took place, it was a modern idea, and the doctrine of the state was to be 
based on social justice, the protection used by the owners of the workers’ 
́ ́
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capital, but quickly became the basis for one of the world’s most terrifying 
and repressive totalitarian regimes.
The dissolution of the USSR in the 1990s surprised many in the republics 
that were part of the USSR as well as the leaders of the USSR itself. For the 
leaders of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, however, it was no surprise because 
they initiated and signed the dissolution of the USSR, even though this was 
a surprise to many of the citizens of the USSR. Free market institutions, 
private property, financial markets and individual entrepreneurship were 
created from scratch, without the help of American specialists.
The many difficulties in institutional changes in Ukraine and Poland have 
been the subject of extensive research, and the basic literature on the subject 
has been presented in Chapter 1. The aim of this chapter is to provide a 
synthetic discussion of the process of ownership transformations in Poland 
and Ukraine, and the role of the capital market in the process of ownership 
between 1990 and 2015. The development of two selected institutions of the 
economy – private property and the capital market, a mechanism support-
ing privatization – is the main area of analysis in this chapter.
2.2 Privatization
The process of the ownership structure transformations in the Polish and 
Ukrainian economies is an important area of major institutional changes 
that took place in the sectors studied during the period of systemic tran-
sition from a communist regime, and a centrally planned economy, to a 
democratic regime and a free market. Both economies experienced nation-
alization at that time, a form of state-expropriation through which the state 
acquired the rights and ownership of land, businesses and capital under a 
legal act. Nationalization was carried out mainly without payment of com-
pensation for existing owners, or for a symbolic remuneration. In Bolshe-
vik Russia, in 1918, after the revolution, private property was nationalized 
without any compensation for private companies-owners, which was also 
extended to soviet-occupied Ukraine in the 1920s. (The opposite of nation-
alization is privatization.)
In Poland, nationalization was implemented in 1946 on the basis of the 
Law on the Acquisition of the Basic Branches of the National Economy 
(Act of 1946) and the Decree amending the Act, dated January 3, 1946, on 
the acquisition of the main branches of the national economy by the state. 
The processes of nationalization were accompanied, both in Poland and 
in Ukraine, by expropriation and confiscation, that is, a forced (without 
compensation or payment) deprivation of private property. These processes 
were conducted under the banner of building communism. The Commu-
nist Party manifesto announced that “communists can express their the-
ory in one phrase: ‘destruction of private property’” (знищенння приватної 
власності). In Ukraine, the processes of nationalization and expropriation 
began in 1919 and was a continuation of the process that began in Russia in 
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1918, on the basis of a decree of the High Council of the People’s Economy 
(Вища Рада Народного Господарства)4 and whose guidelines were sent to 
Ukraine, after its seizure by soviet troops, to the Ukrainian Council for 
The People’s Economy (Українська Рада Народного Господарства).5 In the 
process of nationalization and expropriation, the Ukrainian Council led 
the work of 45 faculties (відділ) with an extensive network of departments, 
management and centers and 10,720 regional units of active property col-
lection. It was an intensive process which resulted in many victims and was 
concluded in 1921.
After the collapse of the USSR, both in Poland and in Ukraine, one of the 
most important tasks of the transformation was the privatization of state-
owned enterprises and the privatization of property in general.
2.2.1 Privatization in Poland
Privatization in Poland, which began in 1990, was a number of diverse ac-
tions aimed at changing the ownership of private property while reducing 
state involvement in the economy (Bałtowski 2002: 17).
In July 1990, a law on the privatization of state-owned enterprises was 
passed in Poland6 – the basic legal act triggering the process of ownership 
transformation in the country.
In the following years, laws were passed: on the management of agricul-
tural property of the State Treasury,7 on the ownership transformations of 
certain state-owned enterprises of particular importance for the economy,8 
on national investment funds (NFI) and their privatization.9 These regula-
tions enabled proprietary transformations using three basic privatization 
approaches:
1  Capital privatization – consisting of the conversion of a state-owned 
enterprise into a single-owner company of the State Treasury and sub-
sequently its privatization by selling shares or stakes (often using the 
capital market) or transferring them to the NFI (National Investment 
Fund)
2  Privatization by liquidation – consisting of the liquidation of a state-
owned enterprise for the sale of its assets, transfer to a company or put-
ting it into non-gratuitous use
3  The inclusion of assets in the Agricultural Property Resources of 
the State Treasury – consisting of the liquidation of an agricultural 
enterprise and the acquisition of its assets by the Agricultural Prop-
erty Agency of the State Treasury (Agencja Własności Rolnej Skarbu 
Państwa)
Poland when initiating, in the early 1990s, the process of ownership trans-
formation encountered difficulties due to the lack of a bona fide register of 
state property.10 Most of the production assets were the responsibility of 
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49 provincial offices (Urząd Wojewódzki). The grassroots initiatives of the 
workers’ council or of the director of a state enterprise were not generally 
blocked by the provincial administration. For example, privatization in the 
Jelenia Góra region covered about 53% of state-owned enterprises by the 
end of 1995.
The most dynamic was the privatization processes in 1992 and 1994. In-
formation about ownership transformations at the provincial level did not 
always go to the State Treasury Ministry, and if it was transmitted, the 
ministry did not maintain any database on the original formal and legal 
status of privatized assets, the number of transformations carried out and 
many other detailed bits of information on the basis of which a credible, 
myth-free image of the dynamics of privatization in Poland could have 
been created. 
A much more reliable picture of the ownership transformation processes 
emerges from those ownership changes that took place directly under the 
supervision of the Ministry of the Treasury (Resort Skarbu Państwa). The 
Statistical Bulletin of the GUS (Biuletyn Statystyczny GUS) from 1991 re-
ports that there were 8,453 state-owned enterprises operating at the end of 
1990 in Poland. Between August 1, 1990, and the end of December 2015, 
6,003 state-owned enterprises were included in the ownership transforma-
tion programs. At the end of 2015, the number of state-owned enterprises 
was 41, including 19 active business enterprises.11
Between 1991 and 2015, 1,756 state-owned enterprises were commercial-
ized (29.3% of all converted enterprises), 2,308 applications for direct privat-
ization (38.4% of all converted enterprises) were commercialized, and 1,939 
state-owned enterprises were liquidated due to their poor financial condition 
under Article 19 of the Law on the privatization of state-owned enterprises 
in the absence of opposition from the Ministry of Property Transformation 
or the Ministry of the Treasury (32.3% of the total companies by at the end 
of 1990).12 The grand total was some 6,003 state-owned enterprises. In 2013, 
the GUS13 provided a specific number, that is, 7,555 entities that were cov-
ered by the privatization process between 1990 and 2012.
As a result of the commercialization of state-owned enterprises between 
1990 and 2012, 1,710 companies were established.14 Most companies were 
created in the Śląskie (306) and Mazowieckie (230) provinces, the least in 
the Lubuskie (35) and Warmińsko-Mazurskie (37). At the end of 2012, 1,047 
companies were operating as a result of commercialization (in 2011 – 1097), 
including 178 single-member Companies of the State Treasury (there were 
228 a year earlier).
At the end of 2015, the Minister of the State Treasury (Minister Skarbu 
Państwa) exercised ownership rights in 206 companies which were conduct-
ing economic activity (excluding 67 companies with only employee shares). 
The State Treasury’s share was 100% in 87 companies out of the 206 “active” 
operating companies, in 29 companies the State Treasury held a majority 
stake, and in 90 companies the State Treasury held a minority stake.
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In 217 companies, legal proceedings were conducted aimed at terminating 
their operations: in 73 companies the liquidation process was continuing, 
68 companies went bankrupt, and 76 companies were not in operation.15
The experience of 25 years of economic transformation allows an over-
all positive assessment of Polish privatization. Although the Ministry of 
the Treasury did not possess, in the 1990s, a structured list of state-owned 
 enterprises – that is, a register of its assets – the state’s share as owner of the 
means of production between 1990 and 2015 decreased radically, according 
to both MSP and GUS data.
A comparison of the course and effects of Polish privatization with the 
same process conducted in Ukraine indicates that the path adopted and 
the methods used were generally appropriate. Numerous empirical studies 
and GUS statistics indicate that privatized companies are better managed 
than state-owned companies, and thus achieve better financial results. The 
effectiveness of the various privatization paths in Poland varies. Privatiza-
tion with a strategic investor was the most effective method. The path of 
labor privatization was significantly less effective. By far the least effective 
method of ownership transformation turned out to be the NFI Programs – 
Programs of Universal Privatization (Stępniak-Kucharska 2015: 142).
One of the criticisms of the privatization process in Poland was the fact 
that the rules of privatization were not clearly defined, which led to numer-
ous abuses. The state retained the right to decide the fate of a company as 
a whole, that is to say, the liquidation, merger with another entity or its sale 
(Zalewa 2008: 67) and the fact of top-down privatization, not bottom-up, 
which resulted in an asymmetry of information among entities and trans-
formation for private purposes used by the previous communist mangers 
and, above all, by the directors of enterprises and employee’s councils. This 
process in the 1990s was commonly referred to as the “pillaging of the econ-
omy” because a company’s assets were sold for symbolic quotas – that is, 
pennies on the dollar, regardless of the condition of the company. It is worth 
mentioning that in Poland since 1987 the law has allowed the possibility 
of converting state-owned enterprises into commercial partnership compa-
nies, provided that the shareholders will be from various state organiza-
tions (Fedorowicz 1990: 25), and the Act of 24 February 1989 on certain 
conditions of consolidation of the national economy contained a general 
declaration as to the transfer to natural and legal persons of state-owned 
enterprises, for the purpose of doing business16 (Guzek 1994).
The institutional framework for the privatization process was being pre-
pared in Poland for at least five years before its formal initiation, by drafting 
the appropriate legislative acts. The laws were adopted under a specific recip-
ient, and the form of the companies created was called “nomenclature com-
panies”, since it was only former communist party directors who established 
and conducted private activities using state assets (Gomułka 2013; Długosz 
2014). It is also pointed out that for privatization purposes, a large number 
of institutions were established in Poland that functioned as companies and 
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had the powers of ministries and were not under any real public control, 
such as the Agricultural Market Agency, 1990–2017, in 2017, merged with 
the Agricultural Real Estate Agency and transformed into the National Ag-
ricultural Support Centre; The Agricultural Property Agency of the State 
Treasury (1991–2017; converted in 2003 into the Agricultural Real Estate 
Agency; the Military Real Estate Agency (2005, transformed into the Mili-
tary Property Agency in 2015); the State Coal Agency Joint Stock Company 
(1990, in 2003 converted into the Coal Company Joint Stock Corporation, in 
2016 acquired by the Polish Mining Group Joint Stock Company), etc. It is al-
ready clear from the names of the agencies that they can be segregated by the 
economic sectors in which the state has retained supervision, and their task 
was to carry out privatization. Today, they are among the largest companies 
in Poland. It is worth noting that the functions, tasks and competences of 
such enterprises with the competence of the ministries were created as com-
panies with public money, which is a characteristic of Polish privatization, 
although in Poland none of these network systems are officially referred to 
as an oligarchy. Nevertheless, these are networks of shadow systems, of old 
political arrangements and of state-policy- business-privatization links. The 
state apparatus has great legal, semi-legal and illegal capabilities in Poland 
to fight organized crime; however, the ministry- companies and their pri-
vatizations were never the subject of a criminal investigation conducted by 
the public prosecutor’s office. The Polish security services and the judiciary 
not only do not combat such phenomena, but are also interested in main-
taining and supporting them. “Protection” of the system according to the 
patron-client principle is a characteristic of the privatization era (see: Gad-
owska 2002; Jarosz 2004: 44; Zalewa 2008: 117).
2.2.2 Privatization in Ukraine
In 1991, Ukraine regained its independence and began to reform both the 
political and legal, as well as the economic systems. The dissolution of the 
Soviet Union led to the creation of more than a dozen independent states, 
resulting in the disintegration of dependencies within the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, including the dissolving of dependencies between for-
mer soviet republics and the businesses operating in their territory. One 
of the most important challenges – institutional changes – on the path to 
systemic and economic change has become the privatization of the state 
 sector – a key element of the socialist system.
The reference point for the proposed ownership transformations in 
Ukraine in the early 1990s was the experience of decentralizing the public 
sector of the economies of the Western European countries of the 1970s 
and 1980s. However, ownership changes in western European countries 
have taken place under the conditions of a structured and mature private 
property institution, while in Ukraine it was necessary to construct this 
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institution almost from scratch, by creating adequate legal bases and form-
ing the relevant institutions, a process which continues to this day.17
At the initial stage of the ownership transformation process – national 
privatization, based on the Law on the Privatization of State Property 
(1992) – the transfer of “property titles” to part of the state assets in the form 
of a new type of securities, that is, privatization coupons, was organized.
The main reasons were (1) the taking up of public and managerial 
functions in privatized companies by the former bureaucratic apparatus, 
(2) questionable valuations of companies intended for coupon privatization 
and (3) a profound pauperization of society. Under the conditions of hyper-
inflation, combined with the unpunctual payment of wages, the reprivatiza-
tion coupons were often exchanged in “currency kiosks” for an amount of 
money equal to the cost of three to four loaves of bread.
In 1995, in the industrial processing sector of Ukraine, where the pro-
cess of ownership transformation took place at the fastest pace, state-owned 
enterprises, nevertheless, continued to dominate. At the beginning of the 
ownership transformation process, they were estimated to be around 8,900 
companies, that is, approximately 70% of the total number of state-owned 
enterprises. By 1995, 3,701 companies had been commercialized; only one 
of them was completely privatized.18 In 1997, the classification of legal enti-
ties changed; hence, the existing organizational and legal forms in the early 
1990s and those in force after 1997 are quite difficult to compare.
In 1996, the Company register was created (Єдиний державний реєстр 
фізичних осіб-підприємців та громадських формувань – JPRPOU) – that 
is a system for collecting, accumulating and processing data on enterprises 
and organizations operating in all legally permitted forms of ownership. 
Since 1997, the process of ownership transformation has taken on a faster 
pace. It should be noted, however, that the consolidation of data sets con-
cerning corporate entities was not started until 1998, hence the lack of data 
for 1995. Since 1996, UKRSTAT has kept a record of data for all economic 
operators together, in one group, without distinguishing between forms of 
ownership in the manufacturing processing sector. The dynamics of changes 
in the number of economic operators according to different forms of owner-
ship between 2000 and 201519 are presented in Table 2.1.
The number of state-owned enterprises decreased significantly during 
the analysis period. In 2000, The State Property Fund of Ukraine (Фонд 
державного майна України, Fond derzhavnoho mayna Ukrayiny) re-
ported nearly 10,000 state-owned enterprises on its balance sheet. After 
15 years, this number has fallen to 4,042 companies. The increasing num-
ber of limited liability companies is explained by their attractive legal and 
business construction, commonly used in business activities in Ukraine. 
A very significant decrease in the number of public limited liability com-
panies between 2010 and 2015 can be explained by the mass closure due 
to the break-up of trade relations with the Russian Federation, and a 
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strong increase in the prices of Russian raw materials (2013–2014) used by 
Ukrainian industry.
In 2008, the Center for Economic Development (Центр економічного 
розвитку, Tsentr ekonomichnoho rozvytku) based in Kyiv conducted a ret-
rospective analysis of the effects of the privatization processes in Ukraine. 
During the timeframe considered, three main stages of the ownership trans-
formation process were identified. Stage one (1992–1994) was characterized 
by a slow pace of privatization and the gradual buyback of previously leased 
state property. Stage two was mass privatization using privatization coupons 
(1995–1998). At this stage, the securities trading market was established, 
while the base of state assets intended for privatization employing privatiza-
tion coupons was expanding. The main barriers to effective privatization at 
this stage were a low standard of living (hence the rapid resale of privatiza-
tion coupons), a dearth of knowledge on the rules of how a market economy 
functions and hyperinflation. The third phase, from 1999 to 2004, was char-
acterized by a decrease in the average state revenue from the sale of medium 
and large state property entities and a reduction in the sale of state-owned 
enterprises to strategic industrial investors (see Paskhaver et al. 2008: 85).
The last decade has seen the creation of large Ukrainian business groups 
with an agricultural, industrial and financial profile. This is linked to the 
formation of a new Ukrainian elite – representatives of “big business”, 
which use the intensive involvement of foreign capital by Ukrainian compa-
nies on the external market for their modernization and expansion. The last 
few years have manifested a marked increase in the value of direct foreign 
investment in Ukraine, but also of considerable Ukrainian capital invest-
ment abroad (see: Leonov, Zhuk 2005: 135; Andriychuk 2015: 12–22).
According to data from the State Property Fund of Ukraine (Фонд 
державного майна України, Fond derzhavnoho mayna Ukrayiny (SPFU), 
a central body of executive power with special status and being adminis-
tered by the Cabinet of Ukraine, in 1992–2017 more than 132,700 entities 
Table 2.1 N umber of economic entities in Ukraine between 2000 and 2015 
(in thousands)
Indicator 2000 2005 2010 201520
State sector
• State-owned enterprises 9.9 7.8 6.8 4.0
• Public utility … 16.5 16.0 11.5
Private sector
• Private companies (entrepreneurs) 175.9 2380 283.7 201.9
• Public limited liability companies 
(spółki akcyjne)
35.2 34.6 30.2 15.9
• Limited liability companies (spółki z o.o.) 198.1 302.9 418.1 453.9
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua.
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were privatized. Of these, 29,610 were state entities, and 103,090 were mu-
nicipal property facilities. The total budgetary revenue from the privati-
zation of state property during the analysis of ownership conversions was 
67  billion UAH (SPFU 2018).
Since 2017, there has been an online platform for the sale of small privat-
ization facilities https://prozorro.sale/ (ProZorro.Продажі). A mechanism 
has been put in place to block rogue entities from participating in the state 
property rental competition. Currently, 18,906 state-owned economic facil-
ities are leased (as of January 2018; SPFU 2018).
At the end of 2017, 3,893 state companies were registered in the SPFU and 
public utility companies numbered 11,640. The state has majority packages 
in approximately 500 capital companies (SPFU 2018). The issue of owner-
ship changes of large and strategic state-owned enterprises and an increase 
in the efficiency of the management of Ukraine’s agricultural property are 
still not resolved.
The current geopolitical situation and the declining average living stand-
ard create a social and economic situation and social sentiment reminiscent 
of those from 1995 to 1998, that is, the risk of selling off state and private as-
sets below their fair value, and are therefore not conducive to stabilization.
In general, any assessment of the current process in the ownership trans-
formation in Ukraine and its results is not unambiguous. Two opposing 
forces are clashing. On the one hand, a strong pro-market stimulus has 
been unleashed, which has contributed to a radical change in the political 
and economic system, including the construction of a private property sec-
tor from scratch, and the emergence of national production capital, which 
played a particularly positive role in ensuring a high pace of economic 
growth in the period of 2005–2008 (Chenash 2013: 55–60; Khoma, Kondak-
ova 2013: 280–286). On the other hand, the privatization methods employed, 
the lack of proper control over their course and corruption caused tensions 
in Ukraine’s social fabric. The gap between the narrow group of “winners” 
and a broad group of “losers” in the process of ownership transformation 
(Paskhaver et al. 2008) became one of the causes of the political crisis in 
the country – the Orange Revolution (Ukrainian: Помаранчева революція, 
Pomarancheva revolyutsiya) 2004 and the Euromaidan (Євромайдан, Yev-
romaidan) in 2013–2014.
2.3 T he capital market – a mechanism to support ownership 
transformation
Long-term finance capital is understood to be one of the tools of the eq-
uity path of ownership transformation and the mechanism for converting 
national savings into corporate sector investments. A mature and efficient 
capital market is also a mechanism: economic optimization and ration-
ality, trans-economic turnover and the financial supply for projects with 
above-average economic risks (new business models, new product solutions)
34 Svitlana Chugaievska et al.
The aim of this part of the chapter is to generally diagnose the potential of 
the Polish and Ukrainian equity and debt securities equity, as a mechanism 
used to increase the allocative and dynamic efficiency of the huge long-term 
capital finance required.
The following assumptions are made in the subsection: (1) a well- 
functioning and developed capital market contributes to economic growth 
and job creation, (2) companies present on the capital market as issuers of 
equity and/or debt securities are characterized by a higher than average in-
tensity in R&D activities, (3) a well-functioning and developed capital mar-
ket supports fair economic turnover.
The development of the Polish capital market is closely observed by Pol-
ish and Ukrainian economists (see: Madej 1998; Krasnov 2001; Arkhireyev 
2006; Harutyunyan 2017), and the results of its analysis in Poland were regu-
larly published in the journal Rynek Kapitałowy: miesięcznik analiz polskiego 
rynku kapitałowego (Capital Market: a monthly analysis of the Polish capital 
market, 1998–2008), and by the National Bank of Poland in recurring re-
ports entitled “The Financial Market in Poland” (1998–2018);21 in Ukraine 
in “Visnyk of the National Bank of Ukraine” (Вісник Національного банку 
України), since 1994.
2.3.1 The Polish capital market
Individual operating segments of the financial market have been developing 
in Poland since the early 1990s. The interbank market will be the first to 
develop the following segments: interbank deposits, treasury bills and cur-
rency exchange. In parallel with the interbank market, the market for equity 
and debt capital is developing within the market governed by securities trad-
ing. The main driving force behind the development of the equity market 
was privatization, while for the debt securities market, it was the issuing of 
treasury bonds.
The development of the financial capital market depends not only on eco-
nomic conditions but also on the quality of created institutions – i.e. the 
durability and efficiency of regulatory solutions resistant to the dynamics 
of changes in an economic environment. Capital market institutions in the 
1990s of the 20th century, just before accession to the European Commu-
nity, as well as during the period of full membership of the EU’s internal 
capital market, are characterized by high volatility.
The ratification of the Europe Agreement establishing an association be-
tween the Republic of Poland and the European Communities (1992)22 has 
necessitated a consistent alignment in the manner national institutions op-
erate, in comparison with those institutions already developed in nations 
within the European Community. In the 1990s, with regard to the capital 
market, significant changes in capital market regulations were observed. 
These activities were linked with the development of the internal market or 
from the single-currency zone within the European Community.
Ownership transformations 35
In 1999, the European Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) was adopted 
by the European Commission. In 2000, the European Council recognized 
it as an important part of the so-called Lisbon Strategy. According to the 
original assumptions, the majority of the actions taken under the FSAP re-
lated to the capital market and retail financial services. In the preceding 
period, as well as during the creation of the FSAP, these areas were the least 
integrated with the European financial market.
The following directives adopted by the European Parliament and the 
Council of the EU are among the most important capital market regula-
tions during this period: (1) regarding prospect uses (2003/71/EC), (2) re-
garding markets in financial instruments (Markets in Financial Instruments 
 Directive – MiFID; 2004/39/EC), and (3) regarding transparency and infor-
mation obligations (2004/109/EC). All these changes in EU capital market 
regulations are fully reflected in the Polish legal order, that is, in the 2005 
package of laws: (1) on the trading of financial instruments,23 (2) on the pub-
lic offer and conditions for the introduction of financial instruments into an 
organized trading venue and on public companies24 and (3) supervision of 
the capital market.25
Among European countries, the capital market in Poland is in tenth place 
(±2 places depending on the year) according to the criterion of the capitaliza-
tion of companies and the value of trading in shares.26 Europe’s biggest mar-
kets are currently Euronext with a market capitalization of nearly $4 trillion 
and the London Stock Exchange Group with a capitalization of $3.8 trillion 
at the end of 2018. The market value of listed companies on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange is about USD 160 billion, and the capitalization of the Ukrainian 
Stock Exchange (Українська біржа, Ukrayinska birzha) is 4.4  billion USD. 
Similar levels of capitalization are found in the Cyprus Stock Exchange 
($3.3 billion) and the Ljubljana Stock Exchange ($7.1 billion). At the end of 
2018, there were 854 companies listed in Warsaw and 86 in Kyiv.
In the EU, the level of individual capital markets development and their 
importance in the local economy varies greatly, which is best reflected in 
stock market capitalization, the number of listed companies or the ratio of 
capitalization of exchanges to GDP. In Poland, this relationship is about 
38%. By comparison, in the United States it is about 160%; around 150% in 
the UK; around 100% in France, Finland and Belgium; and less than 10% in 
Lithuania, Latvia, Cyprus and Slovakia. For Ukraine, this ratio is currently 
difficult to determine.27
2.3.2 The Ukrainian capital market
The position in the ranking of the capitalization of the Ukrainian Exchange 
against the background of the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) (Polish: 
Giełda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie – and other European ex-
changes) prompts one to search for the reasons for the observed weak com-
petitive position in the area of securities trading in Europe. Harutyunyan 
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proposes a periodization of the stages of development of the Ukrainian cap-
ital market, which can assist us to understand the causes of the observed 
weak competitive position of the Ukrainian capital market (Harutyunyan 
2017).
Between 1990 and 1999, a mass privatization of state-owned enterprises 
was carried out, which created the National Bank of Ukraine (Ukrainian: 
Національний банк України, Natsionalnyy bank Ukrayiny) and the first 
Stock Exchange (Trading Information System (Ukrainian Торгівельно-
інформаційна Система, Torhovelno-informatsiyna Systema).28 In 1997, 
the National Securities and Stock Market Commission began to operate 
(Ukraine) (Ukrainian: Національна комісія з цінних паперів та фондового 
ринку, Natsionalna komisiya z tsinnykh paperiv ta fondovoho rynku).
Between 2000 and 2009 the infrastructure framework of Ukraine’s insti-
tutional financial system was revised. The banking system was developed 
and the legal bases for the activities of exchanges were standardized. It was 
only at this stage that the process of educating the private shareholders of 
the largest industrial companies, combined with a noticeable and deliberate 
transformation of national savings into investments by companies, began. 
However, capital control and corruption were among the major barriers to 
capital market development during this period.
Institutional changes in the financial sphere coincided with a good eco-
nomic situation in the real economy. Between 2001 and 2007, real GDP per 
capita in Ukraine increased by 60.7%. Such favorable results were mainly 
due to the undertaken economic reforms related to the conversion of the 
Ukrainian currency (UAH), stabilization of inflation, increasing the com-
petitiveness of domestic production and the creation of favorable conditions 
for the development of innovation and entrepreneurship (Pustovoit 2016: 
86–109). The equity securities market and the debt market were discount-
ing the overall prosperity. The issue of a new series of shares and bonds 
(government and corporate) expanded from UAH 47.3billion (in 2000) to 
UAH 95.6 billion (in 2010). The liquidity of the securities market dramati-
cally increased from UAH 39.2 billion (in 2000) to UAH 1 537.8 billion (in 
2010). Over the whole of the year under consideration, there was a marked 
increase in the share of government bond issuance and their increasing 
share of total securities turnover (46.4% in 2010).29 The economic prosperity 
of this decade created a climate of trust in the institutions of the financial 
system. In October 2008, a consolidated Ukrainian Exchange was estab-
lished (Українська біржа, Ukrayinsa birzha) in Kyiv. The main motivation 
was to create a transparent securities trading platform conducive to corpo-
rate governance, to attract foreign capital and to integrate securities market 
operators into international competition.
The last decade (2009–2019) was characterized by political instability, 
nationalization trends (the case of PrivatBank, ПриватБанк), a decrease in 
confidence in the financial system, a weak economic downturn, the depreci-
ation of the UAH, difficulties in fulfilling the conditions of cooperation with 
́
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the International Monetary Fund (IMF), continuing restrictions on capital 
turnover, the inoperable criminal justice system and corruption.
In these circumstances, any development of the capital market is ex-
tremely difficult. In a development strategy paper entitled: “A Compre-
hensive Development Program for the Finance Sector of Ukraine by 2020” 
(Комплексна програма розвитку фінансового сектору України до 2020 р.; 
Compleksna prohrama rozvytku finansovoho sectoru Ukrainy do 2020), 
the need for an evolution based on those standards developed in the west-
ern part of Europe is stressed.30 From the perspective of 2018, the biggest 
weaknesses of the Ukrainian capital market include the downward trend 
in trading volume, the low level of free float, the limited and decreasing 
number of investors, and the construction of the main stock market index 
(Акції в Індексі UX) based in 72% on the results of the shares quotations of 
3 companies (Центренерго,31 Мотор Січ,32 Укрнафта33).
The Polish capital market is the largest and most developed market in 
Central and Eastern Europe and is an important element in the corporate 
development financing system. Compared to the largest capital markets in 
Europe, Poland is a relatively small market with little capitalization and 
turnover. The Warsaw Stock Exchange is more than ten times smaller than 
the stock exchange in Switzerland, and the scale may compare with the 
markets in Turkey or Norway, but it is 35 times the size of the Kyiv Stock 
Exchange. Only macroeconomic stabilization combined with the implemen-
tation of the standards and principles of the member states of the European 
Union can change the competitive position of the capital market and its 
impact on the Ukrainian economy.
The Ukrainian capital market is still not an important tool for ownership 
transformation and an efficient mechanism for converting national savings 
into investments in the business sector, nor does the creation of transpar-
ency augment economic turnover.
2.4 Summary
The experience of the last 25 years allows for an overall positive assessment 
of the Polish way of ownership transformation and the development of pri-
vate property institutions. The share of the Polish State as owner of the 
means of production between 1990 and 2015 decreased radically.
In general, an assessment of the heretofore process of ownership transfor-
mation in Ukraine and its results is not clear. On the one hand, the process 
of ownership transformation is still far from completed, and is considered 
an important impetus for the development of a market-oriented political 
and economic system; on the other hand, selected privatization paths, a lack 
of proper control over its course and corruption have caused great dissatis-
faction and a lack of the universal public acquiescence required to continue 
this process by the methods employed until now. Privatization in Ukraine is 
an unfinished process.
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The Polish capital market during the first two decades of the economic 
transformation was significantly involved in the process of the privatization 
of the public sector. The sale of shares of state-owned companies was one of 
the most important changes in the whole process of the transformation of 
the ownership structure of Polish companies. The Ukrainian capital market 
is much less involved in the process of the ownership transformation of the 
Ukrainian economy and its entities. It is to be assessed as a barely efficient 
mechanism for supporting private sector development in Ukraine.
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In June 1989, communism ended in Poland. The inflation rate was 640% 
per annum, the Polish currency did not have a widely accepted internal 
exchangeability – the market converted it to dollars – and shop shelves 
were bare. Poland was threatened with an economic catastrophe. The 
free market, fight against inflation, budgetary discipline, politically in-
dependent monetary policy, opening up to foreign trade and sanction-
ing unemployment were the main assumptions and tools of Poland’s new 
economic policy. In the early 1990s, the Polish economy underwent a 
revolution.
In 1989, Ukraine was one of the republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) whose independent economy was part of an inefficient 
Soviet economic organism. As a result of the 1990s systemic transformation 
in Ukraine was overtaken by conglomerates, while output in all production 
sectors decreased by more than 50%. Hyperinflation in the early 1990s was 
the result of, amongst others, a lack of independence of the Central Bank of 
Ukraine, which led to a destabilization of the state’s finances and a signifi-
cant devaluation of the Ukrainian currency.
In Ukraine the 1990s were a period of deep economic recession. The sit-
uation in Ukraine was also indirectly exacerbated by the Russian financial 
crisis of 1998, which did not have much impact on Poland. The Ukrainian 
GDP per capita (in PPPs, at fixed prices from 2011) fell from 9,500 USD in 
1991 to 4,500 USD in 1999. In 2017, it did not retain its 1991 level – 7,900 USD 
per capita. By comparison, in Poland, the GDP per capita has grown by 
nearly 190% over the last 27 years from 9,500 USD in 1991 to 27,000 USD in 
2017 (Figure 3.1). In 2018, the Polish GDP per capita was three times higher 
than in 1991 (The World Bank 2019).
Between 2000 and 2007, the real GDP per capita increased by 83% in 
Ukraine. The Russian financial crisis combined with the gas conflict with 
Russia led to a one-year, significant recession in Ukraine in 2009 (nearly 
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Figure 3.1 G DP per capita in Poland and Ukraine between 1990 and 2018 (USD, 
PPPs, in 2011 prices).
Source: The World Bank Group, Indicators, (2019). (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD?locations=UA-PL&view=chart, access: 2019-12-30).
a 15% decrease), after which, in 2010, the Ukrainian economy returned 
to the path of economic growth until 2013. The cumulative real GDP per 
capita growth during this period was 11.2%. This upward trend was halted 
after the Euromaidan (2013–2014), Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and 
the fight against pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, as mentioned 
in Chapter 1. In 2014–2015, the real GDP per capita of Ukraine decreased 
by nearly 10%. In 2018, the GDP per capita in Ukraine was on the level 
of tiny, former soviet states, such as Moldova, Georgia and Armenia (ac-
cording to purchasing power parity), and was three times lower than in 
Poland.
The financial sector was affected by the crisis resulting from above- 
mentioned events. The value of deposits in 2015 decreased by 2/3 compared 
to the value of deposits of 2013. There was a devaluation of the UAH, the 
foreign debt exceeded $47.5 billion, and the total debt was $75 billion. This 
political crisis affected the real economy (an approximately 50% decrease in 
investment, and an increase in unemployment by around 3%). In 2018, the 
state budget spent the largest expenses on servicing the foreign debt. Af-
ter the events of 2014, the Ukrainian economy was declining. Negotiations 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) required the implementation 
of difficult reforms in exchange for further loan tranches. One of the condi-
tions of the IMF was the unfreezing (deregulation) of natural gas prices. In 
practice, this meant that a sharp increase is gas prices. This in turn resulted 
in an increase in inflation (Figure 3.2).
The aim of this chapter is to present and discuss the structural changes 
in the GDP of Poland and Ukraine as a consequence of the institutional 
changes referred to in Chapters 1 and 2.
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3.2 Share of the industrial sector in GDP
The share of the industrial sector (mining, industrial processing, energy, 
construction) in the Ukrainian economy in the early 1990s was high; at the 
same time, however, it was characterized by significant volatility. In 1991, 
the share dropped to 55%, in 1990 – 42%, and between 1997and 1998, it fell 
to a level of approximately 30.5% of GDP.
The sharp decline in the GDP share of Ukrainian industrial sector be-
tween 1991 and 1998 was a consequence of:
• the slow process of ownership transformation (privatization) of state-
owned industrial enterprises,
• difficulties in expanding into foreign markets and the decapitalization 
fixed assets.
The low competitiveness of industrial products in the conditions of this 
transition and of the world market which was increasingly open to Ukraine 
led to a radical reduction in this sector’s share of the Ukrainian GDP 
(Figure 3.3).
During the period of 1998–2017, there was a constant decline in the 
competitiveness of the Ukrainian industrial sector reinforced by political 
turmoil and domestic demand variability, a weakening of international 
competitiveness, violations of the free competition rules (unlawful enrich-
ment of a very narrow social group) and corruption.
Over this same period, the Polish industrial sector held a stable average an-
nual GDP share of 29%. At the end of 2017 the share of the industrial sector in 
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Figure 3.2 C onsumer price index (2010 = 100), Poland and Ukraine, 2010–2017.
Source: The World Bank Group, Indicators, (2019). (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
FP.CPI.TOTL?end=2017&locations=PL-UA&start=2010, access: 2019-12-30).
44 Rafał Wisła et al.
In the emergent countries of the former USSR – which, like Poland, 
became members of the European Union, namely Lithuania, Latvia and 
 Estonia – the GDP share of the industrial sector decreased steadily between 
1995 and 2017. This process ran relatively calmly (Figure 3.4).
In the case of Lithuania, this share decreased by 1.8% points (pp), Estonia 
by 4.7 pp and Latvia by 7.3 pp. Against this background, Ukraine stands out 
with an almost 14 pp decrease over the last 23 years, as shown in Figure 3.5.
During the period considered, the Visegrád Group countries (Visegrád 
Four, V4) – Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – were characterized 










Figure 3.3 C hanges in the gross value added of the industrial sector (ISIC: 10–45) 
in GDP (in %), Poland and Ukraine.
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Figure 3.4  Changes in the gross value added of the industrial sector (ISIC: 10–45) 
in GDP (in %), 1995–2017, The Baltic states and Ukraine.
Source: The World Bank Group, Indicators, (2019). (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NV.IND.TOTL.ZS?locations=UA-EE-LT-LV&view=chart, access: 2019-12-30).
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Hungary, both in 1995 and 2017, this share remained at the same level of 
26%. Similarly, in Czechia, in 1995, this share was 35.3%; however, over 
23 years it decreased slightly to 33.5% – the largest GDP share in the group 
as a whole. Slovakia was the last country to start reform and has taken the 
longest in the V4 group. However, Slovakia has been dependent on the raw 
materials and the economy of Russia; therefore, this change was just above 
1 pp over the entire 22-year period (Figure 3.6).
A common feature of Ukraine, Russia, Romania and Bulgaria was the 
sharp collapse in the economic activity of industrial companies in the 
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Figure 3.5  Changes in the gross value added of the industrial sector (ISIC: 10–45) 
in GDP (in %), 1995–2017, The Visegrád group and Ukraine.
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Figure 3.6  Changes in the gross value added of the industrial sector (ISIC: 10–45) 
in GDP (in %), 1990–2017, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Ukraine.
Source: The World Bank Group, Indicators, (2019). (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NV.IND.TOTL.ZS?locations=UA-RU-BG-RO&view=chart, access: 2019-12-30).
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industry, down from a nearly 52% share of GDP (1990) to barely a 19% share 
in 1996. In 2017, industry produced a 24% stream of the global production 
of the Bulgarian economy.
The slow, systematic decline in the Russian industrial GDP share over 
the last 3 decades indicates evolutionary changes in the GDP structure, 
rather than a sharp collapse in its competitiveness. Romania has had the 
highest volatility regarding the industry GDP share of industry. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, as in the case of the other countries, this share 
was high, close to 46% of GDP. In 2000, it fell to its lowest level (30.1%); 
however, it increased by 8.5% over the next 11 years. In 2017, it returned to 
its 2000 level.
3.3 GDP share of the agricultural sector
The share of the agricultural sector in the Ukrainian economy in the early 
1990s was close to 25%, while the industrial processing sector accounted 
for a total of 80% of the stream of GDP produced. Between 1995 and 
2001, the share of agriculture hovered between 14.5% and 12%; in 2007, it 
fell to its lowest level in Ukraine’s history (6.6%). The period 2008–2015 
manifested a consistent marked increase in the share of agricultural pro-
duction in GDP (an increase of 5.5% points). In 2017, this share was 10.1% 
(Figure 3.7).
In the same period, production of the Polish agricultural sector reduced 









Figure 3.7 C hanges in the gross value added of the agricultural sector (ISIC: 1–5) 
in GDP (in %), 1995–2017.
Source: The World Bank Group, Indicators, (2019). (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=PL-UA&view=chart, access: 2019-12-30).
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measured by the gross value per employee was one of the lowest compared 
to other EU Member States. It was a consequence:
• of the fragmentation of Polish agriculture,
• an unfavorable agriculture structure,
• the low economic strength of agricultural holdings, as well as
• a lack of modern machinery and equipment on the farms.
The proportion of workers employed exclusively in Polish agriculture has 
been steadily declining since the early 1990s, when around 100,000 people 
worked in this sector of the economy, 27% of the total number of those em-
ployed. In 2004, about 100,000 people worked in agriculture, that is, 16.5% 
of the total number of employees, or 2.1 million people. In 2018 this number 
increased to 1.6 million people (i.e., 9.7% of the total workforce in the na-
tional economy) (Figures 3.8 and 3.9).
In the Baltic States, between 1995 and 2017, the share of the agricultural 
sector in GDP decreased steadily:
• in Lithuania from 10% (1995) to 3% (in 2017),
• in Latvia from 8% to 3.4%, and
• in Estonia from 5% to 2.5%.
Following the accession of the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) 
and the EU V4 countries, the share of agricultural production in GDP has 
remained stable at 3% (±1%). The decline in the share of the agricultural 
sector in GDP over the last 23 years has been gradual and was the result of 
a more rapid growth in the remaining sectors. At the end of 2017, the share 
of the agricultural sector in GDP in Hungary and Slovakia was 3.3%, in 
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Figure 3.8  Changes in the gross value added of the agricultural sector (ISIC: 1–5) 
in GDP (in %), 1995–2017, the Baltic states.
Source: The World Bank Group, Indicators, (2019). (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=UA-EE-LT-LV&view=chart, access: 2019-12-30).
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The common feature of Ukraine, Russia, Romania and Bulgaria was a 
much more significant decrease in the share of the gross value added of the 
agricultural sector in GDP compared to the other groups of countries ana-
lyzed. The share of the agricultural sector in the Ukrainian economy in the 
early 1990s was close to 25% of GDP. In 2017, this share decreased to10.1% 
of GDP. In the case of Romania, there was a decrease from 22% of the share 
of GDP (in 1990) to 4.3% (2017 and 2018). In Bulgaria, in 1990, the agricul-
tural sector’s share of GDP was 17.7% and decreased to 9.2% in 1995, and in 
1997, it increased to its highest level (20.6%) during the period of economic 
transition. At the end of 2017, it was only 4%.
The reduction in the gross value-added share of the agricultural sec-
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Figure 3.9 C hanges in the gross value added of the agricultural sector (ISIC: 1–5) 
in GDP (in %), 1995–2017, the Visegrád Group.
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Figure 3.10  Changes in the gross value added of the agricultural sector (ISIC: 1–5)
in GDP (on %), 1990–2017, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Ukraine.
Source: The World Bank Group, Indicators, (2019). (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=UA-RU-BG-RO&view=chart, access: 2019-12-30).
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share) – 1998 (5.1%). Between 1999 and 2017, this share decreased by 3.4% 
points, that is, to 3.1% of GDP.
3.4 GDP selected components from the distribution side
3.4.1 Total investment expenditure
The investment1 rate in Poland between 1995 and 2018 ranged from 17.5% 
(1995, 2017) to 24% (1999–2000). The average investment rate in Poland for 
this period was 20.2% of GDP. This was significantly lower than Estonia’s 
average of 28.1% and that of Latvia, 24.2%. The average value of this pa-
rameter for the Lithuanian economy was 21%, and for the Ukrainian econ-
omy 19.1%.
The group’s highest investment rates in 2007 were a common feature for 
all the countries analyzed. Over the next decade, the investment rates of 
these countries have not come close to the level of 2007.
• Estonia, Latvia approx. 36.5% of GDP (2007), 2018 – Estonia 23.9%, 
Latvia 22.8%
• Lithuania 28.5% (2007), 19.3% in 2018
• Ukraine 26.1% (2007), 17.2% in 2018
• Poland 22.5% (2007), 11 years later, 18.2%.
The average investment rate for EU Member States in 2018 was around 
20.5%, while for the Euro zone it was 20.8%.
The general regularities emerging from Figure 3.11 were (1) during the 
analyzed period (1995–2018), investment rates in Ukraine and Poland were 
almost lower in each year and often significantly lower than in Czechia, Slo-
vakia and Hungary; (2) the average annual investment rate in Czechia was 
the highest in the group under consideration at 28.3% of GDP, for Slovakia 
it was 26.1%. Hungary’s average investment rate (22.8%) was also signifi-
cantly higher than in Poland and Ukraine (Figure 3.12).
The average investment rates for the period of 1995–2018 for Ukraine 
(19.1%), Russia (19.8%), and Poland and Bulgaria (in both cases 20.2%) are 
relatively close to each other. Romania (24.1%) is characterized by a signifi-
cantly higher average investment rate. Bulgaria (4.5% in 1996; 33% in 2008) 
and Romania (18% in 1999; 37.2% in 2008) had the highest volatility of an-
nual investment rates (Figure 3.13).
Investment rates in Poland and Ukraine are lower than in the other coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe. From the point of view of international 
competitiveness and the development prospects of both economies, this is a 
negative factor. Part of the difference between the investment rate in Poland 
and Ukraine, and the other countries of the region, is the sectorial structure 
of these economies. If the share of individual sectors in creating added value 
in Poland and Ukraine was at the average of EU countries in general, their 
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investment rates would probably be higher. The investment economic fluc-
tuations in Poland between 1995 and 2018 are highly synchronized with the 
EU (0.54) and, in particular, with the Euro zone. The correlation of GDP is 
around 0.6. This relationship weakened significantly after 2008 (0.15), when 
the pro-cyclicality of investments in Poland decreased. On the other hand, 
the degree of synchronization of the economic cycle between Poland and the 
EU remained high.
What is surprising is the level of the correlation index (Pearson) for 
Ukraine and the EU. For the period of 1995–2018 it was 0.80, and for 2008–
2018 it rose to 0.84. Between 1995 and 2007, this synchronization was 0.41.
The correlation rate of the investment rate changes in Poland and Ukraine, 
for the period 1995–2018 was 0.29; in 2008–2018 it rose to 0.65. Between 1995 
and 2007, this interdependence was negative (−0.09).
3.4.2 R&D expenditure
Research and development expenditure (R&D) spending in Poland, as well 
as for software and databases, remains particularly low. This is a negative 
factor from the point of view of the development prospects of the Polish 
economy.
R&D outlays relative to GDP have not increased significantly since Po-
land entered the EU. In 2004 it reached 0.55%, and in 2017 it increased to 1% 
of GDP. In the EU, the average level is twice as high (2.1%), and the average 
value of this share for the Visegrád Four, without Poland, is about 1.4%. 
Recognizing that R&D capital expenditure promotes an increase in the to-
tal productivity of input and consequently economic growth, measures are 
systematically taken to support the activity and innovation of enterprises, 
including those of R&D centers of global corporations. Such a process, al-
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Figure 3.14 C hanges in the share of R&D expenditures in GDP (in %), 1996–2017, 
Poland and Ukraine.
Source: The World Bank Group, Indicators, (2019). (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS?locations=UA-PL&view=chart, access: 2019-12-30).
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In the case of Ukraine, the R&D investment expenditure level is consist-
ently becoming less and less important; more than 1% in 2004, it was down 
to just 0.4% in 2017. Based on such a trend, it is possible to infer the fading 
potential for the development of the Ukrainian economy, with a source of 
technological progress and growth in productivity.
From the point of view of economic development prospects, both the in-
vestment rate and its structure are important. Against this background, in 
highly developed countries in recent decades, there is a noteworthy trend of 
systematic growth in the role of investment in intellectual property prod-
ucts, that is, research and development, computer software and databases. 
R&D and software outlays display significantly higher growth rates than 
overall investment. The increase in investment rates in intellectual property 
products, from a theoretical point of view, is linked to an increase in the 
innovative potential of the economy.
3.4.3 National defense spending
Poland has spent 2% of GDP on defense per annum, on average, over the 
last 25 years. With an average annual 4% economic growth during this pe-
riod, this means, in practice, a systematic increase in real defense spend-
ing for Poland. In most geopolitically stable countries in the world, defense 
spending is approximately 1% of GDP (Figure 3.15).
In 1993, the share of defense spending in Ukraine’s GDP was 0.44%, 
while the real value was $642.4 million (in fixed 2010 prices). In 1997, this 
share increased to 4%, which in fact meant an expenditure of $3.44 billion 
(in fixed 2010 prices). Between 1993 and 1997, Ukraine’s GDP decreased 
from $146 billion to $86 billion. Between 1997 and 2013, military spending 
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Figure 3.15  Changes in the share of defense spending in GDP (in %), 1993–2017, 
Poland and Ukraine.




The political tensions that Ukraine has been embroiled in since 2013 pushed 
defense spending up again to 4% of GDP in 2015, that is, to $4.84 billion 
in real terms (in fixed 2010 prices). In 2017, this value fell to $4.1 billion, 
or 3.24% of GDP. Social and political instability after the Euromaidan of 
2013–2014, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the fight against pro-Russian 
separatists in eastern Ukraine have resulted in a marked increase in this 
category of public spending in 2014–2015 (by about $1.4 billion).
3.5 Summary
Poland, after the period of a centrally planned economy (1946–1989), in the 
early 1990s, had at its disposal several basic or well-trained institutions typ-
ical of a market economy.
At the beginning of the 1990s, Ukraine did not have any institutions with 
experience in building a market economy, or the institutions of parliamen-
tary democracy. Ukrainian society had to face the extremely difficult task 
of creating market economy institutions from scratch. In Poland, the GDP 
per capita has increased by 190% over the last almost 30 years from 9,500 
dollars (1991) to 27,300 dollars (2017). When we consider 2018, the Polish 
GDP per capita is three times the value of 1991.
The Ukrainian GDP per capita in 2017 has still not returned to its 1991 
level. GDP per capita in Ukraine is currently at the level of Moldova, Geor-
gia and Armenia and is three times lower than in Poland. The main brake 
on Ukraine’s GDP growth is established informal non-market institutions, 
which are not conducive to free competition (clan interest networks and 
corruption).
Between 1991 and 2017, the low competitiveness of industrial products 
combined with the lack of managerial competence to operate under a grow-
ing market economy resulted in a radical reduction in the share of the pro-
cessing sector in the Ukrainian GDP. This trend was reinforced by political 
turmoil and the volatility of domestic demand. Between 1991 and 2017, the 
Polish industrial sector held a stable 29% of average annual GDP. At the end 
of 2017, the share of the industrial sector in the Polish economy was 29.5%, 
while in the Ukrainian economy, it was 23.3%.
The share of the agricultural sector in the Ukrainian economy in the early 
1990s was close to 25%. In 2017, this share was 10.1%. During the same pe-
riod, the agricultural sector’s share of Polish GDP was reduced from 5.5% 
to 2.8%. The productivity of agricultural labor, measured by the gross value 
per employee, was one of the lowest, when compared to other EU Member 
States.
Economic fluctuations in investment in Poland (1995–2018) are highly 
synchronized with the average investment rate of EU Member States (0.54); 
by comparison, the similarly calculated GDP correlation is around 0.6. 
For Ukraine and all EU Member States, this interdependence is at an even 
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higher level (0.84). R&D spending relative to GDP has increased since Po-
land’s entry into the EU. In 2004, it was 0.55% and increased to 1% of GDP 
in 2017. In the case of Ukraine, a contrary trend is observed – from more 
than a 1% share in 2004, R&D spending fell to just 0.45% in 2017.
Note
 1 Gross expenditure per fixed assets to GDP.
4.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to characterize the absolute and relative demo-
graphic potential of Polish and Ukrainian regions. In Poland, there are 
voivodeships (województwo), and in Ukraine oblasts (область). These anal-
yses concern 2004–2017 (or 2004–2016) depending on the availability of 
statistics from the Central Statistical Data Bank (hereinafter BDL GUS, 
https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/) and the Ukrainian Statistical 
Office (Державна Cлужба Cтатистики України) (hereinafter ДCCУ, http://
www.ukrstat.gov.ua/http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/).
This chapter analyzes the demographic potential of the population, pop-
ulation density and the division of the population into urban and rural ar-
eas. It also takes into consideration the spatial diversity and dynamics of 
both the population numbers and the urbanization rate.
4.2 Administrative divisions of Poland and Ukraine
Since January 1, 1999, Poland has been divided into 16 voivodeships. For 
analytical purposes, these voivodeships are divided into four groups:
• Mazowieckie,
• five voivodeship in eastern Poland (Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, 
Świętokrzyskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie),
• five in central Poland (Kujawsko-Pomorskie, Łódź, Małopolskie, Po-
morskie and Śląskie),
• five western Polish voivodeships (Dolnośląskie, Lubuskie, Opolskie, 
Wielkopolskie, and Zachodniopomorskie (Map 4.1).
The Mazowieckie Voivodeship was treated as a separate entity, as it is atypi-
cal as a voivodeship. This is because it contains the capital of Poland-Warsaw 
and the very economically vigorous city of Płock (mainly due to the largest 
Polish oil company “Orlen” being based there) and the fairly weak, economi-
cally, agricultural environs surrounding Warsaw, Płock and Radom.
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Eastern Poland includes areas belonging to the poorest in the European 
Union, which therefore benefit from the special funds provided by the Eu-
ropean Union.
The remaining voivodeships were divided into two parallel groups con-
sisting of the voivodeships of central and western Poland. Through the 
voivodeships of central Poland run the main north-south transportation 
routes (railway and road) connecting the Tri-city region (Tri-city – Gdańsk, 
Gdynia and Sopot) with Bydgoszcz, Toruń, Łódź, the Górny Śląsk-Zagłębie 
agglomeration and Kraków. On the other hand, the areas of the current 
voivodeships of western Poland were before World War I in the German par-
tition, and in the interwar period (except for the voivodeship of Wielkopol-
skie) belonged to Germany (for more information on the specifics of these 
Polish voivodeships see: Filipowicz, Tokarski 2015, Filipowicz 2017, 2019 or 
Szczepaniak, Tokarski 2018).
Ukraine is divided into 24 oblasti, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
(Автономна Республіка Крим, ARC) with its capital city of Simferopol and 
two cities with a specific status (міста зі спеціальним статусом): Kyiv and 
Map 4.1 Administrative division of Poland.
Source: https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podzial_administracyjny_Polska.
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Map 4.2 Administrative division of Ukraine.
Source: http://www.ukrexport.gov.ua/eng/about_ukraine/admin/?country=ukr.
Sevastopol. Since 2014, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevas-
topol have been occupied by Russia (Map 4.2).
The names of most Ukrainian regions are adjectives derived from the 
names of their capitals, except the regions of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, 
Kirovohrad Oblast, Volyn Oblast and the Zakarpattia Oblast. The capital 
city of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast region is the city of Dnipro (which until 
2016 was called Dnipropetrovsk) and the Kirovohrad Oblast Kropyvnytskyi 
(until 2016 called Kirovohrad). The capital city of the Volyn Oblast is Lutsk, 
while the Zakarpattia Oblast’s capital is Uzhhorod. In these cases, the names 
of oblasts are historically contingent. The boundaries of the Volyn Oblast 
largely coincide with the Volyn Oblast’s border of the interwar period,1 
whose capital city at the time was Lutsk. The Zakarpattia Oblast belonged 
to the Kingdom of Hungary (a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) before 
World War I, and in the interwar period, it was in Czechoslovakia. The his-
toric capital of the Zakarpattia region is Uzhhorod, which is currently the 
capital city of the Zakarpattia Oblast.
The oblasts of Ukraine are divided into five groups:2
• There are eight oblasts in western Ukraine (Khmelnytskiy, Chernivtsi, 
Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Volyn and Zakarpattia),
• The north Ukrainian oblasts (Kyiv with the regions of Chernihiv, Kyiv, 
Sumy and Zhytomyr),
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• There are four oblasts in eastern Ukraine (Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk 
and Zaporizhzhya),
• The south of Ukraine has the following regions: the Autonomous Re-
public of Crimea, Kherson Oblast, Mykolayiv Oblast, Odesa Oblast 
and Sevastopol,
• Finally, there are five oblasts in central Ukraine (Cherkasy, Dnipropet-
rovsk, Kirovohrad, Poltava and Vinnytsya).
Located in Volyn (Волинь), the Volyn Oblast (Волинська область) and Rivne 
Oblast (Рівненська область) before World War I were located in the Russian 
Empire, near the border, while in the interwar period, they were in Poland 
along its eastern border. The Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, Lviv Oblast and Ter-
nopil Oblast until 1918 were the easternmost part of the Kingdom of Gali-
cia and Lodomeria belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Habsburg 
Monarchy), while in the interwar period, this region was in Poland. Located 
in Bukovina (Буковина), the Chernivtsi Oblast in the years 1849–1918 was 
part of the Austrian Empire’s Duchy of Bukovina, while between World 
Wars I and II, this district belonged to Romania. The Zakarpattia Oblast, 
until 1918, was part of the Kingdom of Hungary, while in the interwar pe-
riod, Czechoslovakia. The Khmelnytskiy Oblast, located in Podilla, was in 
the Romanov Empire before World War I, and was part of the Soviet Un-
ion in the interwar period. After World War II (until Ukraine regained its 
independence in 1991), all the oblasts of western Ukraine were part of the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which in turn was part of the Soviet 
Union.
It can be concluded that the oblasts of western Ukraine over the past 200 
years have been the outermost areas of the countries to which they belonged. 
This was not an aid in fostering neither their social or political stability nor 
their economic development (see: for example, Hrycak 2000; Serczyk 2001 
or Hud 2018).
The districts belonging to the remaining provinces (in particular those 
areas located in Ukraine, on the right (west) bank of the Dnieper River3 and 
the coastal oblasts, i.e., of the Odesa Oblast, Mykolayiv Oblast and Kherson 
Oblast) in the19th and 20th centuries were much more (than the oblasts of 
western Ukraine) politically and economically integrated first with tsarist 
Russia, and subsequently with the USSR. Therefore, their history, social, 
political and economic relations differed significantly from what was taking 
place in western Ukraine (see Hrycak 2000; Serczyk 2001; Wyszczelski 2015 
or Hud 2018).
4.3 The demographic potential of the Polish voivodeships
Statistical data describing the voivodeships and the above-mentioned 
groups of voivodeships relate to the area and population at the beginning 
and end of the time period considered in this chapter.
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From statistical data, it can be concluded that:
• the largest voivodeships in terms of area are the Mazowieckie (11.4% 
of Poland), Wielkopolskie (9.5%) and Lubelskie (8.0%). The small-
est voivodeships include the Śląskie (3.9%), Świętokrzyskie (3.7%) and 
Opolskie (3.0%);
• The voivodeships of eastern Poland occupy 31.7% of the country’s area, 
while those of western Poland 30.7% and central Poland 26.2%;
• On average, in the years 2004–2017 the largest population was recorded 
in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship (13.7% of the Polish population), fol-
lowed by the Śląskie (12.1%) and Wielkopolskie (9.0%) voivodeships. The 
lowest number of inhabitants was found in the following voivodeships: 
the Podlaskie (3.1%), Opolskie (2.7%) and Lubuskie (2.6%) (Map 4.3);
• At the time, 38.7% of Poland’s population lived in central Poland, the 
provinces of western Poland had 26.3%, while eastern Poland had only 
21.3% of the country’s overall population.
• Between 2004 and 2017, the population in 10 of the 16 voivodeships 
increased, while in the others, it decreased. The largest relative in-
creases were recorded in the following voivodeships: Pomorskie (5.9%), 
Mazowieckie (4.6%), Małopolskie (4.0%) and Wielkopolskie  (3.7%) 
Map 4.3 Population in voivodeships, between 2004 and 2017 (1,000 people).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
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The  highest decreases were recorded in the Opolskie Voivodeship 
(a decrease of 5.8%), followed by the Łódzkie (4.3%), Śląskie and 
Świętokrzyskie (3.2%), Lubelskie (2.7%) and Podlaskie (1.5%) voivode-
ships (Figure 4.1). Hence we may come to a more general conclusion that 
in the years 2004–2017, Polish population growth was mainly charac-
terized by those voivodeships with demographically and economically 
strong urban centers (Warsaw, Kraków, Poznań and the Tri-City area), 
while a decline in population occurred in either the post- industrial 
voivodeships (Łódzkie and Śląskie) or the voivodeships of eastern 
 Poland (see: Trojak, Tokarski 2013; Filipowicz, Tokarski 2015; Trojak 
2015; or Szczepaniak, Tokarski 2018). 
• Regarding the groups of voivodeships, in western Poland the popula-
tion in the research period increased by 0.9%, in central Poland by 0.1%, 
while in the voivodeships of eastern Poland decrease by 1.0%.
• In 2017, the Śląskie Voivodeship had the highest population density 
(369.8 persons/km2,), with an average population density in Poland 
of 122.9 persons/km2. The next in order were the following prov-
inces: Małopolskie (223.1 persons/km2), Mazowieckie (151.3 persons/
km2), Dolnośląskie (145.9 persons/km2) and Łódzkie (136.1 persons/
km2). The lowest value of this characteristic (i.e., less than 100 peo-
ple/km2) was recorded in the following voivodeships: Lubelskie (84.7 
people/km2), Warmińsko-Mazurskie (59.3 people/km2) and Podlaskie 
(58.6  people/km2) in eastern Poland, and the Zachodniopomorskie 














Figure 4.1 P opulation in groups of voivodeships, between 2004 and 2017 (million 
people).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
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• The average population density of central Poland was 180.8 people/km2 
and in western Poland 105.3 people/km2, while eastern Poland had only 
82.0 people/km2.
• The areas of eastern Poland are characterized by a much lower demo-
graphic potential (measured both in population and in population den-
sity) than in other regions of Poland.
• Below are the statistical data on the population of cities that in 2004 or 
2017 had more than 200,000 inhabitants.
• In 2004, there were 18 cities in Poland of over 200,000 and in 2017, only 
16 cities (the population of Gliwice and Kielce dropped below 200,0004). 
Among these cities, both in 2004 and 2017, there was one city of over a 
million (Warsaw), and four with a population between 500,000 and one 
million people (Kraków, Łódź, Wrocław and Poznań) and 13 cities in 
2004 and 11 cities in 2017 with a population between 200,000 and 500,00 
people.
• In total, 21.5% of the Polish population in 2004 and 20.9% in 2017 lived 
in the analyzed group of cities. Those cities with a population exceeding 
500,000 persons were inhabited by some 11.6% (2004) and 11.4% (2017) 
of the Polish population in general.
• In the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, two cities with a population of over 
200,000 persons (Warsaw and Radom) had 37.3% of the inhabitants of 
this voivodeship in 2004 and 36.8% in 2017. Similar indicators for the 
remaining groups of voivodeships were as follows: in eastern Poland 
three cities in 2004 (Lublin, Białystok and Kielce) and two cities in 2017 
(Lublin and Białystok) constituted (respectively) 10.5% and 7.8% of the 
population of these voivodeships. Central Poland had ten cities in 2004 
(Kraków, Łódź, Gdańsk, Bydgoszcz, Katowice, Gdynia, Częstochowa, 
Sosnowiec, Toruń and Gliwice), and nine in 2017 (those previously listed 
with the exception of Gliwice), 25.8% of their respective voivodeship 
populations in 2004, and 23.3% in 2017. In western Poland three cities 
(Wrocław, Poznań and Szczecin) had 16.2% of their respective voivode-
ship populations in 2004, and 15.6% in 2017.
• In five Polish cities, the population in 2017 was higher than in 2004: War-
saw had an increase in the number of inhabitants by 4.2%, Białystok 
1.8%, Kraków 1.3%, Gdańsk 1.1% and Wrocław 0.4%. The largest rela-
tive decreases in population were recorded in Częstochowa and Gliwice 
(a decrease of 9.5%), and in Sosnowiec (10.6%) and Łódź (10.8%).
• It is worth noting that the decrease in the population in some of these 
cities (with the exception of Częstochowa, Łódź, Radom and the cities 
of the Górny Śląsk-Zagłębie agglomeration, i.e., Gliwice, Katowice and 
Sosnowiec) was compensated for by an increase in the population in 
the districts neighboring these cities. The total population of Warsaw 
with neighboring municipalities increased from 2.5 million people in 
2004 to 2.9 million people in 2017 (i.e., by 8.9%), Poznań and the Poznań 
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district grew from 851.700 persons to 920.300 persons (8.0%), the Tri-
City region with neighboring districts went from 1.3 million people up 
to 1.4 million people (7.4%), Kraków and neighboring districts with 
1.2 million people increased to 1.3 million people (6.1%), Wrocław and 
its surroundings with 1.0 million people went up to 1.1 million people 
(5.2%), Toruń and the Toruń district from 295.400 persons up to 308.200 
persons (4.3%), Białystok and the Białystok district from 431.200 per-
sons up to 444.300 persons (3.0%), Szczecin and neighboring district 
from 755.200 persons up to 767.800 persons (1.7%) or Bydgoszcz and the 
Bydgoszcz district from 461.100 persons to 468.300 persons (1.6%). The 
population of Kielce and the Kielce district did not change in 2004–
2017 (it amounted to 406.900 people), while in Lublin and the Lublin 
district the number of inhabitants dropped from 567.300 persons to 
565.600 persons (0.3%), in Radom and the Radom district from 372.000 
persons to 366.500 persons (1.5%), in Czestochowa and the Czesto-
chowa district from 381.900 persons to 359.600 persons (5.8%), in Łódź 
with its neighboring districts from 1.1 million people down to 1.0 mil-
lion  people (by 6.4%) and in the urban districts of the Górny Śląsk- 
Zagłębie agglomeration this chart dropped from 2.3 million  people to 
two  million people (by 7.1%).
• In the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, the population of Warsaw and Ra-
dom together with their surrounding areas increased by 7.7%, in the 
large cities of western Poland and neighboring districts this chart in-
creased by 5.1% and in eastern Poland by 0.8%, while in central Poland 
this chart fell by 1.0%.
• The total population in the 18 large Polish cities and the neighboring 
districts mentioned above increased in 2004–2017 from 14.1 million peo-
ple to 14.4 million people (by 2.2%). It can be stated that some inhabit-
ants of large Polish cities change their place of residence by moving to 
districts neighboring these cities.
• In 2004, 46.5% of the population of those cities of over 200,000 lived 
in central Poland, 23.4% in Mazowieckie, 19.7% in western Poland and 
only 10.9% in eastern Poland. In 2017, these indicators were (respec-
tively) 45.1% central Poland, 25.9% Mazowieckie Voivodeship, 20.7% 
western Poland and 8.3% eastern Poland. This leads to the conclusion 
that the voivodeships of eastern Poland not only have a lower demo-
graphic potential but also have a much weaker potential of the popula-
tion living in cities of over 200,000.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present statistical data on the number of people liv-
ing in cities and in the countryside, both in individual voivodeships and 
in the previously distinguished groups of voivodeships in 2004 and 2017. 
Data regarding the number of inhabitants are divided into urban and rural 
districts.
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Table 4.2  The population of Polish cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants in 
2004 and 2017 (1,000 people)
City Voivodeship or group 
of voivodeships
Year Population in 2017 
(year 2004 = 100)
2004 2017






















Szczecin Zachodniopomorskie 411.9 403.9 98.1
Bydgoszcz Kujawsko-Pomorskie 368.2 352.3 95.7





















Radom Mazowieckie 227.6 214.6 94.3
















Mazowieckie 1,920.5 1,979.2 103.1


















e With Gliwice and Kielce.
f Without Gliwice and Kielce.
From statistical data, it can be concluded that:
• Both in 2004 and 2017, the quartile group5 with the largest popula-
tion living in cities included the following voivodeships: Śląskie, Ma-
zowieckie, Dolnośląskie and Wielkopolskie. These values were at a 
level of 3.7 million people in 2004 and 3.5 million people in 2017 in the 
Śląskie Voivodeship, 3.3 million people and 3.5 million people in the Ma-
zowieckie Voivodeship, 2.1 million people and 2.0 million people in the 
Dolnośląskie Voivodeship and 1.9278 million persons, and 1.9034 million 
persons in the Wielkopolskie Voivodeship, whereas the quartile group 
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with the smallest value of the variable analyzed here was composed of 
two voivodeships in eastern Poland and two in western Poland. In the 
cities, in the Podlaskie Voivodeship, there were in 2004 – 710.800 people 
and in 2017 – 719.200 people, in Lubuskie Voivodeship in 2004 – 648.200 
people and in 2017 – 659.700 people, in Świętokrzyskie Voivodeship in 
2004 – 586.700 people and in 2017 – 556.200 people, while in the Opolskie 
Voivodeship in 2004 – 554.000 people and in 2017 – 522.600 people.
• In five voivodeships, the number of urban residents in 2017 was higher 
than in 2004, while in the remaining 11 voivodeships, it was lower. The 
population of cities increased the fastest in the Mazowieckie (by 4.0%), 
Podkarpackie (3.2%), Lubuskie (1.8%) and Podlaskie (1.2%) voivode-
ships. However, the population of cities fell the fastest in the following 
voivodeships: Świętokrzyskie (by 5.2%), Śląskie (5.6%), Opolskie (5.7%) 
and Łódź (7.3%).
• In 2004, 41.6% of the inhabitants of Polish cities lived in the cities of 
central Poland, 27.1% in western Poland, 17.1% in eastern Poland, 
and the remaining 14.2% of the urban population in the Mazowieckie 
Voivodeship. In 2017, these percentage rates were 40.7% in central Po-
land, 27.1% in western Poland, 17.3% in eastern Poland and 15.0% in the 
Mazowieckie Voivodeship.
• In 2017, the number of urban residents in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship 
was 4.0% higher than in 2004, while in other groups of voivodeships the 
value of this demographic variable decreased. In the voivodeships of 
central Poland, the value of this trait decreased in 2004–2017 by 3.6%, 
in western Poland by 1.7% and in eastern Poland – by 1.0%.
• When analyzing the number of inhabitants of cities that are in urban 
districts, it turns out that in 2017 this chart fell in Poland by 1.8% com-
pared to 2004. It should be noted, however, that declines of this mag-
nitude were not evenly distributed geographically. In the voivodeships 
of western Poland the value of this variable increased by 2.6%, in the 
Mazowieckie Voivodeship by 2.3%, while in the voivodeships of eastern 
Poland by 1.1% and central Poland by 5.3% (mainly as a result of pro-
cesses of demographic trends taking place in the post-industrial Śląskie 
and Łódzkie voivodeships).
• In six voivodeships (Dolnośląskie, Lubuskie, Podkarpackie, Mazo wieckie, 
Podlaskie and Małopolskie) the number of inhabitants of urban districts 
increased, while in the remaining voivodeships it decreased. The largest 
relative increases (by more than 5%) in the value of this variable con-
sidered here between 2004 and 2017 were recorded in the Dolnośląskie 
(by 12.4%) and Lubuskie (8.2%) voivodeships in western Poland and the 
Podkarpackie (6.3%) Voivodeship in eastern Poland. The largest de-
creases were recorded in the Wielkopolskie Voivodeship (a 5.5% drop) 
in western Poland, in the Świętokrzyskie Voivodeship (6.0%) in eastern 
Poland and (as already mentioned) the post-industrial Śląskie (8.1%) 
and Łódzkie (by 9.9%) voivodeships in central Poland.
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• The population of cities in rural voivodeships between 2004 and 2017 in 
Poland fell by 1.2%. In the Mazowieckie Voivodeship the value of this 
variable increased by 7.2%, while in the other groups of voivodeships 
it decreased. In the voivodeships of western Poland, the population of 
cities in rural districts fell by 4.6%, in eastern Poland by 0.9%, while in 
central Poland by 0.6%. In the voivodeships of central Poland, the num-
ber of people living in towns in rural districts decreased in 2004–2017 by 
4.6%, in western Poland by 0.9% and eastern Poland by 0.6%.
• In seven voivodeships (except for the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, also 
in the voivodeships: Pomorskie, Wielkopolskie, Małopolskie, Podkar-
packie, Podlaskie and Zachodniopomorskie), the value of the variable 
considered here increased, in the others it decreased. The highest rela-
tive increases were recorded in the Pomorskie (by 2.6%) and Małopol-
skie (2.3%) voivodeships in central Poland, while the largest decreases 
were recorded in the following voivodeships: Łódzkie (4.1%) in central 
Poland, Świętokrzyskie (4.7%) in eastern Poland and Opolskie (7.2%) 
and Dolnośląskie (13.0%) in western Poland.
• In 2017, 4.2% more people lived in the Polish countryside than in 2004. 
The fastest growing population living in the countryside was in cen-
tral Poland (by 7.2%), then in Mazowieckie (5.8%) and western Poland 
(5.4%), while in rural eastern Poland the value of this variable dropped 
by 1.0%.
• In 11 voivodeships the percentage of those living here increased, while in 
the remaining five voivodeships (Lubuskie, Świętokrzyskie, Lubelskie, 
Podlaskie and Opolskie) it decreased. The highest relative increments 
of this variable were recorded in the following voivodeships: Pomor-
skie (17.1%), Wielkopolskie (10.3%), Dolnośląskie (7.9%) and Kujawsko- 
Pomorskie (7.1%). In the Lubuskie Voivodeship, the population living in 
the countryside dropped by 1.1%, in Świętokrzyskie by 1.5%, Lubelskie 
by 2.3%, Podlaskie by 5.3% and Opolskie by 6.0%.
Map 4.4 shows the geographic diversity of urbanization rates in Poland, on 
the average, in 2005–2017, while Figure 4.2 shows the trajectories of these 
rates in the groups of the voivodeships researched in the period of time ana-
lyzed here. From the map and graph mentioned here as well as statistical 
data on urbanization rates in these voivodeships, the results are as follows:
• The highest urbanization rates in the years 2005–2017 were recorded in 
central Poland (64.6%), followed by Mazowieckie (64.4%), and western 
Poland (62.5%), while the lowest values of this feature were recorded 
in the agricultural voivodeships of eastern Poland (only 49.1%, with an 
average percentage for Poland as a whole of 60.7%).
• The quartile group with the highest urbanization rates included the fol-
lowing voivodeships: Śląskie (77.7%), Dolnośląskie (69.9%), Zachodnio-
pomorskie (68.8%) and Pomorskie (65.6%). However, the quartile group 
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Map 4.4 Average urbanization rates in voivodeships in 2005–2017 (%).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
with the lowest value of this variable was composed of the Małopolskie 
Voivodeship6 (49.0%) in central Poland and three voivodeships in east-
ern Poland: the Lubelskie (46.4%), Świętokrzyskie (45.0%) and Podkar-
packie (41.0%).
• Urbanization rates in the agricultural voivodeships of eastern Poland 
were over 15 percentage points lower than in the Mazowieckie Voivode-
ship, whereas in the voivodeships of western Poland these rates were al-
most 2 percentage points lower than in the aforementioned voivodeship. 
Urbanization rates in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship and central Poland 
were similar.
• In the least urbanized voivodeships of eastern Poland, the urbanization 
rate increased by 0.1% point between 2005 and 2017. In other groups of 
voivodeships, this rate was falling. In the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, the 
urbanization rate dropped by 0.4% point, in western Poland by 1.5 per-
centage points and central Poland by 2.2 percentage points (mainly as a 
result of the de-urbanization of the Śląskie and Łódzkie voivodeships).
• When comparing the urbanization rates in individual voivodeships in 
2017 with those recorded in 2005, it turns out that in 3 voivodeships 












Figure 4.2 Urbanization rates in 2005–2017 (%).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
(Podlaskie, Podkarpackie and Lubuskie) these rates increased, while in 
the others they fell. In the Podlaskie Voivodeship, the urbanization rate in-
creased by 1.5 percentage points, while in the Podkarpackie and Lubuskie 
voivodeships by 0.8 percentage point. The largest decreases in the rate 
considered here were recorded in the Kujawsko-Pomorskie (2.2 percent-
age points), Dolnośląskie (2.3 percentage points), Wielkopolskie (2.5 per-
centage points) and Pomorskie (3.4 percentage points) voivodeships. In 
Poland, the urbanization rate then fell by 1.3 percentage points.
4.4. Demographic potential of the Ukrainian oblasts
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present basic statistical data describing oblasts and group 
of oblasts. These data relate to the area and population at the beginning 
and end of the time period considered in this chapter and in 2013, that is, the 
last year in which the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol were 
actually part of Ukraine.
From statistical data it can be concluded that:
• The largest quartile group includes the following oblasts: Odesa in 
southern Ukraine (5.5% of Ukraine, 5.8% of Ukraine without the Au-
tonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol), Dnipropetrovsk Oblast 
(5.3%, 5.5%) in central Ukraine, Chernihiv Oblast (5.3%, 5.5%) in north-
ern Ukraine, Kharkiv Oblast (5.2%, 5.4%) in eastern Ukraine, Zhyto-
myr Oblast (4.9%, 5.2%) in northern Ukraine and the Poltava Oblast 
(4.8%, 5.0%) in central Ukraine. The special status cities were the small-
est in terms of area of the oblasts: Kyiv (0.1%, 0.1%) in northern Ukraine 
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and Sevastopol (0.1%) in southern Ukraine and the following oblasts 
in western Ukraine: Chernivtsi (1.3%, 1.4%), Zakarpattia (2.1%, 2.2%), 
Ternopil (2.3%, 2.4%) and Ivano-Frankivsk (2.3%, 2.4%).
• The largest part of Ukraine is the oblast of central Ukraine (22.0% 
of Ukraine, 23.0% of the country without the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea and Sevastopol). Next in terms of the value of this feature 
are the oblasts of western Ukraine (21.7%, 22.8%), northern Ukraine 
(19.0%, 19.9%), southern Ukraine (18.8%, 15.0%) and eastern Ukraine 
(18.5%, 14.9%).
• In 2004, the quartile group with the greatest demographic potential was 
composed of the Donetsk Oblast in the east of Ukraine (9.9% of the pop-
ulation of the country), Dnipropetrovsk in the center (7.4%), Kharkiv in 
the east (6.0%), Kyiv in the north (5.6%), and the Lviv Oblast in the west 
(5.5%) and the Luhansk oblast in the east of Ukraine (5.2%). Sevastopol 
(0.8%) in the south of Ukraine and the following oblasts: Chernivtsi 
(1.9%) and Volyn (2.2%) in western Ukraine, and Kirovohrad (2.3%) 
in central Ukraine belonged to the oblasts with the lowest population 
numbers at the time, Ternopil (2.4%) in western Ukraine and Kherson 
(2.4%) in southern Ukraine.
• 25.1% of the population of Ukraine lived at that time in the eastern 
Ukrainian oblasts, 22.9% in western Ukraine, 19.5% in central Ukraine, 
17.4% in northern Ukraine and 15.1% in southern Ukraine.
• In 2013 (and thus in the last year for which the DSSU (ДCCУ) statis-
tics on the population of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sev-
astopol are available), the quartile group with the largest population 
overlapped with the quartile group of the oblasts with the highest pop-
ulation in 2004. This situation was similar at the time to the quartile 
group of the least populated oblasts.
• This year, 24.5% of the population of Ukraine (or 25.8% of the popu-
lation of the country without the Crimean Peninsula) lived in eastern 
Ukraine, 23.5% in western Ukraine (24.7%), and central Ukraine 19.0% 
(20.0%), northern Ukraine 17.7% (18.7%) and southern Ukraine 15.4%. 
The population of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol 
at that time was about 2.4 million people, which constituted 5.2% of the 
country’s population (Map 4.5). 
• In 2017 (i.e., three years after Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Pen-
insula), the group of 6 oblasts with the highest demographic potential 
included once again the Donetsk Oblast in eastern Ukraine (9.9% of the 
population of Ukraine without the Crimean Peninsula), Dnipropetro-
vsk in central Ukraine (7.6%), Kyiv (6.9%), the Kharkiv Oblast in east-
ern Ukraine (6.3%), Lviv in the west of Ukraine (6.0%) and Odesa in the 
south (5.6%). The oblasts with the lowest demographic potential were 
Chernivtsi in western Ukraine (2.1%), Kirovohrad in central Ukraine 
(2.3%), Chernihiv in northern Ukraine (2.4%), and Volyn in western 
Ukraine (2.4%), Kherson in southern Ukraine (2.5%) and Ternopil in 
western Ukraine (2.5%).
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Map 4.5 Population in oblasts between 2004 and 2017 (1,000 people).
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
• In 2017, 25.5% of the population of Ukraine lived in eastern Ukraine, 
25.0% in western Ukraine, 19.8% in central Ukraine, 18.9% in northern 
Ukraine and 10.8% in southern Ukraine. The population of Ukraine be-
tween 2004 and 2017 fell from 46.5 million people to 42.5 million people 
(i.e. a decline of 10.5%). If we consider the population of Ukraine with-
out the Crimean Peninsula, then in 2004–2017 it fell from 45.1 million 
people to 42.5 million people (i.e. by 2.6 million people). Also taking 
into account the fact that in the years 2004–2017, the population of the 
capital of Kyiv increased from 2.6 million people to 2.8 million people, 
it will turn out that the population in the provinces of Ukraine (except 
for Kyiv and the Crimean Peninsula annexed by Russia) dropped from 
42.4 million people to 39.6 million people, that is, by 2.9 million people 
(roughly the population of Kyiv) or 6.8% of the population of this part 
of Ukraine.
• If we compare the population in 2004 and 2017 in the oblasts of Ukraine, 
it will turn out that only in two oblasts (Kyiv in the north and the Zakar-
pattia oblasts in the west of Ukraine) the population increased, while in 
others it decreased. In Kyiv, the population increased by 10.5%, while 
in the Zakarpattia Oblast by 0.7% (which in absolute numbers results 
in only 8.7 thousand people). The largest (exceeding 10%) relative de-
clines in the population were recorded in the following oblasts: Cherni-
hiv (14.2%) and Sumy (12.2%) in northern Ukraine, Kirovohrad (12.0%) 
in central Ukraine and Luhansk (11.2%) in eastern Ukraine, Cherkasy 
(10.2%) and Poltava (10.2%) in central Ukraine and Donetsk (10.1%) in 
eastern Ukraine.
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• In 2017, the capital city Kyiv definitely had the highest population den-
sity (3,600 people/km2). High values of this characteristic were also 
noted in the following regions: Donetsk (eastern Ukraine, 159.3 persons/
km2), Lviv (western Ukraine, 116.1 persons/km2), Chernivtsi (western 
Ukraine, 112.0 persons/km2) and Dnipropetrovsk (central Ukraine, 
101.3 people/km2). The lowest population density (below 45 people/km2) 
was observed in the following oblasts: Chernihiv (32.2   people/km2) 
in the north of Ukraine, Kherson Oblast (36.9  people/km2) in the 
south, and the Kirovohrad Oblast (39.1 people/km) km2) and Zhyto-
myr Oblast (41.5 people/km2) in the north of Ukraine. In the Russian- 
occupied Crimean Peninsula in 2013, the population density in 2013 
was 427.4 persons/km2 in Sevastopol and 75.3 persons/km2 in the ARC, 
respectively.
• The eastern Ukrainian oblasts had the highest population density in 
2017 (96.9 people/km2). The next most important were the regions in 
the west of Ukraine (80.8 people/km2), the north (70.2 people/km2) and 
in the center (63.5 people/km2), and the lowest population density was 
in the southern Ukrainian (oblasts: Odesa, Mykolayiv and Kherson, 
53.0 people/km2).7
Figure 4.3 illustrates the trajectories of the population in groups of Ukrain-
ian oblasts. The following conclusions can be drawn from this chart. First of 
all, there were declines in population in all the groups of Ukrainian oblasts in 
the years 2004–2017. Second, the largest losses were recorded in the south of 
Ukraine (where the population dropped from 7.2 million in 2004 to 4.6 mil-
lion at the end of the period researched). However, this was mainly due to the 

















Figure 4.3 Population in groups of oblasts, between 2004 and 2017 (million people).
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
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(i.e., Odesa, Mykolayiv and Kherson), the population dropped from 4.8 mil-
lion people in 2004 to 4.6 million people in 2017 (i.e. by 233,300 people). 
Third, in eastern Ukraine the number of inhabitants in the given time period 
decreased by 1.1 million persons, in central Ukraine by 863,300 persons, in 
the west by 302,400 people and in the north of Ukraine by 262,200 people. 
Fourth, if you consider the fact that in the years 2004–2017 the population of 
Kyiv increased by 236,000 people, it turns out that in the oblasts of northern 
Ukraine with the exception of Kyiv (i.e., Chernihiv, Kyiv, Sumy and Zhyto-
myr) the population dropped by almost 500,000 people.
Table 4.5 summarizes statistical data on the population of Ukrainian cit-
ies with a population exceeding 200,000 residents in 2001 and 2017. From 
statistical data it can be concluded that:
• In 2001, 32 Ukrainian cities had a population of over 200,000. In 2017 
(after the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia) there were 30 
such cities, as Simferopol and Sevastopol have been de facto, outside of 
Ukraine’s jurisdiction since 2014.
• In both 2001 and 2017, the capital City of Kyiv was by far the largest 
Ukrainian city. Over the 16 years considered, the population of Kyiv 
increased by 12.0%.
• In 2001, the population of 4 cities in Ukraine (except Kyiv) exceeded one 
million people. They were Kharkiv (1.5 million people) and Donetsk 
(1.0 million people) in eastern Ukraine, Dnipro (1.1 million people) in 
central Ukraine and Odesa (1.0 million people) in southern Ukraine.
• The largest city with a population of between 500,000 and one million 
inhabitants is Zaporizhzhya in the east, followed by Lviv in the west, 
Kryvyi Rih in the center and Mykolayiv in the south of Ukraine.
• Out of the remaining cities with over 200,000 inhabitants, six were lo-
cated in central Ukraine (Vinnytsya, Poltava, Cherkasy, Kamianske, 
Kropyvnytskyi and Kremenchuk), four in eastern Ukraine (Mariupol, 
Luhansk, Makiyivka and Horlivka), four in northern Ukraine (Cherni-
hiv, Sumy, Zhytomyr and Bila Tserkva), three in southern Ukraine 
(Simferopol, Sevastopol and Kherson) and six cities in western Ukraine 
(Khmelnytskiy, Rivne, Chernivtsi, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk and 
Lutsk).
• 29.5% of those living in cities of more than 200,000 lived in eastern 
Ukraine, 22.0% in northern Ukraine (of which 70.7% in Kyiv), 20.6% 
in central Ukraine, 15.3% in southern Ukraine and 12.7% in western 
Ukraine.
• In 2017, the situation changed (compared to 2001) to the extent that the 
cities of Dnipro and Donetsk ceased to maintain a population of over 
one million (the population of the Dnipro fell by 8.3% to 976,500 people, 
and Donetsk by 8.8% to 927,200 people), while Mykolayiv ceased to be 
a city of over half a million (the population of this city dropped by 4.5% 
to 490,800 people).
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• In the last period surveyed, 29.0% of people living in cities of over 
200,000 lived in eastern Ukraine, 25.1% in northern Ukraine (of which 
73.9% in Kyiv), 20.6% in central Ukraine, 13, 8% in western Ukraine 
and 11.4% in southern Ukraine (not counting around 650,000 – the pop-
ulations of Simferopol and Sevastopol).
• Comparing the population of the cities analyzed here, it turns out that 
the population of seven of these cities increased, while the remaining 
decreased. Growing populations were noted in (as was already men-
tioned) Kyiv (an increase of 12.0%) in northern Ukraine; Chernivtsi 
(10.6%), Ivano-Frankivsk (6.9%) and Khmelnytskiy (5.7%) in western 
Ukraine; Vinnytsya (4.5%), in central Ukraine; Lutsk (3.9%) in western 
Ukraine; and Bila Tserkva (3.8%) in northern Ukraine. The largest (ex-
ceeding 10%) population decreases were recorded in Horlivka (15.2%), 
Makiyivka (10.8%) and Luhansk (10.7%) in the Donbass and Kherson 
(10.7%) in the south of Ukraine.
• In 2017, the number of people living in cities of more than 200,000 fell 
by 6.1%, (excluding the number of inhabitants of Simferopol and Sevas-
topol) where this chart dropped by 2.1%. In northern Ukraine, the value 
of this statistic increased by 7.2%, and in western Ukraine by 2.2%. In 
the remaining groups of oblasts, the population living in cities of more 
than 200,000 fell by 5.8% in central Ukraine, 7.4% in the east of Ukraine 
and 29.8% in the south, respectively (excluding Simferopol and Sevas-
topol, where a drop of 4% was recorded).
Figure 4.4 illustrates the trajectories of the urban population in groups of 
oblasts in 2004–2017. The following conclusions can be drawn from this figure:
• The largest percentage of the urban population in Ukraine was in 
eastern Ukraine (nine to ten million people). Next came the oblasts of 
northern and central Ukraine (5.7–6.2 million people, respectively), and 
western Ukraine (approx. 5.3 million people). The least numerous were 
the cities of the southern Ukrainian oblast (3.0–4.7 million people).
• In the north of Ukraine, the population living in cities increased by 
165,000 people. However, this was mainly due to the growing number of 
residents of the capital, Kyiv. In other cities of northern Ukraine, this 
chart fell by 107,400 people.
• Also, in western Ukraine, the number of urban residents increased (by 
50,000 people).
• In the remaining groups of Ukrainian oblasts, the number of city dwell-
ers was falling. In central Ukraine, this chart fell by 354,300 people, and 
in eastern Ukraine by 759,000 people.
• The largest decreases in the population in cities in 2004–2017 were re-
corded in southern Ukraine. There was a decrease in this volume, of 
approximately 1.7 million people. However, this decline was mainly due 
to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. In the Odesa, Mykolayiv 
and Kherson oblasts, the population living in cities fell (between 2004 
and 2017) from 3.1 million people to 3.0 million people.
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Figure 4.4 Population in groups of oblasts, between 2004 and 2017 (million people).
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
Figure 4.5 illustrates the trajectories of the population living in the country-
side in groups of Ukrainian oblasts in 2004–2017. The following conclusions 
can be drawn from the data illustrated in this figure:
• In contrast to the population living in cities, the highest part of the 
rural population in Ukraine was located in western Ukraine. In the 
years 2004–2017 about 5.3–5.6 million people lived in the countryside. 
In central Ukraine, around 2.7–3.2 million people lived in the coun-
tryside, in northern Ukraine about 1.8–2.2 million people and in the 
east only 1.5–1.9 million people. In southern Ukraine, on the other 
hand, mainly as a result of the Russian armed intervention of 2014 and 
the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, the number of people living 
in villages fell from 2.5 million people, in 2014, to 1.5 million people 
in 2017 (in 2013, i.e., directly before the annexation of Crimea, the 
number of the rural population in the Crimean Peninsula was 756,700 
people).
• The rural population is steadily decreasing in all groups of Ukrain-
ian oblasts. The largest absolute decreases in the population living in 
the countryside were recorded in the south of Ukraine (914,400 people 
between 2004 and 2017), then in central Ukraine (509,000), northern 
Ukraine (427,900 persons), western Ukraine (352,400 persons), while 
the smallest was in eastern Ukraine (337,400 persons).


















Figure 4.5 Village population in oblast groups in 2004–2017 (million people).
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
Map 4.6 Urbanization rates in oblasts in 2004–2017 (%)
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
Map 4.6 illustrates the spatial differentiation of urbanization rates in 
Ukrainian oblasts (on average in 2004–2017), while Figure 4.6 shows the 
trajectories of these rates in groups of oblasts in the researched timeframe. 
The following map and the chart show as follows:
• What is natural, by far the highest urbanization rates were recorded in 
those cities with a special status (i.e. Kyiv and Sevastopol). In Kyiv, this 
rate was 100%, while in Sevastopol (on average in 2004–2013) 93.9%.
• Very high urbanization rates were also recorded in the Donbass (Donetsk 
90.7% and Luhansk 86.8%) in eastern Ukraine, the Dnipropetrovsk 
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Oblast (83.6%) in central Ukraine and the Kharkiv (80.1%) and Zapor-
izhzhya (76.9%) oblasts in eastern Ukraine. 
• In six oblasts, urbanization rates were lower than 50%. These were 
the following oblasts: Zakarpattia (37.1%), Chernivtsi (42.1%), Ivano- 
Frankivsk (43.2%), Ternopil (43.8%) and Rivne (47.6%) in western 
Ukraine and the Vinnytsya Oblast (49.5%) in central Ukraine, border-
ing on both western Ukraine8 and Moldova.
• A more general conclusion can be drawn from this, that is, that the 
oblasts of the left-bank and southern Ukraine, more strongly integrated 
in the past with Russia or the Soviet Union, are still characterized by a 
much higher level of urbanization than the right-bank part of this coun-
try (see also data in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.6).
Figure 4.6 shows the trajectories of urbanization rates in groups of Ukrain-
ian oblasts in 2004–2017. From statistical data it can be concluded that:
• Eastern Ukrainian oblasts had by far the highest rates of urbanization 
(around 85%). Lower urbanization rates were around 10 percentage 
points in the north of Ukraine, which was mainly due to the demo-
graphic potential of the capital City of Kyiv.
• In the oblasts of central Ukraine, the average urbanization rates in 
2004–2017 were about 66.8%, while in central Ukraine 66.2%. The 
 lowest urbanization rates were recorded in the peripheral western 
Ukraine (49.3%), where (as has already been mentioned) there is only 
one large city.
• Urbanization rates were increasing in all oblasts groups. These rates 
increased the fastest in northern Ukraine (by 4.5 percentage points), 
then in central Ukraine (2.5 percentage points), western (1.9 percentage 
points), eastern (1.5 percentage points) and southern Ukraine (0.5 per-
centage points).
• The increase in urbanization rates in northern Ukraine is mainly due to 
the very dynamic increase in the population of Kyiv, combined with the 
gradual depopulation of the rest of this part of Ukraine. In the remain-
ing groups of oblasts, the increasing rates of urbanization are mainly 
due to the fact that Ukrainian villages are depopulating faster than 
Ukrainian cities.
• In all 25 Ukrainian regions (except the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea and Sevastopol), urbanization rates were higher in 2017 than 
in 2004. These rates increased the fastest (by over 3 percentage points) 
in the Chernihiv region (by 6.3 percentage points) in northern Ukraine, 
Khmelnytskiy (5.0 percentage points) in western Ukraine, Vinnytsya 
(4.3 percentage points) in central Ukraine, Sumy (3.8 percentage points) 
in northern Ukraine, Poltava (3.4 percentage points) in central Ukraine, 
Kyiv (3.2) in northern Ukraine and Cherkasy (3.0 percentage points) 
in central Ukraine. In the whole of Ukraine, the urbanization rate in-
creased by 2.1 percentage points.
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Table 4.5  The population in Ukrainian cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants in 
2001 and 2017 (1,000 people)
City Oblast Population in a year Population 
in 2017 (year 
2001 = 100)2001 2017
Kyiv (Київ) City of Kyiv 2,611.3 2,925.8 112.0
Kharkiv (Харків) Kharkiv Oblast 1,470.9 1,439.0 97.8
Odesa (Одеса) Odesa Oblast 1,029.0 1,010.8 98.2
Dnipro (Дніпро) Dnipropetrovsk Oblast 1,065.0 976.5 91.7
Donetsk (Донецьк) Donetsk Oblast 1,016.2 927.2 91.2
Zaporizhzhya 
(Запоріжжя)
Zaporizhzhya Oblast 815.3 750.7 92.1
Lviv (Львів) Lviv Oblast 732.8 728.0 99.3
Kryvyi Rih (Кривий Ріг) Dnipropetrovsk Oblast 669.0 636.3 95.1
Mykolayiv (Миколаїв) Mykolayiv Oblast 514.1 490.8 95.5
Mariupol (Маріуполь) Donetsk Oblast 492.2 449.5 91.3
Luhansk (Луганськ) Luhansk Oblast 463.1 413.4 89.3
Vinnytsya (Вінниця) Vinnytsya Oblast 356.7 372.7 104.5
Makiyivka (Макіївка) Donetsk Oblast 389.6 347.4 89.2
Kherson (Херсон) Kherson Oblast 328.4 293.3 89.3
Poltava (Полтава) Poltava Oblast 318.0 292.0 91.8
Chernihiv (Чернігів) Chernihiv Oblast 305.0 291.6 95.6
Cherkasy (Черкаси) Cherkasy Oblast 295.4 281.5 95.3
Khmelnytskiy 
(Хмельницький)
Khmelnytskiy Oblast 254.0 268.5 105.7
Zhytomyr (Житомир) Zhytomyr Oblast 284.2 267.4 94.1
Chernivtsi (Чернівці) Chernivtsi Oblast 240.6 266.0 110.6
Sumy (Суми) Sumy Oblast 293.1 265.6 90.6
Horlivka (Горлівка) Donetsk Oblast 292.3 247.9 84.8
Rivne (Рівне) Rivne Oblast 248.8 247.4 99.4








Kirovohrad Oblast 254.1 229.6 90.4
Kremenchuk 
(Кременчук)
Poltava Oblast 234.1 222.3 95.0
Ternopil (Тернопіль) Ternopil Oblast 227.8 217.9 95.7
Lutsk (Луцьк) Volyn Oblast 208.8 217.0 103.9
Bila Tserkva
(Біла Церква)
Kyiv Oblast 200.1 207.7 103.8
Simferopol 
(Сімферополь)
ARC 343.6 – –
Sevastopol 
(Севастополь)
City of Sevastopol 342.5 – –
Central Ukraine 3,448.1 3,248.2 94.2
Eastern Ukraine 4,939.5 4,575.1 92.6
North Ukraine 3,693.8 3,958.1 107.2
South Ukraine 2,557.6 1,794.8 70.2





Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
a Ukraine without the ARC and Sevastopol.

















Figure 4.6 Urbanization rates in oblast groups in 2004–2017 (%).
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
4.5 Summary
The considerations can be summarized as follows:
 i The Mazowieckie, Śląskie and Wielkopolskie voivodeships were char-
acterized by the largest demographic potential. The lowest potential 
was found in the Opolskie, Lubuskie, Świętokrzyskie and Podlaskie 
voivodeships.
 ii The group of oblasts with the highest demographic potential was 
composed of the Donetsk region in the east of Ukraine, Dnipropet-
rovsk in central Ukraine and the Kharkiv oblasts in the east of that 
 country. Sevastopol in the Crimea and the Chernivtsi and Volyn 
oblasts in western Ukraine were characterized by having the lowest 
population.
i ii In the voivodeship groups, the largest population was recorded in the 
voivodeships of central Poland (about 15 million people), followed by 
Western Poland (about ten million people) and eastern Poland (about 
eight million people). In the voivodeships of western and central Po-
land, the population had a slight upward trend, while in eastern Poland 
it was decreasing.
 iv In 2017, about a quarter of the population of Ukraine lived in the east of 
this country, ¼ in the west, almost 20% in central and northern Ukraine 
and just over 10% in southern Ukraine.
 v All oblast groups in the years 2004–2017 suffered a decrease in popu-
lation. The population declined by far the fastest in southern Ukraine 
(due to the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula), and then 
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in the oblasts of the pro-Russian separatists in the regions of eastern 
Ukraine (Donbas). The lowest drops in population were recorded in the 
west and north of Ukraine.
 vi The voivodeships of central Poland had the highest population density, 
followed by Mazowieckie Voivodeship, the western Poland voivode-
ships, and the smallest value of this variable (over two times lower than 
in Central Poland) was in the voivodeships of eastern Poland.
 vii In 2017, the industrial oblasts of eastern Ukraine were by far the highest 
in population density. Next in line (due to the value of this variable) 
were the oblasts of western, northern, central and southern Ukraine.
 viii In 2004, there were 18 cities in Poland with a population exceeding 
200,000 persons, and in 2017 there were 16 (the population of Gliwice 
and Kielce fell below 200,000). Among the largest Polish cities, the pop-
ulation of Warsaw is growing the fastest, while Łódź and the cities of 
the Górny Śląsk-Zagłębie agglomeration are depopulating the fastest. 
What’s more, the total population of all cities of over 200,000 inhabit-
ants in eastern Poland was lower than the population of Warsaw. The 
situation was similar with the total population of cities of over 200,000 
in western Poland.
 ix In 2001, there were 32 cities in Ukraine over 200,000; since 2014 (after 
the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, in which Sevastopol 
and Simferopol are located), the number of these cities has dropped 
to 30. By far, the fastest growth in population in the years 2001–2017 
was noted in the capital of Kyiv and in the city of Chernivtsi, located 
near the borders with Romania and Moldova, in the province of Buk-
ovina. The population of Ivano-Frankivsk and Khmelnytskiy in west-
ern Ukraine, Vinnytsya in central Ukraine, Lutsk in western Ukraine 
and Bila Tserkva in northern Ukraine also increased. The population 
of Horlivka, Makiyivka and Luhansk in Donbas and Kherson in the 
south of Ukraine fell the fastest. In 2017, the total population of cities of 
more than 200,000 in western or southern Ukraine was smaller than the 
population of Kyiv.
 x The highest rates of urbanization were found in central Poland (mainly 
due to the Górny Śląsk-Zagłębie agglomeration) and the Mazowieckie 
Voivodeship (due to the Warsaw agglomeration), followed by western 
Poland, and the lowest (in the case of population density) was in the ag-
ricultural voivodeships of eastern Poland (where these rates were more 
than 15 percentage points lower than in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship).
 xi In the most industrialized regions of eastern Ukraine, urbanization 
rates were around 85%. Next in terms of urbanization rates were the 
oblasts located in the north of Ukraine (about 75%), in central and 
southern Ukraine (over 65%) and the lowest (below 50%) in the oblasts 
of western Ukraine.
 xii In all groups of voivodeships (except for the voivodeships of eastern 
Poland) urbanization rates fell in 2004–2017. This resulted mainly from 
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the fact that a part of the population of the urban districts moved to 
neighboring villages. On the other hand, the growing urbanization rates 
in eastern Poland were the result of the fact that the number of the rural 
population in this part of Poland fell slightly faster than the number of 
the urban population.
 xiii In contrast, in Ukraine, urbanization rates were rising in all oblasts 
groups. This resulted from the fact that Ukrainian villages depopulated 
in the analyzed period of time, much faster than Ukrainian cities. 
Notes
 1 At that time, the Volhynian Voivodeship also included the city of Rivne, which 
is now the capital of the Rivne Oblast.
 2 For a more extensive description of the general characteristics and division 
of Ukrainian provinces into group of oblasts see, e.g. Tokarski, Chugaievska, 
Chugaievska (2019).
 3 Left-bank Ukraine (Right Bank Ukraine) is the part of Ukraine that lies on the 
left (right) of the largest Ukrainian river – the Dnieper. In left-bank Ukraine 
there are therefore the following oblasts: Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Luhansk, 
Donetsk, most of the Zaporizhia oblasts, the eastern parts of the Kyiv, Cherkasy 
and Dnipropetrovsk regions, the south-eastern part of the Cherkasy oblast and 
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.
 4 The population of Gliwice fell below 200,000 persons in 2005, and Kielce in 
2013.
 5 The first (second, third, fourth) quartile group will be understood hereinafter as 
a set of provinces or oblasts characterized by the value of the analyzed statistical 
feature higher than the third quartile (between the third and fourth quartiles, 
between the second and third quartiles, lower than the third quartile).
 6 It seems that the low level of urbanization in the Małopolskie voivodeship results 
from the mountainous terrain found in the southern part of this voivodeship.
 7 In 2013, the population density of the southern Ukraine oblasts together with the 
ARC and Sevastopol was 61.7 people/km2.
 8 Urbanization rates were also low in other western Ukrainian oblasts. In the 
Volyn oblast, the average urbanization rates in 2004–2017 were 51.6%, in the 
Khmelnytskyi oblast 54.6%, and only in the Lviv oblast (mainly due to the urban 
potential of Lviv) did these rates exceed 60% (on average in the period consid-
ered here they were 60.7%).
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the spatial diversity of the eco-
nomic potential of Polish voivodeships and Ukrainian oblasts. Absolute 
economic potential is equated with the amount of GDP. Relative economic 
potential is understood as GDP per capita.
The timeframe and sources of statistical data are the same as those used 
in Chapter 4.
5.2 Economic potential of Polish voivodeships
Map 5.1 illustrates the spatial diversity of GDP in voivodeships in 2004–
2016. The following conclusions can be drawn from this map and data on 
this macroeconomic variable:1
• The highest levels of GDP in 2004–2016 were recorded in the Ma-
zowieckie (PLN 331.4 billion, 21.6% of Polish GDP), Śląskie (PLN 196.8 
billion, 12.8%) and Wielkopolskie (PLN 146.9 billion, 9.6%) voivode-
ships. A high level of this variable was also recorded in the Dolnośląskie 
(127.8 billion PLN, 8.3%), Małopolskie (118.7 billion PLN, 7.7%) and 
Łódzkie (PLN 94.3 billion, 6.1%) voivodeships.
• The group of voivodeships with a low value of this variable included the 
Zachodniopomorskie (PLN 59.0 billion, 3.8%) Warmińsko-Mazurskie
(PLN 41.9 billion, 2.7%) and Świętokrzyskie (PLN 38.9 billion, 2, 5%) 
voivodeships. However, the group of voivodeships with the lowest value 
of this variable was composed of the Podlaskie (PLN 34.8 billion, 2.3%), 
Lubuskie (PLN 34.8 billion, 2.3%) and Opolskie (PLN 33.6 billion, 
2.2%) voivodeships.
• When comparing GDP data for 2004 and 2016 in individual voivode-
ships, it turns out that the value of this variable increased in each of 
these voivodeships. The largest (exceeding 60%) increases in this mac-
roeconomic variable were recorded in the following voivodeships: 
  
5 The economic potential of 
Polish voivodeships and 
Ukrainian oblasts
Nataliia Chugaievska, Oleksii Kelebaj and 
Tomasz Tokarski
The economic potential 87
Map 5.1  GDP in voivodeship groups in 2004–2016 (PLN billion, according to 2015 
prices)
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
Mazowieckie by 70.1% (4.2% on average annually), Dolnośląskie by 
70.5% (4.5%), Małopolskie by 64.6% (4.2%), Wielkopolskie by 63.7% 
(4.2%) and Pomorskie by 61.5% (4.1%). The lowest increases in this var-
iable were recorded in the Śląskie 39.9% (2.8%), Opolskie 36.6% (2.6%) 
and Świętokrzyskie 35.7% (2.6%) voivodeships.
• In the voivodeships of central Poland, in the years 2004–2016, 36.9% of 
the Polish GDP was generated, in the voivodeships of western Poland 
it was 26.2%, in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship 21.5%, while in the five 
voivodeships of eastern Poland only 15.4%.
• Figure 5.1 illustrates the trajectories of GDP in the Mazowieckie 
Voivodeship and other groups of voivodeships. This graph shows the 
following:
• In the voivodeships of central Poland, GDP increased from PLN 
450.6 billion in 2004 to PLN 678.2 billion in 2016. In the voivodeships of 
western Poland the value of this macroeconomic variable increased from 
PLN 306.3 billion to PLN 487.1 billion, in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship 
from PLN 241.6 billion to PLN 413.1 billion, while in the voivodeships 
of eastern Poland from 188.7 billion PLN billion to PLN 276.8 billion.













Figure 5.1 G DP in voivodeship groups in 2004–2016 (PLN billion, according to 
2015 prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
• On average, in 2004–2016, the Polish GDP grew at a rate of 3.8%. The 
value of this variable was rising the fastest before the global crisis, that 
is, before 2009 (the average annual GDP growth rate was 5.1% at the 
time). In 2010–2013, the growth rate of this variable in Poland dropped 
to 1.9%, before rising to 4.2%.
• In 2004–2009, GDP grew the fastest in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship 
(6.0%), then in the voivodeships of western Poland (5.4%) and central 
Poland (4.6%), and the slowest in the voivodeships of eastern Poland 
(4.5%).
• During the economic slowdown (2009–2013) caused by the global finan-
cial crisis, the Mazowieckie Voivodeship continued to develop the fast-
est (2.9%) followed by the voivodeships of western Poland (1.9%) and 
central Poland and eastern Poland (1.6% each).
• Starting from 2013, the average annual GDP growth rate in the Ma-
zowieckie Voivodeship increased to 4.4%, in western Poland to 4.3%, in 
central Poland to 4.2% and in eastern Poland to 3.3%. 
• As a result of these changes, the shares of the Mazowieckie Voivodeship 
and the voivodeships of western Poland in the creation of the Polish 
GDP increased, while in the other two groups of voivodeships it de-
creased. And so the share of the Mazowieckie Voivodeship grew from 
20.4% to 22.3% and in the voivodeships of western Poland from 25.8% to 
26.3%. The share of the voivodeships of central Poland in GDP fell from 
38.0% to 36.6%, while in the voivodeships of eastern Poland it declined 
from 15.9% to 14.9%.
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Map 5.2  GDP per capita in voivodeships in 2004–2016 (PLN, in thousands, accord-
ing to 2015 prices)
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
Map 5.2 illustrates the spatial differentiation of GDP per capita in Poland’s 
voivodeships in the research period (see also Figure 5.2 – in the groups of Po-
land’s voivodeships). The following conclusions can be drawn from this fig-
ure (see also, for example, Tokarski 2005a; Trojak, Tokarski 2013; Mroczek 
et al. 2014; Filipowicz, Tokarski 2015; Trojak 2015 or Filipowicz 2017, 2019):
• The Mazowieckie Voivodeship had by far the highest GDP per capita 
(PLN 63.0 thousand), which resulted mainly from the economic poten-
tial of Warsaw together with the Warsaw agglomeration and the city 
of Płock. The Dolnośląskie (44.1 thousand) and Wielkopolskie (PLN 
42.8 thousand) voivodeships in western Poland were also characterized 
by very high levels of this variable.
• The group of voivodeships with a high GDP per capita included the 
three voivodeships of central Poland: Śląskie (PLN 42.5 thousand), Po-
morskie (PLN 38.8 thousand) and Łódzkie.
• However, the group of voivodeships with a low, and the lowest GDP per 
capita, included the Opolskie Voivodeship (PLN 33.0 thousand) from west-
ern Poland and five voivodeships from eastern Poland: Świętokrzyskie 
(30.5 thousand PLN), Warmińsko-Mazurskie (29.2  thousand) PLN), 
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Podlaskie (PLN 29.1 thousand), Podkarpackie (28.4 thousand PLN) and 
Lubelskie (28.0 thousand PLN).
• As in the case of GDP, the GDP per capita in 2016 in each voivodeship 
was higher than in 2004. The fastest GDP per capita increase was in 
Dolnośląskie (by 69.9%, i.e., 4.5% on average per year), Mazowieckie 
(64.0%, 4.2%), Małopolskie (58.7%, 3.9%), and Wielkopolskie (58.3%, 
3.9%) and Łódzkie (57.5%, 3.9%). The lowest increases in this variable 
were recorded in the following voivodeships: Opolskie (44.6%, 3.1%), 
Zachodniopomorskie (44.3%, 3.1%), Śląskie (44.2%, 3.1%), Kujawsko–
Pomorskie (43.9%, 3.1%) and Świętokrzyskie (39.6%, 2.8%).
Figure 5.2 presents the trajectories of GDP per capita in voivodeship groups. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from this figure:
• The shape of these trajectories was similar to the trajectory of GDP, 
as the variability of GDP was much greater than the variability of the 
population. 
• The GDP per capita of the Mazowieckie Voivodeship in 2004 was higher 
than the value of this variable in each of the other groups of voivode-
ships at the end of the research period.
• The GDP per capita of the voivodeships of western Poland in 2004 
accounted for 65.2% of the value of this variable in the Mazowieckie 
Voivodeship, whereas in central Poland it was 64.8% and in east-
ern Poland only 49.0%. In 2016, these indicators were (respectively) 














Figure 5.2 G DP per capita in voivodeship groups in 2004–2016 (PLN, in thousands, 
according to 2015 prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
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5.3 Economic potential of Ukrainian oblasts
Map 5.3 illustrates the spatial differentiation of GDP in the oblasts of 
Ukraine in 2004–2017. The following conclusions can be drawn from this 
map (see also Chugaievska, Tokarski 2018; Tokarski et al. 2019 or Anilovska 
et al. 2019):2
• Almost every five UAH (20%) of the Ukrainian GDP is produced in the 
capital of Kyiv (which is both the administrative and political center as 
well as the scientific, educational, service, communication and financial 
center of Ukraine).3 On average, in 2004–2017 Kyiv’s GDP was about 
0.5 trillion UAH (19.5% of Ukrainian GDP).
• The group of oblasts with a GDP of 100–300 billion UAH included 
Donetsk (271.3 billion UAH, 10.5% of Ukraine’s GDP), Kharkiv 
(154.8 billion UAH, 6.0%) and Zaporizhzhya (108.0 billion UAH, 4.2%) 
in eastern Ukraine; Dnipropetrovsk (261.6 billion UAH, 10.1%) and Pol-
tava (105.4 billion UAH, 4.1%) in central Ukraine; Odesa (123.6 billion 
UAH, 4.8%) in southern Ukraine; Kyiv (111.5 billion UAH, 4.2%) in 
the north of Ukraine; and Lviv (106.9 billion UAH, 4.1%) in the west of 
Ukraine.
• In 11 oblasts and one city with a special status (Sevastopol), the average 
annual GDP in 2004–2017 (or 2004–2013 in the case of Sevastopol) did 
not exceed UAH 50 billion. The statistics in the following oblasts were 
as follows: Khmelnytskyi (47.0 billion UAH, 1.8% of Ukraine’s GDP), 
Rivne (40.4 billion UAH, 1.6%), Zakarpattia (36.7 billion UAH, 1.4%), 
Volyn (36.4 billion UAH, 1.4%), Ternopil (31.3 billion UAH, 1.2%) and 
Map 5.3  GDP in oblasts in 2004–2017 (UAH million, according to 2016 prices)
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
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Chernivtsi (23.6 billion UAH, 0.9%) in western Ukraine; Sumy (46.3 bil-
lion UAH, 1.8%), Zhytomyr (44.4 billion UAH, 1.7%) and Chernihiv 
(43.0 billion UAH, 1.7%) in northern Ukraine; Kirovohrad (41.2 billion 
UAH, 1.6%) in central Ukraine; and Kherson (37.0 billion UAH, 1.4%) 
and a city with a special status, that is Sevastopol4 (18.0 billion UAH, 
0.7%), in the south of Ukraine.
• Regarding the oblast groups, the oblasts of northern Ukraine generated 
on average 29.3% of the Ukrainian GDP in 2004–2013 (Kyiv itself, as 
already mentioned, had 19.5%), eastern Ukraine 24.4%, central Ukraine 
20.6%, western Ukraine 14.7% and southern Ukraine 11.1%.
• Hence, we may come to a more general conclusion that the greatest 
economic potential of Ukraine was concentrated in Left-bank Ukraine 
(Kyiv, the Kyiv region, the city of Dnipro, the Donbas, Kharkiv, Zapor-
izhzhya), in two coastal oblasts (Odesa and Mykolayiv) and the Lviv 
Oblast in western Ukraine. Kyiv, as already mentioned, is an admin-
istrative, communication center of Ukraine. The city of Dnipro is the 
center of financial services of the country, and an important center of 
political, cultural and educational life in central Ukraine. Kharkiv, 
Zaporizhzhya and Donbas are the main centers of the Ukrainian heavy 
and mining industries. The high level of economic development of the 
Odesa Oblast is mainly associated with the port of Odesa. Mykolayiv 
and the Mykolayiv region are a very important communication junc-
tion (road, rail, sea, river and air) in the south of Ukraine, and Lviv 
is by far the most prominent, demographically and economically, city 
in the west of the country (see also Chugaievska et al. 2017, 2019 or 
Chugaievska, Tokarski 2018).
Figure 5.3 illustrates the trajectories of GDP in the oblasts on average in 
2004–2017. This graph shows the following:
• When analyzing the development of the GDP trajectory in oblast 
groups, the timeframe analyzed here should be divided into five sub- 
periods. In the years 2004–2008, the Ukrainian economy was devel-
oping very dynamically. However, in the years 2008–2009 the global 
financial crisis and the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict led to a signifi-
cant decline of the GDP in Ukraine. In 2010–2013, the Ukrainian econ-
omy returned to the path of rapid economic growth, while in 2014–2015 
(i.e., the first years after the Euro-Maidan) a deep recession occurred in 
the Ukrainian economy as a result of the political and military conflict 
with Russia (Crimea) or pro-Russian separatists (Donbas). However, in 
2016–2017 the Ukrainian GDP slowly began to increase again.
• In the years 2004–2008, the oblast groups of eastern and northern 
Ukraine were characterized by the highest absolute economic poten-
tial (in the order of 600–800 billion UAH). The average, according 
to Ukrainian conditions, were those regions located in the center of 















Figure 5.3 G DP in oblast groups in 2004–2017 (UAH billion, according to 2016 
prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
Ukraine (430–580 billion UAH), while the lowest were the regions of 
western Ukraine (340–390 billion UAH) and the southern part of the 
country (280–340 billion UAH).
• In 2004–2008, the GDP grew the fastest in central Ukraine (at a 7.2% 
yearly average), followed by northern (5.0%), eastern (4.9%), and south-
ern Ukraine (4.4%), with the slowest GDP increase noted in western 
Ukraine (3.0%). As a result, the share of individual oblast groups in 
the production of the Ukrainian GDP changed as follows: the share 
of central Ukraine increased from 18.6% to 20.2%, northern Ukraine 
remained unchanged (26.5%), eastern Ukraine fell from 27.8% to 27.7%, 
southern Ukraine decreased from 12.3% to 11.9%, and western Ukraine 
fell from 14.7% to 13.6%.
• The global financial crisis combined with the Ukrainian-Russian gas 
conflict affected quite significantly the most highly industrialized re-
gions of eastern Ukraine (where GDP fell by 19.3%) and central Ukraine 
(a decline of 17.1%). In western Ukraine, the GDP fell by 12.7%, in the 
north by 10.8% and in the oblasts of southern Ukraine only by 8.8%. 
This resulted in an increase in the share of western Ukrainian oblasts 
in the Ukrainian GDP by 1.1 percentage points, southern Ukrainian 
oblasts by 0.8 of a percentage points, western oblasts by 0.3 of a percent-
age point and a decrease in the share of central Ukrainian oblasts by 0.6 
of a percentage point and eastern Ukraine by 1.6 points.
• An economic recovery after the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict resulted 
in the development of the regions of northern Ukraine (5.5% yearly 
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average) the fastest, then western (4.2%), central (4.0%), and southern 
Ukraine (1.4%), and the slowest progress in oblasts located in the east 
of the country (only 0.8%). In 2013, the oblasts in the north of Ukraine 
already produced 30.1% of Ukraine’s GDP (an increase of 3.5 percent-
age points compared to 2004), the east 23.6% (a decrease of 4.2 percent-
age points), the center 20.1% (an increase of 1.4 percentage points), the 
west 14.4% (a decrease of 0.3 of a percentage point) and the south 11.8% 
(a  decrease of 0.4 of a percentage point).
• The political-military conflict with Russia after the Euro-Maidan also 
strongly influenced the country’s economy. It affected (most obviously) 
the eastern Ukrainian oblasts (where the struggle with pro-Russian sep-
aratists in the Donbas is still ongoing, with a greater or lesser intensity) 
and southern Ukraine (the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea with Sevastopol).
• In eastern Ukraine oblasts, in 2014–2015 the GDP fell by 20.5% at a 
per annum average. However, the decrease in this macroeconomic value 
was not equal in all regions of this part of Ukraine. In the Luhansk 
region, the GDP in 2015 was as much as 72.0% lower than in 2013, in 
the Donetsk region by 55.0%, in the Kharkiv region by 5.6%, and in the 
Zaporizhzhya region by 5.7%.
• In the oblasts located in the south of Ukraine, the GDP in 2013–2015 
fell by 35.4%. However, this was mainly the result of the annexation of 
the Crimean Peninsula by Russia. If one compares the total GDP of the 
three remaining regions of this part of Ukraine (i.e., Kherson, Myk-
olayiv and Odesa), it turns out that in 2013–2015, the GDP fell by 5.2%.
• In the remaining groups of oblasts in the first two years after the Euro- 
Maidan, drops in the GDP were not as drastic as in the east and south 
of Ukraine. The average annual rates of decline of this macroeconomic 
variable in central Ukraine were 1.5%, in northern Ukraine 2.7% and in 
the western part of the country 2.5%.
• As a result of these changes, the share of northern Ukrainian oblasts in 
the generation of Ukraine’s GDP increased to 33.8%, the central part 
of the country to 23.1%, western Ukraine to 16.2%, while the share of 
eastern Ukrainian oblasts fell to 17.7% and in the south to 9.1%.
• In 2016–2017, the Ukrainian economy began to expand again. The GDP 
in northern Ukraine grew at an average annual rate of 5.5%, while in the 
south by 2.9%. The value of this variable increased much more slowly in 
western (1.1%), eastern (0.6%) and central Ukraine (0.2%).
• The effect of these changes was that the GDP in 2017 in three out of 
the five oblast groups considered here was higher than in 2004. In 
the regions of northern Ukraine, the value of this variable increased 
by 41.6% (2.7% annual average), central Ukraine by 24.4% (1.7%) and 
western Ukraine by 12.8% (0.9%). In eastern Ukraine, the GDP in 2017 
was lower than at the beginning of the research period by 35.6% (an 
average annual decrease of 3.3%), while in southern Ukraine by 21.7% 
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(a  decreases of 1.9%). However, if we consider only the Mykolayiv, 
Odesa and Kherson oblasts, it turns out that the GDP increased here 
between 2001 and 2017 by 9.8% (a 0.7% yearly average).
• When comparing the absolute value of GDP in 2004 and 2017 in the 25 
regions of Ukraine (excluding the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and 
Sevastopol), it turns out that in 21 of these regions the GDP increased 
and in four regions it fell (in Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia in western 
Ukraine and in Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine). The high-
est (exceeding 30%) increases in this macroeconomic variable were re-
corded in the Kyiv Oblast (68.6%, 4.1% per annum), in the City of Kyiv 
(44.9%, 2.9%) in the north of Ukraine and in the Vinnytsya (37, 3%, 
2.5%) and Cherkasy (30.2%, 2.0%) oblasts, in the center of the country 
(Map 5.4). In the Luhansk Oblast, the GDP fell by as much as 72.7% 
(9.5% on average per year), in the Donetsk Oblast by 58.7% (6.6%), in 
the Zakarpattia Oblast by 10.0% (0.8%) and in the Chernivtsi Oblast by 
3.7% (0.3%).
• In Sevastopol, the GDP in 2013 was 34.4% higher than in 2001 (and 
therefore the GDP grew annually at a rate of 3.3%), while in the Autono-
mous Republic of Crimea, it increased at this time by 26.0% (an average 
annual growth of 2.6%).
• Map 5.1 illustrates the spatial diversity of GDP per capita in oblasts 
during 2004–2017 (see also Figure 5.4). The following conclusions can 
be drawn from this figure:
• The capital of Kyiv had by far the highest value of this macroeconomic 
variable (179.9 thousand UAH). However, if we aggregate the GDP per 
Map 5.4 G DP per capita in oblasts in 2004–2017 (UAH, in thousands, according 
to 2016 prices)
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
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capita of an inhabitant of Kyiv together with the Kyiv Oblast (which 
may be compared with the capital-Mazowieckie Voivodeship in Poland, 
or with the Kharkiv, Odesa or Dnipropetrovsk oblasts in Ukraine), the 
average GDP per capita falls here to a level of 129.3 thousand UAH.
• The Dnepropetrovsk (78.3 thousand UAH), Poltava (70.9 thousand 
UAH) and Kyiv (64.3 thousand UAH) had a rather high GDP per capita 
(for Ukrainian conditions), a result which was also characteristic of the 
Donetsk region in the Donbas (60,700 UAH).
• Those oblasts located in the Dnieper valley (except for the Kher-
son Oblast), eastern Ukrainian oblasts and the Odesa and Mykolayiv 
coastal oblasts were characterized by the highest level of the macroeco-
nomic variable analyzed here(GDP per capita). This is due to the fact 
that (first of all) in this part of Ukraine there are nine of the ten largest 
Ukrainian cities (except Lviv) and (second) the region of the Dnieper 
valley is very strongly influenced by the economic ripple effects from the 
rest of Ukraine (Chugaievska et al. 2017).
• Of the five oblasts with the lowest GDP per capita, three were located 
in the west, and one in the north and south of Ukraine. These oblasts 
were Zakarpattia (29.4 thousand UAH), Ternopil (28.9 thousand UAH) 
and Chernivtsi (26.0 thousand UAH) in western Ukraine; Zhytomyr 
(34.6 thousand UAH) in northern Ukraine; and Kherson (33.9 thousand 
UAH) in southern Ukraine.
• In general, the oblasts of Left-bank Ukraine together with the Black Sea 
oblasts of Odesa and Mykolayiv were characterized by a higher level of 
GDP per capita than the Right-bank oblasts (with the exception of the Lviv 
Oblast, which maintained an average GDP per capita of 42,000 UAH).
• Comparing the data on GDP per capita in 2017 with the value of this var-
iable from 2001, in 25 out of 27 Ukrainian oblasts (excluding the Auton-
omous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol), it turns out that – as in the 
case of GDP – in 21 of these oblasts the value of this variable increased, 
while in four (the Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia oblasts in western Ukraine, 
and the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in eastern Ukraine) this value fell.
• The highest (exceeding 30%) per capita GDP growth was recorded in 
the following oblasts: Kyiv (an increase of 73.3%, average annual growth 
of 4.3%)5 in northern Ukraine, Vinnytsya (50.5%, 3.2%) and Cherkasy 
(45.4%, 2.9%) in central Ukraine, Khmelnytskyi (35.8%, 2.4%) in the 
west of Ukraine, Dnipropetrovsk (34.3%, 2.3%) in central Ukraine, 
Zhytomyr (34, 0%, 2.3%) and in City Kyiv (33.1%, 2.2%) in the north 
of Ukraine, while in the Kirovohrad (32.7%, 2.2%) and Poltava (32.1%, 
2.2%) oblasts in central Ukraine.
• In the Chernivtsi Oblast, the GDP per capita in 2017 was 2.8% lower 
than in 2001 (an average annual decrease of 0.2%), in the Zakarpattia 
region it fell by 10.4% (0.8% annual average), in the Donetsk GDP it fell 
by 53.9% (5.8% on average per year), while in the Luhansk Oblast, the 
GDP declined by as much as 69.2% (8.6%).
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• In Sevastopol, the 2013 GDP per capita was 32.3% higher than in 2001 
(and therefore the GDP grew annually at a rate of 3.2%), while in the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea as a whole, it increased by 21.8% (an 
average annual growth of 2.6%).
• Figure 5.4 illustrates the trajectories of GDP per capita in groups of 
Ukrainian oblasts. This graph shows the following:
• Trajectories of GDP per capita in oblast groups are similar in shape to 
the trajectory of GDP. This is due to the fact that in the research period 
in Ukraine (as in Poland), the variability of GDP in the oblast groups 
was much greater than the volatility of the population. 
• By far the highest GDP per capita (mainly due to Kyiv and, to a lesser 
extent, the Kyiv Oblast) was recorded in the group of oblasts of north-
ern Ukraine. Moreover, no other group of oblasts in 2004–2017 at-
tained the level of GDP per capita of the oblasts of northern Ukraine 
from 2004.
• In the group of industrial oblasts of eastern Ukraine (characterized by 
the GDP per capita in 2004, the highest after that of northern Ukraine), 
as a result of the gas conflict with Russia in 2009 and the struggle with 
pro-Russian separatists in Donbas, the value of this variable dropped 
from 54.5 thousand UAH in 2004 to 38.7 thousand UAH in 2017 (there-
fore by 29.0%).
• The GDP per capita in the central Ukrainian oblasts was (on average 
throughout the entire research period) about 32.9% higher than in 
southern Ukraine and 70.4% higher than in western Ukraine. However, 
in relation to the GDP per capita of northern Ukraine, the value of this 


















Figure 5.4  GDP per capita in oblast groups in 2004–2017 (UAH, in thousands, ac-
cording to 2016 prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
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5.4 Summary
 i As in the case of demographic potential, the largest economic poten-
tial (measured in GDP) was recorded in the Mazowieckie, Śląskie and 
Wielkopolskie voivodeships. The lowest economic potential was re-
corded in the Podlaskie, Lubuskie and Opolskie voivodeships.
 ii By far the highest GDP level in 2004–2017 was recorded in the capital 
City of Kyiv, where literally every 5th UAH (20%) of Ukraine’s GDP 
was generated. A high level of this macroeconomic variable was also 
recorded in the Donetsk, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhya regions located in 
eastern Ukraine. Nevertheless, the lowest absolute economic potential 
was found in the Zakarpattia, Volyn, Ternopil and Chernivtsi oblasts in 
western Ukraine as well as in Kherson and in the special status city of 
Sevastopol in southern Ukraine.
 iii The largest part of the Polish GDP in 2004–2016 was generated by the 
voivodeships of central Poland (36.9%), followed by western Poland 
(26.2%), the Mazowieckie Voivodeship (21.5%), and the smallest part by 
the voivodeships of eastern Poland (15.4%).
 iv In Ukraine (mainly due to Kyiv and, to some extent, the Kyiv Oblast), 
the largest part of GDP was generated by the northern regions of the 
country (29.3% of Ukrainian GDP). Next in line were (the most in-
dustrialized) oblasts of eastern Ukraine (24.4%), the oblasts of central 
Ukraine (20.6%), and those of western Ukraine (14.7%). However, the 
oblasts of southern Ukraine had the lowest economic potential (11.1%).
 v The GDP in voivodeship groups rose the most rapidly prior to the global 
financial crisis, and grew the slowest during the crisis itself.
 vi On the other hand, the Ukrainian economy (and groups of oblasts) 
developed the fastest right up until the global financial crisis and the 
Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict. After a one-year recession in 2009, the 
economy returned to a path of economic growth, which was interrupted 
by a deep recession resulting from the political and military conflict 
with Russia and the pro-Russian separatists. This recession hit the two 
oblasts of Donbas particularly hard, which significantly weakened the 
economic potential of eastern Ukraine.
 vii By far the highest GDP per capita in 2004–2016 was recorded in the 
Mazowieckie Voivodeship. A high GDP was also recorded in the Dol-
nośląskie and Wielkopolskie voivodeships. The lowest GDP per capita 
was recorded in the Opolskie Voivodeship and the five voivodeships of 
eastern Poland.
 viii As in the case of absolute GDP, the capital City of Kyiv had the highest 
GDP per capita, by far. Next in line were the Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava 
and Kyiv oblasts lying in the Dnieper valley. The least developed, eco-
nomically, parts of Ukraine are the Zakarpattia, Ternopil and Cher-
nivtsi oblasts in western Ukraine, Zhytomyr in northern Ukraine, and 
Kherson in southern Ukraine.
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 ix During the research period, the GDP per capita of the voivodeships of 
western Poland accounted for about 62–65% of the value of this varia-
ble in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, central Poland 60–65% and east-
ern Poland only 45–50%. What’s more, because the GDP per capita in 
the most affluent voivodeship, that is, the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, in 
2004–2016 increased by 64.0%, in the provinces of western Poland by 
57.6%, central Poland by 50.4% and the poorest group of those voivode-
ships in eastern Poland by only 47.9%, on the one hand, the development 
gap between the best-developed Mazowieckie Voivodeship and the rest 
of the country is growing and, on the other hand, the gap between the 
least-developed voivodeships of eastern Poland and other groups of 
voivodeships is also increasing.
 x In Ukraine in 2004, the GDP per capita of the eastern Ukrainian oblasts 
constituted 72.6% of the value of this variable in northern Ukraine, 
and it was in central Ukraine 61.9%, southern Ukraine 53.0%, and 
western Ukraine only 42.0%. In 2004–2017, the most prosperous re-
gions of northern Ukraine were developing the fastest (total GDP per 
capita growth by 46.2%), followed by central Ukraine (37.2%), and 
then southern (23.1%) and western Ukraine (16.0%). In contrast, the 
GDP per capita of the eastern Ukrainian oblasts fell by as much as 
29.0% during this timeframe. As a result, the development gap be-
tween the north of Ukraine and the rest of the country widened. In 
2017, the GDP per capita of central Ukraine already accounted for 
only 61.9% of the value of this variable in northern Ukraine, while in 
southern Ukraine it was 45.6%, eastern Ukraine 38.1% and in western 
Ukraine 34.2%.
Notes
 1 All charts given in this section regarding GDP or GDP per capita of the voivode-
ships are expressed in constant prices from 2015.
 2 In 2016, Ukraine’s nominal GDP amounted to 2,385.4 billion hryvnia, while 
 Poland’s was PLN 1,861.1 billion. The real GDP of Ukraine at PPP and fixed 
prices from 2010 was at that time USD 6,281.1 billion, and in Poland USD 
917.8  billion (see https://w3.unece.org/). Therefore, the dollar was (according to 
PPP) was valued at 3.798 hryvnia or 2.010 PLN. From this comes the conclusion 
that 100 hryvnia from 2016, after including PPP, equaled PLN 52.9.
 3 The fact that the capital of the state is also the most developed city (as is the 
case in both Poland and Ukraine) is by no means the rule. For example, the best 
developed cities of Germany are Hamburg and Munich, not the capital Berlin 
(Pastuszka 2016, 2017; Gomółka et al. 2017), while in Italy, the capital region of 
Lazio is much less developed than Lombardy or the province of Trentino-Alto 
Adige (Pastuszka, Tokarski 2017).
 4 In 2004–2013, the average value of GDP generated in the Crimean Peninsula 
(i.e., in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol) amounted to UAH 
95.0 billion (3.6% of the Ukrainian GDP).
 5 In Kyiv, together with the Kyiv Oblast, the GDP per capita increased by 42.7%, 
that is, 2.7% on average per annum.
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter is a continuation of the analyses carried out in Chapters 3–5. 
Chapter 3 presents and discusses the structural changes in the product 
stream and investments in Poland and Ukraine in macroeconomic terms. 
Chapters 4 and 5 began a series of meso-economic analyses. The division 
of a complex, multidimensional and dynamic structure, that is the national 
economy into smaller elements such as regions and sectors of regional econ-
omies, permits a better understanding of the ongoing changes in space and 
its economic structure.
The next parts of this chapter describe changes in the gross value added in 
the following sectors of the economy: agriculture, industry, construction and 
services in Polish voivodeships (2004–2015) and in Ukrainian oblasts (2004–
2016). In the conducted regional analyses, these voivodeships and oblasts 
were divided into groups according to the same criteria as in Chapters 4 
and 5. The data used in this chapter come from the Local Data Bank, Sta-
tistics Poland, (GUS)1 and the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (ДCCУ).2
The analyses conducted in this chapter concern both the absolute and 
relative potential of various sectors of the regional economy. The absolute 
potential of these sectors is measured by the gross value added of individual 
sectors in voivodeships and oblasts, while the relative potential is the share 
of the gross value added in a given sector in the gross value added of four 
major sectors of the region’s economy.
6.2 S ector structure of the product market in Poland
6.2.1 A dded value in agriculture
Figure 6.1 presents the gross value added in agriculture in voivodeship 
groups in 2004–2015. The shape of their trajectory indicates that the value 
added in agriculture has fluctuated significantly in all groups of voivode-
ships throughout the entire research period. The course of the trajectory 
on the graph is probably the result of many factors, the most important of 
which (in the context of the agricultural sector) being climate fluctuations 
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Figure 6.1  Gross value added in agriculture in voivodeship groups in 2004–2015 
(PLN billion, according to 2015 prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
and agricultural policy. It is worth noting that the agricultural potential of 
eastern Poland oscillated in the range of 8.1–11.8 billion PLN and was com-
parable or lower than the potential of western Poland (9.5–12.4 billion PLN) 
or central Poland (9.4–12.0 billion PLN). The Mazowieckie Voivodeship had 
the lowest added value in agriculture (6.2–9.2 billion PLN). In addition, the 
value added in agriculture increased in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship (by 
32%) and in the voivodeships of eastern Poland (by 7%) in 2015 compared 
to 2004; in the other two groups there was a decrease in the value of this 
variable in the years under consideration.
On average, in the years 2004–2015, the highest absolute values of the var-
iable under consideration were recorded in the following voivodeships: Ma-
zowieckie (7.9 billion PLN), Wielkopolskie (5.7 billion PLN) and Łódzkie 
(3.24 billion PLN). In turn, the lowest values were observed in the following 
voivodeships: Lubuskie (1.08 billion PLN), Opolskie (1.07 billion PLN) and 
Podkarpackie (1.00 billion PLN, see Map 6.1). The low added value in agri-
culture in the Lubuskie and Opolskie voivodeships was probably associated 
with the low demographic potential of these voivodeships.
Figure 6.2 shows the share of gross value added in agriculture (in gross 
value added in all sectors of the economy) in groups of voivodeships. The 
share of the agricultural sector in GVA was falling in every group of voivode-
ships. The largest decrease was recorded in the group of voivodeships of 
western Poland (by approx. 2% points), then in central Poland (approx. 1% 
point). The voivodeships of eastern Poland had the highest share of this sec-
tor in the generated gross value added (from 5.2% in 2004 to 3.9% in 2015). 
In turn, the share of the agricultural sector was the lowest in the voivode-
ships of central Poland (in 2004 it was 2.7%, while in 2015 it was only 1.7%).













Figure 6.2  Share of gross value added in agriculture in voivodeship groups in 2004–
2015 (%).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
Map 6.1 G ross value added in agriculture in voivodeships in 2004–2015 (PLN bil-
lion, according to 2015 prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
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The average share of gross value added in agriculture in Poland in the 
years 2004–2015 was 3.0%, so for the entire economy this sector was rather 
marginal. Nevertheless, there are significant differences in the importance 
of this sector on the level of individual voivodeships. The highest share of 
gross value added in agriculture was found in the following voivodeships: 
Podlaskie (7.7%), Warmińsko-Mazurskie (6.2%) and Lubelskie (5.3%). In 
turn, the agricultural sector had the least significance in the generated gross 
value added in the following voivodeships: Małopolskie (1.7%), Dolnośląskie 
(1.6%) and Śląskie (0.8%, i.e., over seven times less than in Podlaskie, see also 
Map 6.2).
6.2.2  Added value in industry
Figure 6.3 shows the gross value added in industry in voivodeship groups. It 
can be observed that in the years 2004–2015, in all groups of voivodeships 
there was an increase in gross value added in industry. The largest increase 
was recorded in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship and in the voivodeships of 
western Poland (an increase of approx. 78% in 2015, compared to 2004). The 
value added in industry is a procyclical variable; in all groups of voivode-
ships there was a decrease in the growth rate after 2008, that is, during the 
global financial crisis. Throughout the entire analyzed period, the highest 
Map 6.2 S hare of gross value added in agriculture in voivodeships on average in 
2004–2015 (%).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
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Figure 6.3  Gross value added in industry in voivodeship groups in 2004–2015 (PLN 
billion, according to 2015 prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
value added in industry was recorded in the voivodeships of central Poland 
(PLN 114.6–175 billion). In addition, the potential of industry located in the 
five eastern Polish voivodeships (PLN 38.6–62.9 billion) was comparable to 
the potential of the industrial sector in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship (PLN 
37.0–65.8 billion). 
On average, in the years 2004–2015 the highest value added in indus-
try was recorded in the following voivodeships: Śląskie (PLN 59.9 billion), 
Mazowieckie (PLN 49.0 billion) and Dolnośląskie (PLN 37.7 billion). The 
lowest values were recorded in the following voivodeships: Opolskie (PLN 
9.0 billion), Świętokrzyskie (PLN 8.8 billion) and Podlaskie (PLN 6.2  billion, 
see Map 6.3).
Figure 6.4 presents the share of gross value added in industry in voivode-
ship groups. The shape of all trajectories is similar, but one can see a slight 
decrease in these shares after 2008 (associated with the global financial 
crisis) and then, from 2013, a renewed increase in the importance of this 
sector in all groups of voivodeships. When comparing 2015 to 2004, an in-
crease in the share of gross value added in industry in all groups can be 
observed, with the largest increase in the variable considered being recorded 
in the provinces of western Poland (by 3.9% points) and eastern Poland (by 
3.2% points). The industrial sector was of the greatest importance for the 
provinces of western Poland and central Poland. The shares of this sector 
in 2004–2015 in these groups changed in the range of 27.3–31.2%. In the 
voivodeships of eastern Poland, the level of the feature considered fluctu-
ated between 22.9% and 26.3%. The lowest share of gross value added in 
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Map 6.3 G ross value added in industry in voivodeships in 2004–2015 (PLN billion, 
according to 2015 prices).
















Figure 6.4  Share of gross value added in industry in voivodeship groups in 2004–
2015 (%).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
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Map 6.4  Share of gross value added in industry in voivodeships in 2004–2015 (%).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
industry was recorded in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship; in the entire ana-
lyzed period it did not exceed 19%.
The average share of gross value added in industry in Poland in 2004–
2015 was 25.7%. The industrial sector had a significant share in the gen-
erated gross value added in the Śląskie (35.0%), Dolnośląskie (33.8%) and 
Lubuskie (31.0%) voivodeships. The lowest shares of the gross value added 
of the considered sector were recorded in the following voivodeships: Lubel-
skie (20.2%), Zachodniopomorskie (20.1%) and Mazowieckie (17.0%, more 
than twice less than in the Śląskie Voivodeship (see Map 6.4)). 
6.2.3 V alue added in construction
Figure 6.5 presents the gross value added in construction in groups of 
voivodeships in the years 2004–2015. The shape of the trajectories of these 
macroeconomic variables allows us to conclude that the value added in this 
sector did not fall after 2008, which means that the sector did not react to 
the global financial crisis. The effects of the crisis have probably been neu-
tralized by significant infrastructure investments throughout Poland related 
to the organization of the Euro 2012 football tournament. A decrease in 
this variable can be perceived only in 2011–2013. In the last two analyzed 
years, the value added in construction increased once again in all groups of 
















Figure 6.5 G ross value added in construction in voivodeship groups in 2004–2015 
(PLN billion, according to 2015 prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
voivodeships. Definitely the highest values of the variable under consider-
ation were obtained in central Poland (PLN 28.7–48.7 billion), followed by 
western Poland (PLN 19.6–32.9 billion), Mazowieckie (PLN 12.1–26.2 bil-
lion) and the voivodeships of eastern Poland (PLN 12.4–18.7 billion). It is 
worth noting that the value added in the construction sector in the Ma-
zowieckie Voivodeship in 2004 was similar to the value of this variable in 
the five voivodeships of eastern Poland. However, in the following years, 
there was a much more rapid growth of the construction sector located in 
the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, and in 2015 its potential was already about 
40% greater than the potential of this sector in the voivodeships of eastern 
Poland.
Map 6.5 illustrates the spatial diversity of gross value added in voivode-
ships in 2004–2015. The following conclusions can be drawn from this map: 
The highest value added in construction was recorded in the Mazowieckie 
(PLN 19.9 billion), Śląskie (PLN 13.3 billion) and Wielkopolskie (PLN 
10.1 billion) voivodeships. In turn, the Opolskie (PLN 2.3 billion), Podlaskie 
(PLN 2.3 billion) and Lubuskie (PLN 2.2 billion) voivodeships recorded the 
lowest values of this variable.
Figure 6.6 shows that the share of the gross value added in the construc-
tion sector in the voivodeships of eastern, central and western Poland was 
very similar. In the years 2004–2007, it oscillated in the range of 7.2–7.7%, 
and then in 2011 it attained a level of almost 9%, while over the next two years 
it fell and in 2013 it was at a level of 7.5–8.0%. The share of the construc-
tion sector in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship was slightly lower; however, in 















Figure 6.6 S hare of gross value added in construction in groups of voivodeships in 
2004–2015 (%).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
Map 6.5  Gross value added in construction in voivodeships in 2004–2015 (PLN 
billion, according to 2015 prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
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Map 6.6  Share of gross value added in construction in voivodeships on average in 
2004–2015 (%).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
2004–2011 it increased from 5.6% to 7.9%, then fell and in 2013 was at 6.9%. 
In recent years, the importance of the construction sector is growing again 
in all voivodeship groups. In addition, when referring to 2004 to 2015, an 
increase in the variable under consideration by approx. 1.7% points in the 
Mazowieckie Voivodeship, 1.2% points in central Poland voivodeships and 
below 1% point in the remaining groups of voivodeships can be observed.
The average gross value added in construction in Poland in the years 
2004–2015 was 7.8%. The highest gross value added in construction was 
recorded in the following voivodeships: Małopolskie (9.5%), Zachodniopo-
morskie (9.5%) and Świętokrzyskie (9.4%). In turn, this sector (construction) 
had the least significance for the economies of the Lubuskie (7.1%), Łódzkie 
(7.0%) and Mazowieckie (6.8%) voivodeships (Map 6.6).
6.2.4 A dded value in services
The service sector is definitely the most important component of gross value 
added in the Polish economy. Figure 6.7 presents the added value in services 
in 2004–2015 in groups of voivodeships. In the analyzed period, in all groups 
of voivodeships, the value of this variable increased (by approx. 60% in the 
Mazowieckie Voivodeship, by 49% in western Poland, by 44% in central 














Figure 6.7 G ross value added in services in voivodeship groups in 2004–2015 (PLN 
billion, according to 2015 prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
Poland and by 38% in eastern Poland). In addition, analyzing the trajectory 
of this variable, one can observe their response to the global financial crisis 
(a slowdown in the value of this variable) after 2008. This reaction results 
from the close links of this sector (primarily the financial and insurance in-
dustry) with the global economy. The highest added value in services in the 
whole analyzed period was recorded in the voivodeships of central Poland 
(PLN 242.4–349.9 billion). Voivodeships in eastern Poland had the lowest 
values of this trait (PLN 107.2–148.1 billion). It is also worth noting that the 
potential of the services sector in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship is similar 
to the potential of five voivodeships of western Poland and definitely higher 
than the potential of five voivodeships of eastern Poland.
By far the highest average value added in services was the Mazowieckie 
Voivodeship (PLN 209.7 billion). The following voivodeships were also dis-
tinguished by the high values of the analyzed variable: Śląskie (96.7 billion 
PLN) and Wielkopolskie (75.2 billion PLN). The lowest added values 
in services were recorded in the following voivodeships: Opolskie (PLN 
2.3 billion), Podlaskie (PLN 2.3 billion) and Lubuskie (PLN 2.2 billion, see 
Map 6.7), which is mainly due to the low demographic and economic poten-
tial of these voivodeships.
Figure 6.8 presents the share of gross value added in groups of voivode-
ships in 2004–2015. In all groups this share remained at a stable, high level, 
although it should be emphasized that there was a slight decrease in this ana-
lyzed feature after 2008, which (as previously mentioned) was associated with 
the global financial crisis. The service sector is by far the most important for 
the Mazowieckie Voivodeship (in the analyzed period the shares of this sec-
tor were in the range of 71.6–74.5%). In eastern Poland, the share of the ser-
vices sector throughout the entire period changed between 61.9% and 65.2%.
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Map 6.7 G ross value added in services in voivodeships in 2004–2015 (PLN billion, 
according to 2015 prices).













Figure 6.8 S hare of gross value added in services in voivodeship groups in 2004–
2015 (%)
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
112 Katarzyna Filipowicz et al.
Map 6.8  Share of gross value added in services in voivodeships on average in 
2004–2015 (%).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
In the other two groups, the level of this variable fluctuated around 60%. 
Comparing 2015 with 2004, it turns out that in all groups of voivodeships 
the share of gross value added in services decreased (by 2.6% points in west-
ern Poland, by 2.4% points in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, by 2.3% points 
and by 0.8% point in central Poland).
The average share of gross value added in the service sector in Poland 
in the years 2004–2015 was 63.5%, and therefore this is the sector which 
definitely dominated in the economy. The service sector was of the greatest 
importance for the following voivodeships: Mazowieckie (73.4%), Lubelskie 
(67.1%) and Zachodniopomorskie (67.0%). The lowest shares of the service 
sector in the gross value added were recorded in the following voivodeships: 
Opolskie (57.8%), Dolnośląskie (57.1%) and Śląskie (56.5%, see Map 6.8).
6.3 S ector structure of the product market in Ukraine
6.3.1  Added value in agriculture
Figure 6.9 illustrates the trajectories of gross value added in agriculture in 
groups of Ukrainian oblasts in 2004–2016. This graph shows the following: 
First, at the beginning of the period under consideration, the highest value 
















Figure 6.9 G ross value added in agriculture in oblasts groups in 2004–2016 (UAH 
billion, according to 2016 prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
of this macroeconomic variable was observed in the oblasts of western and 
central Ukraine (about 50 billion UAH). Second, in 2004–2008, the gross 
value added in agriculture fell (as a tendency) in all groups of regions. This 
can (paradoxically) be associated with a good economic situation in the 
non-agricultural sectors of the Ukrainian economy. During this period, the 
UAH strengthened against global currencies,3 which led to a relative decline 
in the price of imported food products, a decrease in demand for domestic 
products and a decrease in domestic agricultural production. Third, after 
2010, agricultural production basically increased in all oblasts groups. This 
can be explained by a reverse process to that which occurred in 2004–2009. 
During that period, the exchange rate rose to a level of 27.224 UAH for the 
euro in December 2016. Fourth, in 2004–2016 the value added in agriculture 
grew the fastest in the regions of central (by 75.2%) and southern Ukraine 
(by 61.5%), while the slowest in the eastern (by 26.1%) and western (by 13.2%) 
regions of Ukraine.
However, Map 6.9 (illustrating the spatial differences in gross value 
added in agriculture on average in 2004–2016) shows that the largest (ex-
ceeding 10 billion UAH) value of this macroeconomic variable was ob-
served in the Kyiv region (13.1 billion UAH) in northern Ukraine, in the 
Vinnytsya (12.9 billion UAH) and in Dnipropetrovsk (12.3 billion UAH) 
oblasts in central Ukraine, in the Kharkiv Oblast (11.8 billion UAH) in 
eastern Ukraine and in the Poltava Oblast (11.5 billion UAH). The low-
est absolute agricultural potential (except for Kyiv and Sevastopol) was 
found in the Rivne (5.9 billion UAH), Ivano-Frankivsk (5.6 billion UAH) 
and Volyn oblasts (5.4 billion UAH) in western Ukraine, in the Luhansk 
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Map 6.9 G ross value added in agriculture in oblasts in 2004–2016 (UAH million, 
according to 2016 prices).
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013.
Source: Our own calculations based on data from the website http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (ac-
cess: 2019-12-30).
Oblast (5.3 billion UAH) in the east of Ukraine, as well as the Zakarpattia 
(4.9  billion UAH) and Chernivtsi oblasts (4.2 billion UAH) in the west. 
Thus, the agricultural potential of western Ukraine (much less urbanized 
than the other parts of the country) is lower than the potential of central or 
northern Ukraine. 
Figure 6.10 shows the trajectories of the shares of gross value added in ag-
riculture in total gross value added in groups of regions in 2004–2016. From 
this figure one can draw the following conclusions: First of all, in periods of 
good/bad economic situations in the Ukrainian economy, the share of gross 
value added (GVA) in agriculture in total (GVA) decreases/increases. This 
is due to the fact that, then, the value added in non-agricultural sectors of 
the economy usually increases (decreases) rapidly. In addition, in periods 
of good (bad) economic conditions there is a nominal appreciation (depre-
ciation) of the UAH against foreign currencies. This, in turn, leads to a de-
crease (increase) in the relative prices of foreign food products compared to 
the prices of domestic products, and domestic consumers exchange domestic 
(foreign) products for foreign (domestic) products. Second, western, central 
and southern Ukrainian oblasts are characterized by a much higher share 
of agriculture in gross value added than the industrial oblasts of eastern 
Ukraine or the service-oriented oblasts of central Ukraine (mainly due to 
Kyiv together with the Kyiv Oblast). Third, the share of agriculture in gross 
value added in Ukrainian oblasts is much higher than in Polish voivode-
ships (see also Table 6.1).
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Map 6.10 shows that the highest shares of gross value added in agricul-
ture (in total gross value added) in 2004–2016 were observed in the Kyiv 
Oblast (26.2%) in central Ukraine, Kherson Oblast (also 26.2%) in south-
ern Ukraine, Vinnytsya Oblast (25.4%) in central Ukraine and the Ternopil 
Oblast (24.0%) in western Ukraine. The lowest values of this indicator (ex-
cluding Kyiv and Sevastopol) were recorded in the Zaporizhzhya (9.8%) and 
Luhansk (9.5%) oblasts in eastern Ukraine, Odesa (9.5%) in the south, and 
Dnipropetrovsk (6.3%) in Central Ukraine and Donetsk (4.9%) in eastern 
Table 6.1  Share of gross value added in groups of voivodeships (in 2003–2015) and 
groups of oblasts (in 2004–2016) in Poland and Ukraine (in %)
Group of voivodeships and oblasts Agriculture Industry Construction Services
Mazowieckie 2.8 17.0 6.8 73.3
Eastern Poland 4.8 24.0 7.9 63.4
Central Poland 2.3 29.1 8.1 60.6
Western Poland 3.3 29.1 8.0 59.6
Poland 3.0 25.7 7.8 63.5
Central Ukraine 13.6 42.8 2.8 40.8
Eastern Ukraine 7.6 44.4 3.0 44.9
North Ukraine 6.5 16.0 4.7 72.8
South Ukraine 13.5 19.7 4.5 62.2
Western Ukraine 16.7 23.3 4.6 55.5
Ukraine 10.5 30.3 3.8 55.4
Source: own calculations based on data from the website https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start 
 (access: 2019-12-30) and http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).













Figure 6.10  Share of gross value added in agriculture in oblasts in 2004–2016 (%).
Source: Our own calculations based on data from the website http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ 
(access: 2019-12-30).  
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Map 6.10  Share of gross value added in agriculture in the oblasts on average in 
2004–2016 (%).
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013.
Source: Our own calculations based on data from the website http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ 
(access: 2019-12-30).
Ukraine. Therefore, the more urbanized oblasts of the Left-bank Ukraine 
(except for the Kirovohrad and Kherson oblasts) are generally character-
ized by a lower share of gross value added generated in agriculture than the 
oblasts of Right-bank Ukraine.
6.3.2  Added value in industry
Gross value-added trajectories in oblast groups in 2004–2016 are presented 
in Figure 6.11. The following conclusions can be drawn from this graph: 
First, at the beginning of the period under consideration, the highest gross 
value added in industry was found in (the most highly urbanized and most 
industrialized) oblasts of eastern Ukraine. The value of this macroeconomic 
variable increased in eastern Ukraine from 252.2 billion UAH in 2004 to 
314.8 billion UAH in 2007. Second, the high value of this feature was char-
acteristic of the central Ukrainian oblasts, where the gross value added in 
industry increased from 141.4 billion UAH to 196.0 billion UAH. Third, the 
lowest gross value added in industry was recorded in the southern oblasts of 
Ukraine, where the value of this characteristic increased from 51.2 billion 
UAH in 2004 to 59.8 billion UAH in 2008. Fourth, the global financial crisis 
combined with the Ukrainian-Russian gas crisis led to a decrease in the 
value of this macroeconomic variable in 2008 or 2009.
The highest gross value added in 2007–2009 fell in western Ukraine (by 
33.4%), and the slowest in southern Ukrainian oblasts (by 13.2%) (Amosha 
et al. 2017). Fifth, in the years 2010–2013, the oblasts of central, northern 
  















Figure 6.11 G ross value added in industry in oblasts groups in 2004–2016 (UAH 
billion, according to 2016 prices).
Source: Our own calculations based on data from the website http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ 
(access: 2019-12-30).
and western Ukraine were characterized (as a tendency) by a growing gross 
value added in industry. Sixth, in the years 2013–2015, in all groups of oblasts 
(with the exception of central Ukraine) the value of the analyzed variable 
decreased. Seventh, in the east of Ukraine, the gross value added in industry 
has been falling since 2012 (in 2016 the value of this macroeconomic vari-
able was as much as 45.3% lower than in 2011). This resulted from both the 
Russian-U krainian conflict in the Donbas and from falling investments in 
this part of the country (in 2017, investments in eastern Ukraine constituted 
only 44.6% of the value of this macroeconomic variable in 2011).
Map 6.11 shows the spatial differentiation of gross value added in industry 
in the oblasts of Ukraine on average in 2004–2016. This map shows that the 
group of oblasts with the highest value of this macroeconomic variable was 
composed of cities with a special status, that is, Kyiv (119.1 billion UAH) 
and of the following oblasts: Donetsk (43.6 billion UAH), and Dnipropetro-
vsk (41.6 billion UAH), Kyiv (33.9 billion UAH) and Kharkiv (26.2 billion 
UAH). The lowest gross value added in this sector of the economy was re-
corded in another city with a special status, that is, Sevastopol (3.8 billion 
UAH), and in the Chernivtsi (5.2 billion UAH), Ternopil (5.4 billion UAH), 
Kherson (5.8 billion UAH) and Chernihiv oblasts (6.0 billion UAH). From 
Map 6.11 one can also draw a more general conclusion that the better ur-
banized regions of the Left-bank of Ukraine were characterized by a much 
higher absolute potential of the industrial sector than the regions of the 
Right-bank of Ukraine. 
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Map 6.11  Gross value added in industry in oblasts in 2004–2016 (UAH billion, ac-
cording to 2016 prices).
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013.
Source: Our own calculations based on data from the website http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (ac-
cess: 2019-12-30).
Figure 6.12 illustrates the share of gross value added in industry in total 
gross value added in groups of oblasts in the research period. This graph 
shows the following: Until 2009, the oblasts of eastern Ukraine were charac-
terized by the highest (generally exceeding 45%) share of gross value added 
in industry. At that time, the region of central Ukraine was characterized 
by a high value, exceeding 40%. Starting from 2010, the share of gross value 
added in these two groups of oblasts was at a similar level. This was mainly 
due to the fact that since 2009, industrial production in eastern Ukraine has 
been systematically falling (see Figure 6.11). The lowest percentage of gross 
value added generated in industry was recorded in northern Ukraine. This 
is due to the fact that in this part of Ukraine, gross production is produced 
in Kyiv and the Kyiv Oblast. There, and in particular in Kyiv, the service 
sector is the dominant sector of the economy. It is also worth noting that (ex-
cept for the oblasts of northern Ukraine after 2013) the share of gross value 
added in industry in this research decreased. 
The highest share of gross value added in industry (in total gross value 
added) in 2004–2016 was observed in the following oblasts: Dnipropetro-
vsk (51.8%), Donetsk (50.1%), Luhansk(50.0%), Poltava (49.1%) and Zapor-
izhzhya (47.3%). The lowest value of this feature was recorded in the city 
with a special status, that is, Kyiv (10.0%), and in the following oblasts: 
Chernivtsi (13.7%), Odesa (16.6%), Ternopil (17.0%) and Volyn (18.5%). Thus, 
the more highly urbanized oblasts located in Left-bank Ukraine were char-
acterized by a higher share of gross value added in construction than those 
oblasts of the Right-bank Ukraine (see Map 6.12).
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Figure 6.12  Share of gross value added in industry in oblasts in 2004–2016 (%).
Source: Our own calculations based on data from the website http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ 
(access: 2019-12-30).  
Map 6.12  Share of gross value added in industry in oblasts in 2004–2016 (%).
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013.
Source: Our own calculations based on data from the website http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ 
(access: 2019-12-30).
6.3.3 A dded value in construction
Figure 6.13 illustrates gross value-added trajectories in construction in 
oblast groups. From this figure one can draw the following conclusions: 
First, the construction sector is characterized by the highest procyclicality 
among the four sectors of the Ukrainian economy. Second, the oblasts of 
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Figure 6.13  Gross value added in construction in oblasts groups in 2004–2016 (bil-
lion UAH, according to 2016 prices).
Source: Our own calculations based on data from the website http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ 
(access: 2019-12-30).
northern Ukraine had by far the highest value of this feature (mainly due to 
Kyiv and partially due to the Kyiv Oblast).
Third, the lowest value of this feature was recorded in the group of oblasts 
of south and central Ukraine and (after the Euro-Maidan) in the east of 
Ukraine.
In the whole research period, the capital of Kyiv definitely had the high-
est value of this variable (18.6 billion UAH). Next in line were the follow-
ing oblasts: Donetsk (6.9 billion UAH), Odesa (5.0 billion UAH), Kharkiv 
(4.9  billion UAH) and Dnipropetrovsk (4.6 billion UAH). These are the 
oblasts in which the largest Ukrainian cities are located (except Lviv). 
However, the lowest value of this feature was recorded in the Kherson 
Oblast (0.7 billion UAH), a city with a special status, that is, Sevastopol 
(0.7 b illion UAH), Ternopil (0.9 billion UAH), Sumy (0.9 billion UAH) and 
the Chernihiv Oblast (1.0 billion UAH). Moreover, Left-bank Ukraine was 
characterized by a higher absolute potential of the construction sector than 
Right-bank Ukraine (see Map 6.13). 
Analyzing the share of the gross value added in the construction sector 
in the gross value added of the entire Ukrainian economy, it turns out that 
the eastern and central Ukrainian oblasts were characterized by a much 
lower value of this characteristic than the other oblast groups. Moreover, 
the share of this sector in total gross value added in all groups of oblasts 
decreased significantly during the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict. In addi-
tion, it should be noted that after the Polish-Ukrainian Euro 2012 football 
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Map 6.13 G ross value added in agriculture in oblasts in 2004–2016 (UAH billion, 
according to 2016 prices).
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013.
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Figure 6.14  Share of gross value added in construction in oblasts groups in 2004–
2016 (%).
Source: Our own calculations based on data from the website http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ 
(access: 2019-12-30).
tournament, in all oblast groups, the value of this analyzed macroeconomic 
variable manifested a tendency to decrease (see Figure 6.14). 
On average, in the entire period under consideration, the highest share 
of construction in the gross value added generated was recorded in the 
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Map 6.14 S hare of gross value added in industry in oblasts in 2004–2016 (%).
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013.
Source: Our own calculations based on data from the website http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ 
(access: 2019-12-30).
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast (6.6%), the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (5.9%), 
the Chernivtsi Oblast (5.9%) and Kyiv Oblast (5.4%) and in the City of Kyiv. 
The lowest value of this feature was observed in the Zaporizhzhya (2.1%), 
Dnipropetrovsk (2.3%), Luhansk (2.4%), Sumy (2.5%) and Kherson (2.5%) 
oblasts. Moreover, the spatial differentiation of this feature (in contrast to 
the analogous index for industry) does not show a clear division of Ukraine 
into its right and left bank (see Map 6.14).
6.3.4  Added value in services
Figure 6.15 illustrates the gross value-added trajectories in the service sec-
tor. The following conclusions can be drawn from this graph. First of all, 
the oblasts of northern Ukraine had by far the highest value of this fea-
ture (roughly in the range of 350–450 billion UAH). This is due to the fact 
that Kyiv and the Kyiv Oblast are located in the north of Ukraine (on aver-
age, in 2004–2016, the value added of the services sector in Kyiv accounted 
for approx. 27% of the value of this variable throughout Ukraine, while in 
Kyiv together with the Kyiv Oblast over 31%). Second, up to the time of the 
 Euro-Maidan, the oblasts of eastern Ukraine were characterized by a high 
potential of the construction sector (the gross value added of services was at 
a level of 200–250 billion UAH). However, the conflict in Donbas led to a de-
crease in the value of this feature in eastern Ukrainian oblasts in 2013–2016 
by approximately 100 billion UAH (and therefore by about 40%). Third, 
as a result of the annexation of Crimea, the gross value added in southern 
Ukrainian oblasts fell after 2013 by approximately 50 billion UAH, and thus 
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Figure 6.15  Gross value added in services in oblast groups in 2004–2016 (billion 
UAH, according to 2016 prices).
Source: Our own calculations based on data from the website http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ 
(access: 2019-12-30).
Map 6.15 V alue added in services in oblasts on average in 2004–2016 (billion UAH, 
according to 2016 prices).
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013.
Source: Our own calculations based on data from the website http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ 
(access: 2019-12-30).
roughly 1/3 of its value before the Euro-Maidan. Fourth, the service sector 
in Ukraine is characterized by a prominent procyclicality.
Map 6.15 illustrates the spatial differentiation of gross value added in the 
oblasts of Ukraine in 2004–2016. This map and data on that feature show 
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Figure 6.16 S hare of gross value added in construction in oblast groups in 2004–
2016 (%).
Source: Our own calculations based on data from the website http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ 
(access: 2019-12-30).
that the capital City of Kyiv had by far the highest gross value added in 
services (UAH 300.5 billion), among oblasts. A high value of this varia-
ble was also observed in the following oblasts: Donetsk (92.5 billion UAH), 
Dnipropetrovsk (79.7 billion UAH), Kharkiv (69.2 billion UAH), Odesa 
(66.6 billion UAH) and Lviv (51.5 billion UAH). So, this group is composed 
of oblasts in which the largest Ukrainian cities are located. However, the 
group of oblasts with the lowest service potential was composed of a city 
with a special status of Sevastopol (11.1 billion UAH) and the following 
oblasts: Chernivtsi (11.6 billion UAH), Ternopil (14.3 billion UAH), Kher-
son (15.4 billion UAH) and Kirovohrad (16.0 billion UAH). Thus, the level 
of the potential of the service sector (as well as of the industrial sector) on 
the left bank of Ukraine is much higher than in the oblasts located on the 
right bank of the Dnieper. 
Figure 6.16 shows the trajectories of the shares of gross value added in ag-
riculture in total gross value added in groups of oblasts in 2004–2016. From 
this figure one can draw the following conclusions: First, the oblasts of 
northern Ukraine had by far the highest value of this macroeconomic vari-
able (68.5–76.5%). Second, the lowest share of gross value added in services 
was recorded in central (34.6–46.7%) and eastern Ukraine (39.6–50.0%). 
Third, this share is much less procyclical than in the case of the correspond-
ing shares of the industrial and construction sectors.
Map 6.16 illustrates the share of gross value added in total gross value 
added in 2004–2016. This map shows that Kyiv (84.7%) possessed by far the 
highest value of this trait, followed by Sevastopol (75.6%), the Odesa Oblast 
(68.6%), the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (64.3%) and the Lviv Oblast 
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Map 6.16  Share of gross value added in industry in oblasts in 2004–2016 (%).
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013.
Source: Our own calculations based on data from the website http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (ac-
cess: 2019-12-30).
(61.6%). The lowest share of gross value added in total gross value added 
was recorded in the following regions: Poltava (34.2%), Luhansk (38.2%), 
Dnipropetrovsk (39.6%), Zaporizhzhya (40.8%) and Donetsk (42, 0%). 
6.4 Summary
Table 6.1 summarizes the data on sectoral product market structures in 
groups of voivodeships and regions during the research period of this chap-
ter. The following conclusions can be drawn from this map:
 i The share of the service sector in the gross value added generated in 
Poland was higher than in Ukraine, while the share of agriculture was 
significantly lower. This means that the sectoral structure of the product 
market in Poland is more similar than in Ukraine to the more econom-
ically developed countries of western Europe.
 ii In Poland, the share of agriculture is by far the highest in the least de-
veloped economically voivodeships of eastern Poland, while in Ukraine 
in the western and southern oblasts of the country. This is because both 
in Poland and Ukraine, these regions are the least urbanized.
 iii The industrial sector is best developed in central and western Po-
land, while in Ukraine in the oblasts of eastern Ukraine (Donbas and 
Kharkiv) and in central Ukraine (Dnieper).
 iv The spatial differentiation of the percentage of gross value added gen-
erated in construction in both Poland and Ukraine is much smaller 
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than the differentiation of similar percentages in other sectors of the 
economy. In Poland, these percentages were between 6.8% in the Ma-
zowieckie Voivodeship and 8.1% in the voivodeships of central Poland, 
while in Ukraine between 2.8% in central Ukraine and 4.6% in the west 
of the country.
 v The service sector in Poland is best developed in the Mazowieckie 
Voivodeship, while in Ukraine in its northern oblasts. This is mainly 
due to the fact that Warsaw is in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship and Kyiv 
in northern Ukraine, which are the administrative centers and econom-
ically the most developed cities in their respective countries.
 vi In other groups of Polish voivodeships, the share of gross value added 
in services oscillated around 60%, in Ukraine between 40.8% in central 
Ukraine and 62.2% in the coastal oblasts of southern Ukraine.
Notes
 1 https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
 2 http://www.UKRSTAT.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
 3 In January 2004, the nominal exchange rate of the hryvnia against the euro was 
6.183, while in December 2008 it was only 3.301 (www.exchangerate-euro.com/
currency/UAH-hryvnia-ukraine/).
7 Determinants of the spatial 
differentiation of labor markets 
in Poland and Ukraine
Paweł Dykas, Tomasz Misiak and 
Tomasz Tokarski
7.1 Introduction
The labor market is one of the integral elements of the modern economy. Its 
characteristic features are, a high heterogeneity, and high sensitivity to the 
economic cycle or political turmoil and migration issues, amongst others. 
In spatial terms, it is characterized by a large diversity of basic variables 
defining the situations on the labor market. The spatial diversity of local 
or regional labor markets is not only a feature of countries undergoing sys-
temic transformation but also applies to developing and highly developed 
countries (Bradley and Taylor 1997; Egger et al. 2005; Arntz and Wilke 2009; 
Marelli et al. 2012).
The most important variables determining the situation and prospects 
of the labor market are most often labor productivity, the level of wages 
or unemployment rate and employment. The above-mentioned macroeco-
nomic categories are shaped by many determinants. The authors’ attempt 
to endogenize selected variables of the labor market such as increases in 
unemployment rates or gross real wages by ascertaining the basic deter-
minants resulting from the Solow 1979 efficiency wage mode, and the neo- 
classical growth model of Solow (1956) and its generalizations or directly 
from the definition of the unemployment rate. The Solow–Swan model is 
an economic formula of long-run economic growth set within the frame-
work of neoclassical economics. It attempts to explain long-run economic 
growth by looking at capital accumulation, labor or population growth and 
increases in productivity, which are commonly referred to as technological 
progress. Determinants resulting from theoretical models are then verified 
empirically using the econometric methods for panel data.
The main purpose of the analyses carried out in this chapter is to compare 
the spatial diversity of regional labor markets in Poland and Ukraine in the 
first two decades of the 21st century. These analyses relate to changes in the 
number of people employed, the trajectory of unemployment rates, diversity 
and dynamics of labor productivity (measured by GDP per employee), vari-
ability of wages and regional unemployment rates, and an estimation of the 
equation parameters taking into account basic determinants of real wages 
and any crease in unemployment rates.
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7.2  The labor market in Poland and Ukraine in the 
XXI century
The basic factor that determined the volume of employment and unemploy-
ment in Poland in 2001–2018 was the GDP dynamics. In prosperous times, 
the number of people employed usually increased, and the number of unem-
ployed and the unemployment rate fell.
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 present the dynamics of GDP, the number of employed 
persons and the trajectory of the unemployment rate in Poland.1 The follow-
ing conclusions can be drawn from these figures.
In the years 2001–2002, as the result of a cooling down of the economy 
(and a quite restrictive fiscal policy of the government) at the end of the 
20th century and due to a restrictive monetary policy of the National 
Bank of Poland (Narodowy Bank Polski), the growth rate of Polish GDP 
was low (in 2002 the GDP growth rate was 2.0%, in 2003, 3.6%). This, 
with the rapidly increasing labor productivity (5.2% in 2002 and 4.8% in 
2003), translated into a decline in labor demand, a decrease in employ-
ment and an increase in the unemployment rate. In the years 2001–2003 
the number of employed in Poland fell by 4.1% (with an increase of GDP 
by 5.7%), while the unemployment rate increased from 18.3 to 19.8%. This 
can be explained by the fact that with high labor productivity growth 
rates and much lower GDP growth rates (and product market demand), 
employers reduced employment. The unemployment rate in Poland (next 
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Figure 7.1  Dynamics of GDP and employment in Poland in the 21st century 
(2001 = 100)
Source: Our own estimates based on https://w3.unece.org/ reading data: 2019-12-30).
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Figure 7.2 Unemployment rates in Poland in the 21th century (%).
Source: Our own estimates based on https://w3.unece.org/ reading data: 2019-12-30).
Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004 combined with a period of prosperity 
in the global economy led to a significant acceleration of economic growth 
in Poland. The average annual GDP growth rate in 2004–2007  increased 
to 5.5%. This, in turn, led to an increase in labor demand, an increase in 
employment and a decrease in unemployment (in 2003–2008 the unemploy-
ment rate in Poland fell from 19.8 to 7.1%, while the number of employed 
rose at this time by 15.6%, i.e., by about 2.1 million people).
The global financial crisis translated into a significant slowdown in eco-
nomic growth in Poland (in 2007–2013 the average annual GDP growth rate 
fell to a level of 3.1%). This caused a reduction in employment and an in-
crease in unemployment, which lasted until 2013 (when the unemployment 
rate was 10.3%).
In the years 2013–2018, largely due to a favorable economic situation 
in the global economy, the GDP growth rate in Poland increased to 4.1%, 
which led to a cumulative increase in the number of employed in Poland by 
22.0% (approx. 0.9 million persons) and a drop in the unemployment rate to 
4.6% in 2017. This rate is currently one of the lowest in the EU.
The situation was different in Ukraine. Ukraine in the 1990s, due to strong 
links with the other economies of the former Soviet Union and a failure to 
undertake significant market and structural reforms, underwent a deep re-
cession. Ukraine’s GDP in 1999 accounted for only 41.0% of the value of 
this variable from 1990 (by comparison, in Poland the GDP increased by 
37.6% during this period).2 The first signs of economic recovery in Ukraine, 
apparently paradoxically, were the result of the Russian financial crisis of 
1998. This crisis led to a strong depreciation of the Russian ruble and the 
Ukrainian UAH (the average annual USD/UAH exchange rate in 1997 was 
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1.86; in 1998, 2.45; in 1999, 4.13; and in 2000, 5.44).3 The depreciation of the 
UAH resulted in a surge in prices of products imported into Ukraine, when 
counted in UAH. This, in turn, caused that part of the demand of Ukrain-
ian business entities (in particular households and enterprises) to shift from 
foreign to domestic products. This move led to the creation of a Keynesian 
multiplier mechanism, which revived the economy.
In the years 2001–2007, the average annual growth rate of the Ukrainian 
GDP was 7.5% (a decrease in the high growth rate in this period took place 
only in 2005, which was a direct result of the political and social crisis follow-
ing the Orange Revolution at the turn of 2004/2005). The rapid GDP growth 
in Ukraine in 2001–2007 led to an increase in the number of employed in 
2008 by 5.0% compared to 2001 (i.e., by about one million people) and a de-
crease in the unemployment rate from 10.9 to 6.4% (Figs. 7.3 and 7.4).
The Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict 2008–20094 led to a one-year reces-
sion (a 15.1% decrease in GDP in 2009), which translated into a decrease in 
the number of employed by 3.7% (around 0.8 million people) and an increase 
in the unemployment rate from 6.4 to 8.8%.
In the years 2010–2013 (i.e., between the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict 
and the Euromaidan), the Ukrainian GDP began to increase again (cumula-
tive growth was then 6%), which translated into a 1% increase in the number 
of people employed combined with a decrease in unemployment by 1.5% 
points.
The direct consequences of the Euro-Maidan at the turn of 2013 and 2014 
were the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula (i.e., the Autonomous 
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Figure 7.3  Dynamics of GDP and employment in Ukraine in the 21st century 
(2001 = 100).
Source: Our own estimates based on https://w3.unece.org/ reading data: 2019-12-30).
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Figure 7.4 Unemployment rates in Ukraine in the 21th century (%).
Source: Our own estimates based on https://w3.unece.org/ reading data: 2019-12-30).
and political crisis, which led to open warfare with the pro-Russian separa-
tists in the Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). As a result, Ukraine has 
again experienced a deep economic recession. In 2014, the Ukrainian GDP 
fell by 6.6%, while the number of people employed decreased by 11.4%. This 
reduction in the number of people employed resulted from the annexation 
of Crimea, fighting in the Donbas and the economic recession.5 The unem-
ployment rate increased abruptly by 2% points (to 9.3%). After 2014, despite 
an increase in the GDP in 2015–2018, the number of employed has stabilized 
at around 16.3–16.4 million people, and the unemployment rate at around 
9.3–9.5%.
7.3 D ifferentiation in labor productivity, wages and 
unemployment rates
Map 7.1 illustrates the spatial diversity of labor productivity in Poland on 
average for 2004–2016. In contrast, Figure 7.5 shows the trajectories of this 
variable in groups of voivodeships. The following map and graph show what 
ensued (see also Tokarski 2005a, b, 2008; Mroczek, Tokarski 2013; Trojak, 
Tokarski 2013; Trojak 2015; Mroczek et al. 2014 or Filipowicz 2017, 2019):
7.3.1 D ifferentiation in labor productivity, wages and unemployment 
rates in Poland
• As in the case of GDP per capita, the Mazowieckie Voivodeship also 
had by far the highest level of labor productivity (PLN 128.8 thousand). 
132 Paweł Dykas et al.
Map 7.1 L abor productivity in Polish voivodeships in 2004–2016 (1,000 PLN, 
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Figure 7.5 L abor productivity in Polish voivodeships groups in 2004–2016 (1,000 
PLN, according to 2015 prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
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In addition, in the Dolnośląskie (107.2 thousand PLN), Wielkopolskie 
(101.4 thousand PLN) and Śląskie (100.5 thousand PLN) voivodeships, 
the value of the macroeconomic variable considered here exceeded 100 
thousand PLN. In the Pomorskie (PLN 98.1 thousand) and Zachodni-
opomorskie (PLN 95.7 thousand) voivodeships, the average production 
per employee was higher than 90 thousand PLN.
• The group of voivodeships with low labor productivity was composed of 
the following voivodeships: Lubuskie (78.1 thousand PLN), Warmińsko- 
Mazurskie (73.4 thousand PLN) and Łódzkie (72.3 thousand PLN). The 
lowest value of this feature was recorded in three voivodeships of eastern 
Poland: the Podlaskie (69.4 thousand PLN), Świętokrzyskie (63.7 thou-
sand PLN) and Lubelskie (58.6 thousand PLN).
• Such spatial diversity of the macroeconomic variable analyzed for Po-
land was mainly due to the spatial differentiation of capital-labor ra-
tio and (to a lesser extent) the diversity of gravity effects (see Tokarski 
2005b; Mroczek, Tokarski 2013; Trojak, Tokarski 2013; Trojak 2015; 
Mroczek et al. 2014 or Filipowicz 2017, 2019).
• Between 2004 and 2016, an increase in labor productivity was recorded 
in all voivodeships. The fastest-growing value of this macroeconomic 
variable grew in the following voivodeships: Lubelskie (a cumulative 
growth equal to 94.7%, an average annual growth of 5.7%), then in 
Łódzkie (92.3% and 5.6%, respectively), Małopolskie (81.3%, 5.1%), Ma-
zowieckie (74.4%, 4.7%) and Podkarpackie (72.4%, 4.6%). The slowest 
increase in labor productivity was in the Śląskie (55.0%, 3.7%), Zacho-
dniopomorskie (51.1%, 3.5%), Pomorskie (42.3%, 3.0%) and Opolskie 
(41.9%, 3.0%) voivodeships.
• Labor productivity in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship was much higher 
than the value of this macroeconomic variable in other groups of 
voivodeships. It grew from 96.7 thousand PLN in 2004 to 168.5 thou-
sand PLN in 2016. In the remaining groups of voivodeships, production 
per employee increased from a level of 69.8 thousand PLN in 2004 to 
124.8 thousand PLN in 2015, it later fell to a level of 114.0 thousand in 
2016 PLN in western Poland,6 in central Poland it grew from 65.8 thou-
sand PLN in 2004 to 109.4 thousand PLN in 2016, and in the voivode-
ships of eastern Poland it increased from 49.4 thousand PLN up to 85.7 
thousand PLN.
• It is also worth noting that the level of labor productivity in the voivode-
ships of eastern Poland in 2017 was significantly lower than the value 
of this variable in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship in 2004 and was com-
parable with the production per employee in western or central Poland 
from 2009 to 2010.
• In 2004, labor productivity in the voivodeships of western Poland ac-
counted for 72.2% of the value of this variable in the Mazowieckie 
Voivodeship, while in 2016 it was only 67%. Similar indicators for the re-
maining groups of voivodeships are as follows: in central Poland, 68.1% 
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and 64.9%, while in eastern Poland, 51.1% and 50.9%. This means that 
in terms of labor productivity (similar to the GDP per capita analyzed 
in Chapter 3), the gap between the Mazowieckie Voivodeship and the 
rest of the country is widening.
• In contrast to GDP or to per capita GDP, which are variables both 
in the Polish economy as a whole and in groups of voivodeships, the 
workforce productivity increased the fastest before the global financial 
crisis, while the slowest growth performance during the crisis itself (of 
work forced productivity) was in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship and the 
voivodeships of eastern Poland. It grew the fastest during the global 
financial crisis (at an annual average rate of 6.6% in the Mazowieckie 
Voivodeship and 6.1% in eastern Poland, respectively), and growth was 
slower before and after the financial crisis. What’s more, also in the 
voivodeships of central and western Poland, production growth rates 
for those employed after 2013 dropped (from 4.1 to 3.5% in central Po-
land and from 5.3 to −0.5% in western Poland, respectively). This can 
be explained by the hypothesis of unemployed economic growth (cf. e.g. 
Kwiatkowski et al. 2004 or Kotlorz, Sojka 2017). During the global fi-
nancial crisis, the Polish economy experienced a significant slowdown 
in economic growth – the GDP growth rate fell below the rate of labor 
productivity growth resulting from capital accumulation and techno-
logical progress. This resulted in a decrease in labor demand, a decrease 
in employment and an increase in unemployment. This effect was an in-
crease (with positive GDP growth rates) in labor productivity. However, 
after 2013, the demand for labor in Poland began to increase, which led 
to a decrease in the rate of labor productivity growth.
Map 7.2 presents the average levels of wages in voivodeships in the years 
2004–2017, Figure 7.6 – the trajectories of this variable in groups of voivode-
ships. The following conclusions can be drawn from Map 7.2 and Figure 7.6 
(see also Tokarski 2005b, 2012; Roszkowska, Rogut 2007; Adamczyk et al. 
2009; Misiak, Tokarski 2012 or Adamczyk 2015):
• As in the case of GDP per capita or labor productivity, the highest 
wages were also recorded in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship (on average 
in 2004–2017 PLN 4,654.48). In the Śląskie (3,813.20 zlotys), Dolnośląskie 
(3,725.98 zlotys) and Pomorskie (3,707.35 zlotys) voivodeships, wages 
were higher than 3,500 PLN. The lowest level of wages (below PLN 
3,200) was recorded in the Podkarpackie (PLN 3,125.46), Warmińsko- 
Mazurskie (PLN 3,126.35) as well as Lubuskie (3,181.68 PLN) and 
Kujawsko- Pomorskie (PLN 3,181.91) voivodeships.
• Comparing the spatial diversity of wages with the diversity of labor 
productivity (Map 7.1) and unemployment rates (Map 7.3), it turns out 
that in voivodeships with a higher level of labor productivity and lower 
unemployment, wages were higher The correlation coefficient between 
Determinants of spatial differentiation 135
Map 7.2 Wages in Polish voivodeships in 2004–2017 (PLN, according to 2015 prices).
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Figure 7.6 W ages in Polish voivodeships groups in 2004–2017 (PLN, according to 
2015 prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
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voivodeship wages and labor productivity (in 2004–2016) was 0.886, and 
between wages and unemployment rates, 0.716.
• In 2004–2017, overall wages in all Polish voivodeships were character-
ized by an upward trend. The highest (exceeding 50%) wage increases 
were recorded in the Dolnośląskie (53.1%), Małopolskie (52.1%) and 
Łódzkie (51.2%) voivodeships, whereas the lowest growth rate of this 
macroeconomic variable was recorded in the Świętokrzyskie (43.2%), 
Śląskie (29.6%) and Mazowieckie (38.3%) voivodeships. 
• Comparing wages in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship with the value of 
this feature in the other groups of voivodeships, it turns out that the 
wages in this voivodeship in 2004 (amounting to PLN 3,939.26) were 
slightly lower than the wages in the central (PLN 4,252.79) and western 
(PLN 4,205.69) voivodeships and higher than wages in eastern Poland 
(PLN 3,862.94) in 2017.7
• Before the global financial crisis (2004–2009) wages in the voivodeships 
of central and western Poland grew at an average annual rate of 3.6%, 
in eastern Poland, 3.5% and in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, 3.3%. An 
increase in unemployment during this crisis reduced the wage dynamics 
in Poland. The average annual growth rate of wages in 2010–2013 fell to 
1.6% in eastern Poland, 1.5% in central Poland, 1.3% in western Poland 
and only 0.5% in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship. The economic recov-
ery after 2013 combined with falling unemployment translated into a 
significant acceleration of the growth rate of the macroeconomic var-
iable analyzed here in Poland. Wages in western Poland increased in 
2014–2017 at a rate of 4.3%, in central and eastern Poland at a rate of 
3.7% and in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship at a rate of 3.6%.
The spatial differentiation of unemployment rates in Poland in 2004–2017 
is shown on Map 7.3. In contrast, Figure 7.7 shows the trajectories of this 
macroeconomic variable in groups of voivodeships. The following conclu-
sions can be drawn from Map 7.3 and Figure 7.7 (see also Tokarski 2005a, b, 
Kwiatkowski, Tokarski 2007, Tokarski 2008, Misiak, Tokarski 2012, Dykas 
et al. 2013, Majchrowska et al. 2013, Trojak, Tokarski 2013, Trojak 2015, 
Gomółka et al. 2017 or Pastuszka, Tokarski 2017):
• The highest unemployment rates in the research period were in the 
Warmińsko-Mazurskie (20.0%), Zachodniopomorskie (17.2%) and 
Kujawsko-Pomorskie (16.5%) voivodeships. The first two of these 
voivodeships and partly also the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Voivodeship are 
voivodeships which formerly possessed many (communist) state-owned 
collective farms. Thus, the liquidation of these state-owned farms 
(Państwowe Gospodarstwo Rolne, PGR) at the beginning of the trans-
formation of the economic system led to high structural unemployment 
(see: Rogut, Tokarski 2001, 2002), which to a large extent still persists.8
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Map 7.3 The unemployment rates in voivodeships in 2004–2017 (in %).
Figure 7.7 The unemployment rates in groups of voivodeships in 2004–2017 (in %).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
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• The lowest unemployment rates were recorded in the following voivode-
ships: Wielkopolskie (9.0%), Mazowieckie (9.8%), Małopolskie (10.0%) 
and Śląskie (10.2%). 
• In all voivodeships, the unemployment rates in 2017 were significantly 
lower than at the beginning of the research period. These rates fell most 
in those regions which liquidated state-run collective farms such as in 
the9 Lubelskie (from 25.6 to 5.6%), Zachodniopomorskie (from 27.5 to 
8.5%) and Warmińsko-Mazurskie (from 29.2 to 11.7%) voivodeships, 
and the least in three voivodeships of eastern Poland (Podlaskie from 
16.1 to 8.5%, Lubelskie from 17.8 to 8.8% and Podkarpackie from 19.1 to 
9.6%) as well as in the Mazowieckie (from 14.7 to 5.6%) and Małopolskie 
(from 15.0 to 5.3%) voivodeships.
• In 2004–2008, that is, immediately after Poland’s accession to the Eu-
ropean Union, the good situation of the economic cycle led to an in-
crease in labor demand, an increase in employment and a decrease in 
unemployment. At that time, the unemployment rate in eastern Poland 
fell from 20.3 to 12.8%, in western Poland from 21.0 to 9.5%, in central 
Poland from 18.5 to 8.5% and in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship from 
14.7 to 7.3%.
• The global financial crisis has led to a significant slowdown in economic 
growth in Poland. This, in turn, translated into a decrease in demand 
for work and an increase in unemployment. The unemployment rate in 
eastern Poland increased until 2013, reaching 16.2%, in western Poland 
it increased to 13.2%, in central Poland it increased to 13.0%, and in the 
Mazowieckie Voivodeship it rose to 10.7%. 
• The good economic cycle in 2014–2017 increased the demand for work, 
leading to an increase in employment and a decrease in unemployment. 
Unemployment rates in 2017 were at a level of 5.6% in the Mazowieckie 
Voivodeship and in western Poland, 6.1% in central Poland and 9.5% in 
eastern Poland.
Figure 7.8 presents the coefficient of the variation of labor productivity, 
wages and unemployment rates in Poland in the research period (defined 
as the relationship of standard deviations to the unweighted arithmetic 
mean of the analyzed variables). From this figure, the following conclu-
sions can be drawn: First, the spatial diversity of wages was much smaller 
than the differences in labor productivity or unemployment rates. This 
resulted from the fact that wages in the public sector are loosely related to 
both the level of labor productivity and unemployment in a given voivode-
ship. Second, the spatial diversity of wages in 2004–2017 was character-
ized by a certain convergence tendency (the coefficient of variation of this 
variable fell from 0.117 to 0.102). Third, the spatial diversity of unemploy-
ment rates in Poland in times of prosperity grows, while in weak economic 
conditions it decreases. Fourth, the spatial diversity of labor productivity 
is relatively stable.
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Figure 7.8 C oefficients of the variability of labor productivity, wages and unem-
ployment rates in Poland in 2004–2017.
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
7.3.2 D ifferentiation in labor productivity, wages and unemployment 
rates in Ukraine
Map 7.4 presents the spatial differentiation of labor productivity in the 
oblasts of Ukraine in 2004–2017.10 Trajectories of this variable in oblast 
groups are illustrated in Figure 7.5. Map 7.4 and Figure 7.9 show the follow-
ing (see also Pustovoit 2016, Chugaievska et al. 2017, Chugaievska, Tokarski 
2018 or Tokarski et al. 2019):
• As in the case of GDP per employee, the highest level of labor produc-
tivity was also recorded in Kyiv (364.4 thousand UAH). A high value 
of this trait, in Ukraine, was also characteristic of the Dnipropetrovsk 
(172.1 thousand UAH) and Poltava oblasts (164.9 thousand UAH) in 
central Ukraine, Donetsk (157.6 thousand UAH) in eastern Ukraine 
and Kyiv (147.0 thousand UAH) in the north of Ukraine.
In the case of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol in 
2004–2013.
• The lowest (less than 80 thousand UAH) labor productivity was recorded 
in the Kherson Oblast (77.7 thousand UAH) in the south of Ukraine 
and in the Ternopil (74.7 thousand UAH), Zakarpattia (69.2 thousand 
UAH) and Chernivtsi (62.9 thousand UAH) oblasts in western Ukraine.
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Map 7.4  Labor productivity in the oblasts in the years 2004–2017 (1,000 UAH, 
prices 2016).
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Figure 7.9  Labor productivity in oblast groups in 2004–2017 (1,000 UAH, accord-
ing to 2016 prices).
In the case of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol in2004–2013.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
• This is because Left-bank Ukraine and the Odesa and Mykolayiv 
oblasts are characterized by a higher capital-labor ratio of labor 
and (often) stronger gravitational effects than Right-bank Ukraine 
(Chugaievska et al. 2017), so the level of labor productivity in these 
areas was generally higher than in the west of Ukraine.
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• In 21 out of 25 Ukrainian oblasts (excluding the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea and Sevastopol) labor productivity in 2017 was higher than in 
2004 (although in the Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast production per employee 
increased only by 1.7%, i.e., 0.1% annual average). 
• The highest (exceeding 30%) increases in this macroeconomic variable 
were recorded in the Kyiv Oblast (73.9%, 4.3% on average per year) and 
Kyiv City (44.1%, 2.8%) in the north of Ukraine and in the Vinnytsya 
(37.3%, 3.4%) and Cherkasy (40.9%, 2.7%) oblasts in the center of the 
country. The highest increases in labor productivity were recorded in 
the Kyiv Oblast (73.9%, 4.3% on average per year) and the City of Kyiv 
(44.1%, 2.8%) in northern Ukraine and the Vinnytsya (54.4%, 3.4%) and 
Cherkasy (40.9%, 2.7%) oblasts in central Ukraine. Labor productiv-
ity in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea increased in 2004–2013 by 
24.4% (2.5% on average per year), while in Sevastopol by 32.9% (3.2%).
• Similar trends in labor productivity can be seen in all the oblast groups 
(except in eastern Ukraine). In the years 2004–2008 the value of this 
variable increased, and in 2009 it decreased significantly. This decrease 
was the result of both the global financial crisis and the gas conflict with 
Russia. In 2010–2014 (and thus until the Euro-Maidan) the GDP per 
working person began to grow again. In 2015, the level of this variable 
decreased. The increase in labor productivity in 2016–2017 was due to 
the fact that the Ukrainian economy recorded the first symptoms of 
economic recovery after the crisis caused by the political perturbations 
after the Euro-Maidan (in 2016 the Ukrainian GDP increased by 2.4%, 
and in 2017 by 2.5%).
• By far the highest level of GDP per working person was recorded in the 
regions of northern Ukraine, where the value of this variable increased 
from 166.6 thousand UAH in 2004 to 249.2 thousand UAH in 2017. In 
eastern Ukraine, labor productivity increased from 124.4 thousand 
UAH to 139.7 thousand UAH, in central Ukraine from 110.0 thousand 
UAH to 154.4 thousand UAH, in the south from 91.3 thousand UAH to 
116.6 thousand UAH, and in the west from 80.0 thousand UAH to 91.5 
thousand UAH. Thus, the value of this variable grew the fastest in the 
best-developed northern Ukraine (3.1% on average per year), and the 
slowest in the industrial and mining oblasts of eastern Ukraine (0.9%).
Map 7.5 presents the spatial diversity of wages in Ukraine, while Figure 7.10 
shows the trajectories of this variable in oblast groups in 2004–2015. The 
following conclusions can be drawn from the map and graph (see also, for 
example, Chugaievska et al. 2017, Bolińska, Gomółka 2017 or Tokarski et al. 
2019):
• As in the case of labor productivity, the highest wages were recorded in 
the capital of Kyiv (on average in 2004–2017 8386.05 UAH). The Donetsk 
(5,990.33 UAH), Dnipropetrovsk (5,481.32 UAH), Kyiv (5,330.82 UAH) 
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and Zaporizhzhya (5,239.78 UAH) oblasts also had a high value of the 
macroeconomic variable analyzed here.
• The lowest wages occurred in the Chernivtsi (4,012.08 UAH), Volyn 
(4,005.88 UAH) Ternopil (3,763.51 UAH) and Kherson (4,009.66 UAH) 
oblasts in the west of Ukraine and in the Chernihiv (4,000.78) UAH) 
Oblast in the north of the country.
Map 7.5 Wages in Ukrainian oblasts in 2004–2017 (UAH, according to 2016 prices).
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Figure 7.10 W ages in groups of oblasts in 2004–2017 (UAH, according to 2016 
prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
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• In all oblasts, wages in 2017 were higher than at the beginning of the 
research period. The fastest value of this variable grew in the Ternopil 
(by 85.2%, 4.9% on average per year), Volyn (83.7%, 4.8%, respectively) 
and Khmelnytskiy (83.4%, 4.8%) oblasts in western Ukraine and in the 
Vinnytsya (82.1%, 4.7%) Oblast in central Ukraine. The lowest wage 
increases were recorded in the Dnipropetrovsk (34.6%, 2.3%) Oblast 
in central Ukraine and the Zaporizhzhya (32.4%, 2.2%) and Luhansk 
(27.3%, 1.9%) oblasts in the eastern Ukraine. In the Autonomous Re-
public of Crimea, wages in 2004–2013 increased by 41.1% (3.9% on aver-
age per year), while in Sevastopol by 41.0% (3.9%). 
In the case of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol in 
2004–2013.
• The spatial diversity of wages in Ukraine largely coincided with the di-
versity of labor productivity. The correlation coefficient between these 
variables was 0.946. On the other hand, the correlation coefficient be-
tween wages and unemployment rates considered below is 0.586.
• Wage trajectories in oblast groups were similar in shape to both the tra-
jectory of GDP and labor productivity. This is due to the fact that labor 
productivity has largely affected the level of wages in Ukraine. 
• In Ukraine northern, wages increased from 4,499.27 UAH in 2004 to 
7,130.00 UAH in 2017, in the east from 4,373.79 UAH to 5,881.58 UAH, 
in central Ukraine from 3,741.65 UAH to 5,654.84 UAH, in the south 
from 3,669.01 UAH to 5,614.69 UAH, while in the poorest region, that is 
western Ukraine, from 3,176.35 UAH to 5,291.34 UAH. Thus, the high-
est average annual wage dynamics were observed in the group of west-
ern Ukraine oblasts (4.0%), while the lowest in eastern Ukraine (2.3%).
Map 7.6 illustrates the spatial differentiation of unemployment rates in 
Ukrainian oblasts (on average in 2004–2017), while Figure 7.11 shows tra-
jectories of this macroeconomic variable in groups of oblasts. The follow-
ing conclusions can be drawn from the aforementioned map and figure (see 
also, e.g., Lysiuk, Kaflevska 2012, Paniuk 2013, Homiak 2015, Yarova 2015, 
Chugaievska et al. 2017, Chugaievska, Tokarski 2018 or Tokarski et al. 2019):
• The lowest average unemployment rates in the period under consider-
ation were recorded in the two cities with a special status (Sevastopol 
5.0% and Kyiv 5.3%) and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (5.7%) 
and in the Odesa Oblast (5.9%) in southern Ukraine. The highest level of 
this variable was recorded in the Zhytomyr Oblast (10.1%) in the north 
of Ukraine, as well as in the Ternopil (10.3%) and Rivne (10.4%) oblasts 
in western Ukraine. High unemployment rates also occurred in the 
Chernihiv Oblast (9.8%) in the north and the Kirovohrad Oblast (9.7%) 
in central Ukraine.
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Map 7.6 The unemployment rates in oblasts in 2004–2017 (in %).
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Figure 7.11 The unemployment rates in group of oblasts in 2004–2017 (%).
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
In the case of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol in 
2004–2013.
• The spatial differentiation of unemployment rates in Ukraine partially 
coincided with the spatial differentiation of labor productivity and 
wages in the sense that the higher the labor productivity or wages, the 
lower the unemployment rates were. The correlation coefficient between 
these rates and labor productivity was −0.499, and between unemploy-
ment rates and wages −0.586.
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• In 12 Ukrainian oblasts, unemployment rates in 2017 were lower than in 
2004, while in the remaining 13 they were higher. The group of oblasts 
in which unemployment rates fell included the following regions: Cher-
nivtsi, Khmelnytskiy, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne and Ternopil in 
western Ukraine; Kyiv, Sumy and Zhytomyr in the north of Ukraine; 
Kharkiv in the east of Ukraine; Mykolayiv in the south; and the Cher-
kasy Oblast in central Ukraine. The largest decreases in unemployment 
rates were recorded in the following regions: Chernivtsi by 3.8% points 
(from 12.2% in 2004 to 8.4% in 2017), Lviv by 2.5% points (from 10.0 to 
7.5%) and Khmelnytskiy by 2.4% points (from 11.1 to 8.7%), while the 
highest increases were in the Poltava by 4.5% points (from 7.4 to 11.9%), 
Donetsk by 7.1% points (from 7.4 to 14.5%) and Luhansk oblasts by 7.4% 
points (from 9.2 to 16.5%). In the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the 
unemployment rate fell from 6.9 to 5.9% in 2004–2013, while in Sevas-
topol it increased from 5.3 to 5.7%. 
• A period of relative prosperity in the Ukrainian economy (2004–
2008), when the GDP grew quickly, translated into an increase in em-
ployment combined with a decrease in unemployment in all groups 
of oblasts. Unemployment rates fell the fastest in western Ukraine 
(by 2.7% points), in northern and southern Ukraine (2.3% points) and 
in eastern Ukraine (2.1% points), and the slowest in central Ukraine 
(1.7% points). As a result, the difference between the group of oblasts 
with the highest value of this variable (western Ukraine) and the group 
with its lowest value (eastern Ukraine) fell from 2.7% points in 2004 to 
2.1% points in 2008.
• The global financial crisis, combined with the Russian-Ukrainian gas 
conflict, translated into a one-year recession, which also resulted in a 
significant increase in unemployment rates in all oblast groups. At the 
time, these rates rose the fastest in the oblasts of central Ukraine (by 
3.1% points), then in the northern (3.0% points) and eastern (2.6% points) 
oblasts. The slowest increase was in the south and west of Ukraine (by 
1.8% points).
• Economic growth in Ukraine in the years 2010–2013 again led to a de-
crease in the variable analyzed here, in all oblast groups. The highest de-
creases in unemployment rates were then recorded in western Ukraine 
(1.9% points), while the lowest in southern Ukraine (1.4% points).
• The economic, political and military crisis after the Euro-Maidan 
caused a surge in unemployment rates in all groups of Ukrainian 
oblasts. These rates increased from 7.9% in 2013 to 9.4% in 2014 in west-
ern Ukraine, from 7.6 to 9.7% in central Ukraine, from 6.9 to 9.8% in 
eastern Ukraine, from 6.9 to 8.6% in the north and from 6.3 to 8.6% in 
southern Ukraine.
• In 2015–2017, the unemployment rates in all groups of Ukrainian 
oblasts stabilized, except for the oblasts of northern and southern 
Ukraine. In the north they began to rise slightly, while in the south they 
fell insignificantly.
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Figure 7.12 C oefficients of variability of labor productivity, wages and unemploy-
ment rates in Ukraine in 2004–2017.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
Figure 7.12 presents the coefficients of variation of the analyzed macroe-
conomic variables in Ukrainian oblasts in 2004–2017. The following con-
clusions can be drawn from this figure: First of all, labor productivity was 
much more spatially diverse than wages and unemployment rates. Second, 
the diversity of labor productivity in Ukraine was greater than the diversity 
of this macroeconomic variable in Poland. Third, the spatial diversification 
of labor productivity in Ukraine (as a trend) increased. Fourth, the differ-
ences in wages and unemployment rates were similar and quite stable.
7.4  Determinants of the increase in unemployment rates and 
gross real wages – a theoretical approach and empirical 
verification
In order to determine the main determinants of the increase in unemploy-
ment rates, one can rely on the definition of the unemployment rate of the 
equation  (where Uit and Lit means the number of unemployed 
and working persons in the i-this voivodeship or oblast respectively in a 
given year t). Differentiating this equation (after time t) and making simple 
transformations, we conclude that:
Equation (7.1) shows that the increase in the unemployment rate uit′  depends 
on its uit level and the difference between the labor supply growth rate 
N Nit′ it  and the employment growth rate Lit′ Lit.
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Assuming that the employment growth rate Lit′ Lit is higher, the higher 
the product growth rate g and by using the relationship (7.1), we arrive at an 
equation for the growth of the unemployment rate of the form of (see also 
Dykas et al. 2013):
 N
u u′ ( )1 (it′
 
it = − it ⋅ − f g) ,  (7.2)
 Nit  
L′ = f g(
L
where ) and f g′( ) > 0. This equation (7.2) shows the following 
conclusions: First, an increase in the unemployment rate is a decreasing 
function of the product growth rate g and second if the labor supply rate 
is higher (lower) from the employment growth rate, the increase in the 
unemployment rate is a decreasing (increasing) function of the unemploy-
ment rate.
While analyzing the factors determining wages, the following reasoning 
can be used, resulting from the Solow 1979 efficiency wage model and the 
neoclassical Solow 1956 economic growth model and its generalizations (To-
karski 2005a, b or Dykas, Misiak 2014). This model shows that the higher 
the regional level of wages is, the higher the regional labor productivity is, 
and the lower the regional unemployment rate is as well. So we have the 
following equation:
w uit = −α α0 1 ⋅ +it α2 ⋅ yit ,  (7.3)
where wit means wages in the region i and in a year t, yit is labor productivity, 
and uit is the unemployment rate.
Statistical analyzes of the impact of the real GDP growth rate (labor pro-
ductivity) on the unemployment rate (gross real wages) in 2004–2017 were 
conducted based on panel data for Poland and Ukraine:
• Poland – 16 voivodeships, corresponding to the NUTS2 classification
• Ukraine – 27 oblasts, while for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
and Sevastopol, data refer to the period of 2004–2013.
The simple theoretical models presented in point 7.3 show that the impact 
of the GDP growth rate on the increase in unemployment rates as well 
as the impact of the unemployment rate and the level of labor productiv-
ity on the level of gross real wages can be established using the following 
equations:
∆ =u uit β β0 1− +it− ∆1 2β βd uu it i−1 3+ ∆lnYt, (7.4)
and:
lnw uit = −α α0 1 it +α2 ln yit , (7.5)
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where uit is the unemployment rate in the voivodeship (oblast) and in a given 
year t, ∆uit is the increase in the unemployment rate, and d∆u is the dummy 
variable taking the value 1 when the unemployment rate in the voivodeship 
(oblast) i and in a year t increased, zero in other cases; ∆ lnYit is the real GDP 
growth rate in the voivodeship (oblast) i in a year t; wit is the average gross 
real wage in a voivodeship (oblast) and i in a year t; yit is the level of labor 
productivity in the voivodeship (oblast) i in a year t; β0 is a constant that 
has no direct economic interpretation; β1 > 0 measures the strength of the 
impact of the unemployment rate on the increase in the unemployment rate 
when the rate is not rising; β2 > 0 measures the impact of the unemployment 
rate on the increase of this rate when the unemployment rate increases; β3 
describes the impact of the real GDP growth rate on the increase in the 
unemployment rate; α0 is constant without direct economic interpretation; 
α1 is a relative decrease in wages in the voivodeship (oblast) i and in a year t 
resulting from an increase in the unemployment rate by 1% point; α2 is wage 
flexibility in terms of labor productivity.
The above equations were estimated in two variants:
 i In Variant I, Eqs. (7.4) and (7.5) were estimated using a two-step esti-
mator based on the First Differences Generalized Method of Moments 
(FDGMM) by Arellano and Bond 1991.
 ii Eqs. (7.4) and (7.5) were estimated in variant II using the System Gen-
eralized Method of Moments Estimator (SGMM) (Blundell and Bond 
1998).
The results of this estimation of the parameters of these Eqs. (7.4) and (7.5) 
for variants I and II are summarized in Tables 7.1 and7.2.
From the estimation results summarized in Table 7.1 the following con-
clusions can be drawn:
• The estimated parameters of the equation for the increase in unemploy-
ment rates using both FDGMM and SGMM, when statistically signif-
icant, are also consistent with theoretical postulates as to the direction 
of the impact of explanatory variables on the increase in unemployment 
rates for both Poland and Ukraine.
• However, the values of estimated parameters for Poland and Ukraine 
differ significantly. Analyzing the results of estimation using FDGMM 
estimators, one can notice a large asymmetry of the impact of unemploy-
ment rates from the previous period, on the increase in unemployment 
rates depending on whether the previous unemployment rates increased 
or decreased. They had a more significant impact from the previous 
period, when they had a downward trend rather than an upward trend. 
This observation applies to both estimated parameters for Poland and 
Ukraine, with the difference that for Ukraine, the estimated parameter 
of the impact of the unemployment rate from the previous year, when 
the unemployment rate was falling, was not statistically significant.
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• Under decreasing unemployment rates, each subsequent percentage 
point of decrease in the unemployment rates in the previous year (cet-
eris paribus) reduced the increase in the unemployment rates in Poland 
by 0.243% points in an estimations using the SGMM and by 0.523 in 
estimates using the FDGMM, and in Ukraine by 0.313% points corre-
spondingly, and in the estimations using the FDGMM this parameter 
was not statistically significant. However, in conditions of rising unem-
ployment, each subsequent percentage point of increase in the unem-
ployment rate in the previous year increased the growth of this variable 
in Poland by 0.153 (0.116) of a percentage point in an estimation using 
the SGMM estimator (FDGMM), and in the Ukrainian economy re-
spectively by 0.25 (0.15) of a percentage point.
• An increase in the real GDP growth rate of 1% point resulted in a de-
crease in the unemployment rates of 0.181 of a percentage point in Po-
land and by 0.034 of a percentage point in Ukraine in estimations using 
the SGMM estimator and by 0.12 of a percentage point in Poland and 
by 0.08 of a percentage point in Ukraine in estimates from using the 
FDGMM estimator.
• Valuations employing the SGMM estimator several times (about 5.3 
times) were more significantly influenced by an increase in the unem-
ployment rate in Poland than in Ukraine.
• Analyzing the estimated parameters using the SGMM estimator, one 
can observe a smaller asymmetry of the impact of delayed unemploy-
ment rates, both in Poland and Ukraine. The difference in estimated 
parameters of the impact of economic growth rates was also smaller. 
For Poland, this parameter was about 56% higher, and in Ukraine about 
56% lower compared to the parameters estimated using the FDGMM.
• The instruments in both estimation variants were properly selected, as 
indicated by the Hansen test values. The obtained Hansen test statis-
tics, as well as the significance levels obtained in variants I and II for 
both Poland and Ukraine, do not provide grounds for rejecting the zero 
hypothesis that all instruments in the model are exogenous.
• Satisfactory Arellano-Bond test values for AR (1) and AR (2) were also 
obtained, which indicate that a negative, statistically significant first 
order autocorrelation and a statistically insignificant second order au-
tocorrelation were obtained in all estimation variants for both Poland 
and Ukraine. This demonstrates the compliance and effectiveness of 
the estimators used.
• Analyzing the results of the estimation of gross real wage equations 
using both FDGMM and SGMM estimators for Poland and Ukraine 
(summarized in Table 7.2), the following conclusions can be drawn:
• The estimated values of the parameters of the real wage equation using 
the FDGMM estimator for Poland and Ukraine were significantly dif-
ferent. The estimated values of the labor productivity impact parameter 
for Ukraine were almost two times higher than for Poland, suggesting 
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that the increase in labor productivity in Ukraine determined the in-
crease in wages more significantly than in Poland. This parameter in as-
sessments using the SGMM estimator for the Ukrainian economy was 
about 58% higher than for Poland.
• Estimates using the SGMM estimator show that when labor produc-
tivity increased by 1%, real wages increased by 0.09% in Poland and by 
0.14% in Ukraine.
• The estimated parameters of the impact of the unemployment rate on 
gross real wages, using the SGMM estimator, indicate that the unem-
ployment rate in Poland exerted a more robust impact by approximately 
23% on wages than in the Ukrainian economy.
• The parameters obtained using the SGMM for Poland and Ukraine are 
consistent with the theoretical assumptions made.
• According to an analysis of the Arellano-Bond test values for AR (1) 
and AR (2) for Poland, a statistically significant first-order autocorrela-
tion and a statistically insignificant second-order autocorrelation were 
observed. The Hansen test values confirm that the instruments were 
correctly selected.
• In the estimation of the equation parameters of gross real wages for 
Ukraine, it can be stated that based on the Arellano-Bond tests for AR 
(1) and AR (2) a negative statistically significant second-order autocor-
relation was observed. These Arellano-Bond test values for AR (2) sig-
nificantly undermine the received estimates of the parameters of the 
gross real wage equation in Ukraine, and indicate that the obtained 
values could be significantly influenced by autocorrelation.
7.5 Summary
The considerations in this chapter can be summarized as follows:
 i Among the voivodeships, the highest levels of labor productivity 
were recorded in (the Mazowieckie, Dolnośląskie and Wielkopolskie 
voivodeships. The smallest value of the discussed variable was recorded 
in three voivodeships of eastern Poland: Podlaskie, Świętokrzyskie and 
Podkarpackie).
 ii In the Ukrainian economy, the highest level of labor productivity was 
recorded in (the capital of the country – Kyiv. The Dnipropetrovsk, Pol-
tava and Donetsk oblasts also belonged to a group of high labor pro-
ductivity oblasts. The lowest value of GDP per working person was in 
the Kherson, Ternopil and Zakarpattia oblasts).
 iii The highest wages, in 2004–2017, occurred in the following voivode-
ships: (Mazowieckie, Śląskie and Dolnośląskie. On the other hand, the 
lowest wages in the Polish economy were recorded in the Podkarpackie, 
Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Lubuskie voivodeships).
 iv In oblasts as a group, the highest wages occurred in the (capital City of 
Kyiv and in the oblast surrounding it – the Kyiv Oblast. High wages also 
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occurred in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, whose capital, Dnipro, is the 
center of financial services in Ukraine. On the other hand, the lowest 
wages in the Ukrainian economy occurred in western Ukraine: in the 
Chernivtsi, Volyn and Ternopil oblasts).
 v In the Polish economy, in the years 2004–2017, the highest unemploy-
ment rates were recorded in the following voivodeships: Warmińsko- 
Mazurskie, Zachodniopomorskie and Kujawsko-Pomorskie. The 
Wielkopolskie, Mazowieckie and Małopolskie voivodeships were char-
acterized by the lowest unemployment rates in the research period.
 vi The lowest average annual unemployment rates were recorded in those 
cities with a special status (Sevastopol and Kyiv) and in the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea. The highest values of this variable, in 2004–2017, 
occurred in the Zhytomyr, Ternopil and Rivne oblasts.
 vii In the conditions of decreasing unemployment rates, each subsequent 
percentage point of a decrease in unemployment from the previous 
year translated into a decrease of this variable in the current period, for 
the Polish economy, depending on the estimation method, by approx. 
0.24–0.52 of a percentage point, and for the Ukrainian economy by ap-
prox. 0.31 of a percentage point (for the SGMM estimates). However, in 
conditions of rising unemployment, each subsequent percentage point 
of increase in the unemployment rate from the previous year translated 
into an increase of approx. 0.15–0.12 of a percentage point (in the case 
of Poland) and by approx. 0.15–0.25 of a percentage point (in Ukraine) 
of the current unemployment rate.
 viii An increase in the real GDP growth rate by 1% point, using the SGMM 
estimator, translated in the case of the Polish economy to a decrease in 
the unemployment rate by approx. 0.181, and in the Ukrainian econ-
omy by approx. 0.034 of a percentage point. However, when using the 
FDGMM estimator, these decreases were as follows: 0.12 of a percent-
age point for Poland and 0.08 of a percentage point for Ukraine.
 ix Labor productivity statistically and significantly determined the level 
of wages in both the Polish and Ukrainian economy. Assessments using 
the SGMM estimator show that wage flexibility in relation to labor pro-
ductivity was about 0.09 for Poland and by about 0.14 for Ukraine.
Notes
 1 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, data base: Labour Force & 
Wages (https://w3.unece.org/PXWeb2015/pxweb/en/STAT/STAT__20-ME__3- 
MELF/, access: 2019-12-30).
 2 Source: Macrotrends (2019), https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/POL/ poland/ 
gdp-growth-rate, and The World Bank Group, Indicators, (2019).
 3 https://bank.gov.ua/markets.
 4 The quarrel began in March 2005. The situation returned to normal in January 
2006. The next conflict began in October 2007 and lasted until 2009.
 5 In 2013, the population of the Crimean Peninsula numbered about 2.4 million 
people (5.2% of the population of Ukraine), and about 1.1 million people were 
employed there (5.3% of Ukraine’s workforce). Similar indicators for the Donbas 
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are 6.6 million inhabitants (14.5% of the population of Ukraine) and 3.0 million 
employed (14.6% of those employed in Ukraine).
 6 The decline in labor productivity in the voivodeships of western Poland in 2016 
was mainly due to the fact that the number of employed there grew faster than 
the GDP. In 2016, the GDP in this group of voivodeships increased by 3.2%, 
while the number of those employed by as much as 12.9%. A similar process took 
place in the Mazowieckie voivodeship in 2014, when the GDP increased by 4.2% 
and the number of employed by 8.8%.
 7 In 2015, wages in the voivodeships of central Poland amounted to PLN 3 960.16 
and western Poland to PLN 3 869.11, and were therefore lower than the wages in 
the Mazowieckie voivodeship in 2004.
 8 Areas with high structural unemployment are also significant parts of the 
Dolnośląskie and Lubuskie voivodeships and the areas of the former Słupsk 
voivodeship in the western part of the Pomorskie voivodeship (for more on this 
topic, see: Misiak, Tokarski 2012 or Majchrowska et al. 2013
 9 Government Agriculture Farm.
 10 Data on the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol illustrated on 
Maps 5.4–5.6 (due to Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014) are 
average values of the analyzed variables from 2004 to 2013.
8 Simulations of voivodeship and 
oblast development trajectories. 
An analysis based on the 
gravity growth model
Svitlana Chugaievska, Katarzyna Filipowicz, 
Tomasz Tokarski and Rafał Wisła
8.1 Introduction
This analysis of the most important determinants of the spatial diversity of 
labor productivity in Poland and Ukraine was carried out on the basis of the 
gravitational model of economic growth proposed in the work by Mroczek 
et al. 2014 (cf. also Filipowicz 2019) and is a compilation of the gravitational 
trade models of Linnemann 1963, Poyhonen 1963 and Pulliainen 1963 with 
the neoclassical model of economic growth of Solow 1956.
The model under consideration is assumed to be, amongst others, an as-
sumption that labor productivity depends both on the capital-labor ratio 
(as is the case in the neoclassical Solow growth model) and on the gravity 
effects affecting a given region. These (as in Newton’s law of universal grav-
itation) are directly proportional to the economic potential of a given region 
(voivodeships or oblasts) and the economic potential of other regions, and 
is inversely proportional to the square of the geometric mean [geomean] of 
the distance between the capital of a given region and the capitals of other 
regions.
The gravitational growth model was used, inter alias, for analyzing 
the spatial diversity of the economic development of Polish voivodeships 
(Mroczek et al. 2014; Filipowicz 2019), Ukrainian oblasts (Chugaievska 
et al. 2017), the Balkan countries (Mroczek et al. 2015) and the EU countries 
(Wisła et al. 2018).
8.2 Gravitational growth model
In the gravitational model of economic growth, the following submis-
sions are made regarding the long-term functioning of the economy (after 
Mroczek et al. 2014, see also Filipowicz 2019):
1  Labor productivity function (resulting from the Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function) is given by the formula:1
∀i yi i( )t a= ( (g t( )) )β αk ti ( ) , (8.1)
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where yi(t) means labor productivity in the region i (i.e., in the Polish 
voivodeship or Ukrainian oblast) at the moment t, a>0 is a certain con-
stant that has no direct economic interpretation, gi(t) are aggregate 
gravity effects, ki(t) is capital-labor ratio, and α ∈ (0,1) and β ∈(0,1) are 
elasticities of labor productivity in relation to capital-labor ratio and to-
1− α
tal gravitational effects. We also assume that β < , which means 
2
that the nontrivial steady state point of the system of differential equa-
tions (8.6) is (by the Grobman–Hartman theorem) asymptotically stable.
2  Total aggregate gravity effects affecting the region i are the geometric 
mean of individual gravity effects connecting this region with the other 
regions, therefore:
∀i gi i( )t g= −1∏ j ( )t , (8.2)N
j≠1
where gij(t) means individual gravity effects connecting the region i with 
the region j.
3  The individual gravitational effects connecting the region i with the re-
gion j are directly proportional to the ratio of the economic potential 
of these regions (measured by their capital-labor ratio) and inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance between them (and exactly 
between their capitals). It follows that individual gravitational effects 
can be written as follows:
k t( )k t( )
∀i j, (∧ ≠i j g tij ) =
i j , (8.3)
d 2ij
where dij is the distance between the capital of the region i and region j 
(this distance was calculated from the Pythagorean theorem in a straight 
line connecting the capitals of voivodeships or oblasts).
4  The increase in capital-labor ratio ki is described by the Solow equation:
 
∀i ki i( )t s= −y ti i( ) µ k ti ( ), (8.4)
Where si ∈ (0,1) is the investment rate in the region i, and µi > 0 is the 
decrease rate of the capital-labor ratio (which is the sum of the depreci-
ation rate of capital and the growth rate of employment).
From Eqs. (8.1) to (8.3) we obtain the function of labor productivity:
(k t )α β+i j( ) ∏(k t( ))β /(N −1)
≠∀i y ( )t a= j 1i , (8.5)2βdi
where di is the geometric mean distance from the capital of the region i 
and from the capitals of the other regions. By inserting Eq. (8.5) into the 
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equations for the increase of capital-labor ratio (8.4), we arrive at the follow-
ing system of differential equations:
( α βi j( )) + ∏( β /(N −1)k t k t( ))
j ≠1
∀i ki i( )t s= −a ( ).2β µi ik t  (8.6)di
The system of differential equations (8.6) has two steady state points: trivial 
at the beginning of the N-dimensional coordinate system and non-trivial in 
which dependencies are met (after Mroczek et al. 2014).
β ∑ as as( ) ln
j + ln i(N − −1 1) α β− 2 µ µβ βd 2 2j j idj i
∀i kln *i = . (8.7)N − 2
1− −α β
N −1
As already mentioned, using the Grobman–Hartman theorem (Grobman 
1999: 219–221) it can be shown that the non-trivial stationary point deter-
mined by Eq. (8.7) is characterized by an asymptotic stability (Mroczek 
et al. 2014). So, this point sets the long-run equilibrium of the gravitational 
model of economic growth.
The following conclusions can be drawn from Eq. (8.7). The level of 
capital- labor ratio in the i-region k*i  is higher when the investment rate in 
this region si is higher, of the decrease rate of investment in other regions sj 
and the lower the capital decrease rate in i-the region μi and the decrease rate 
in other regions μj. The size of the long-term capital-labor ratio in each re-
gion is also affected by its geographical location, which follows from the fact 
that the more centrally located region (i.e., the lower the average geometric 
distance di), the higher is the long-term capital-labor ratio.
8.3 T he diversity of the capital-labor ratio, gravitational 
effects and investment rates
Since the key variables in the gravitational model of economic growth are 
capital- labor ratio and gravitational effects, before simulating the trajectory of 
labor productivity in voivodeships and oblasts, a brief description of the spa-
tial diversity of these macroeconomic variables in Poland and Ukraine seems 
appropriate. These analyses (due to the availability of relevant statistical data 
on the websites of the Polish and Ukrainian Statistical Offices) concern the 
years 2004–2015 (in the case of Poland) and 2004–2017 (in the case of Ukraine).
8.3.1 Poland
In the years 2004–2016 there were significant disproportions between 
voivodeships due to the level of capital-labor ratio. This variable (on aver-
age over the whole period of time studied) ranged from 129,800 PLN in the 
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Map 8.1 D iversification of capital-labor ratio in voivodeships in 2004–2016 (thou-
sand PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
Lubelskie Voivodeship up to 253,900 PLN in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship. 
In addition to the capital of the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, the capital- 
labor ratio exceeded a level of 200,000 PLN in the Zachodniopomorskie 
(213,000 PLN) and Dolnośląskie (202,600 PLN) voivodeships. The follow-
ing voivodeships all exceeded a level of 190,000 PLN, that is, the Opol-
skie (198,300 PLN), Pomorskie (190,400 PLN) and Wielkopolskie (190,200 
PLN) voivodeships. The lowest levels of this variable, however, were in the 
Łódzkie (141,800 PLN) and Świętokrzyskie (133,900 PLN) voivodeships. 
The capital-labor ratio did not exceed a level of 160,000 PLN in the fol-
lowing voivodeships: Małopolskie (159,700 PLN), Warmińsko-Mazurskie 
(159,900 PLN), Kujawsko-P omorskie (157,700 PLN) and Podkarpackie 
(151,500 PLN, see Map 8.1).
Hence, we may come to a more general conclusion that (except for the 
Łódzkie and Świętokrzyskie voivodeships) the voivodeships west of the Vis-
tula (Wisła) river were characterized by a higher level of capital-labor ratio.
The spatial diversity of gravitational effects is the result of two factors. 
These factors are the economic potential of a given region (measured by its 
capital-labor ratio) and its geographic location.
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Map 8.2 D ifferentiation of gravitational effects in voivodeships in 2004–2016 
(million PLN2/mingeo2 according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
The highest levels of gravitational effects in Poland were found in the fol-
lowing voivodeships:2 Mazowieckie (1.522 million PLN2/mingeo2), Śląskie 
(1.243 million PLN2/mingeo2) and Opolskie (1.220 million PLN2/mingeo2). 
The high level of the feature in question was also characteristic of the Łódzkie 
(1.164 million PLN2/mingeo2), Dolnośląskie (1.075 million PLN2/mingeo2) 
and Wielkopolskie (1.011 million PLN2/mingeo2) voivodeships. Low and 
very low levels of gravitational effects were found in peripheral regions, both 
in the east and in the west of Poland. These were the following voivodeships: 
Warmińsko-Mazurskie (0.725 million PLN2/mingeo2), Podkarpackie (0.573 
million PLN2/mingeo2), Lubuskie (0.550 million PLN2/mingeo2), Lubelskie 
(0.498 million PLN2/mingeo2), Zachodniopomorskie (0.424 million PLN2/
mingeo2) and Podlaskie (0.407 million PLN2/mingeo2, see Map 8.2).
In the following numerical simulations of labor productivity, in addition to 
internal gravitational effects, external gravitational effects were also included, 
connecting voivodeships with Poland’s largest economic partner, that is, Ger-
many.3 These effects are also included in the estimation of production function 
parameters and used to determine the development trajectories of voivode-
ships under various scenarios regarding the economic growth in Germany.
External gravitational effects indicate which voivodeships are poten-
tially most affected by the German economy. By far the highest external 
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Map 8.3 E xternal gravitational effects in voivodeships in 2004–2016 (million PLN2/ 
mingeo2 according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
gravitational effects were characteristic of the border voivodeships in the 
west of Poland: the Zachodniopomorskie (9.658 million PLN2/mingeo2) and 
Lubuskie (4.435 million PLN2/mingeo2) voivodeships. The Wielkopolskie 
(1.492 million PLN2/mingeo2) and Dolnośląskie (1.307 million PLN2/min-
geo2) voivodeships also achieved a high level of this feature. Low external 
gravitational effects were observed in the following voivodeships: Małopol-
skie (0.320 million PLN2/mingeo2), Warmińsko-Mazurskie (0.302 million 
PLN2/mingeo2) and Świętokrzyskie (0.239 million PLN2/mingeo2). The 
weakest benefits from the impact of the German economy were recorded in 
the peripheral voivodeships in eastern Poland, that is, in the Podkarpackie 
(0.186 million PLN2/mingeo2), Podlaskie (0.166 million PLN2/mingeo2) and 
Lubelskie (0.149 million PLN2/mingeo2, see Map 8.3) voivodeships.
Because, according to Solow’s Neoclassical Growth Model (1956) (but also 
in accordance with Mankiw et al. growth models (1992), and Nonneman’s, 
Vanhoudt’s (1996), or the gravitational model of economic growth used here), 
the investment rate is a key variable that determines the rate of capital accu-
mulation and the rate of economic growth, one should also look at the spatial 
diversity of this variable in Polish voivodeships and Ukrainian oblasts.
In the years 2004–2015, the range between the highest and lowest invest-
ment rate (calculated as the share of investment in GDP) in voivodeships 
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Map 8.4  Investment rates in voivodeships in 2004–2015 (%).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
was 4.3 percentage points, as these rates ranged from 18.3% (Śląskie Voivode-
ship) to 22.6% (Podlaskie Voivodeship). In as many as 11 voivodeships, 
investment rates exceeded 20%. These were the following voivodeships: 
Podlaskie (22.6%), Podkarpackie (22.4%), Pomorskie (22.3%), Warmińsko- 
Mazurskie (21.9%), Lubuskie (21.6%), Łódzkie (21.4%), Zachodniopomor-
skie (21.1%), Dolnośląskie (20.4%), Małopolskie (20.3%), Mazowieckie 
(20.3%) and Kujawsko- Pomorskie (20.0%). The lowest investment rate was 
recorded in the Śląskie Voivodeship (18.3%, see Map 8.4). 
8.3.2 Ukraine
Map 8.5 illustrates the spatial differentiation of capital-labor ratio in 
Ukraine. We can reach the following conclusions from this map: By far the 
highest level of capital-labor ratio was in the City of Kyiv (670,600 UAH). 
The group of oblasts with a high value of this feature also included the 
Kyiv Oblast (256,300 UAH) in northern Ukraine, and the Donetsk (243,500 
UAH) in the east of Ukraine, and Dnipropetrovsk (227,100 UAH) and 
Poltava (191,000 UAH) oblasts in central Ukraine. A high (for Ukrainian 
conditions) value of this feature was recorded in the Zaporizhzhya (190,400 
UAH), Luhansk (181,300 UAH) and Kharkiv (169,700 UAH) oblasts in 
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Map 8.5  Diversification of capital-labor ratio in oblasts in 2004–2017 (thousand 
UAH, according to 2016 prices).
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
eastern Ukraine and the city of Sevastopol (184,300 UAH), Odesa Oblast 
(179,900 UAH) and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (169,700 UAH) in 
the south. Thus, all oblasts with the highest or high value of capital per em-
ployee were located in Left-bank Ukraine or on the Black Sea.
The group of oblasts with the lowest level of capital-labor ratio was com-
posed of the following oblasts: Zakarpattia (102,900 UAH) and Ternopil 
(104,100 UAH) in western Ukraine, Kherson (104,300 UAH) in the south 
and Zhytomyr (104,500 UAH) and Sumy (108, 600 UAH) in the north of 
Ukraine. A low level of capital-labor ratio also characterized the Vinnytsya 
(109,700 UAH) and Cherkasy (117,300 UAH) oblasts in central Ukraine, the 
Volyn (117,300 UAH), Chernivtsi (121,500 UAH) and Khmelnytskiy (130,100 
UAH) oblasts in the west of the country, and the Chernihiv (119,300 UAH) 
Oblast in the north of Ukraine. Thus, oblasts with a low or very low level of 
capital-labor ratio were located mainly on the Right-bank of Ukraine.
Map 8.6 illustrates the spatial differentiation of national gravitational ef-
fects in Ukraine. This map shows that the highest national gravitational 
effects were observed in the oblasts located in the Dnieper valley (Kyiv 1.628 
million UAH2/mingeo2 and Kyiv Oblast4 0.698 million UAH2/mingeo2, 
Dnipropetrovsk 0.452 million UAH2/mingeo2, Poltava 0.388 million UAH2/
mingeo2 and Kirovohrad 0.380 million UAH2/mingeo2). This resulted both 
from their central geographical location and from the very high economic 
potential (in particular) of Kyiv and the Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts 
(see also Chugaievska et al. 2017).
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Map 8.6  Differentiation of national gravitational effects in the oblasts in 2004–2017 
(million UAH2/mingeo2, according to 2016 prices).
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
In contrast, the group of oblasts with the lowest national gravitational ef-
fects was composed of the following oblasts: Zakarpattia (0.074 million UAH2/
mingeo2), Volyn (0.188 million UAH2/mingeo2) and Lviv (0.189 million UAH2/
mingeo2) in the west of Ukraine; Luhansk (0.114 million UAH2/mingeo2) in 
the east; and Sumy (0.173 million UAH2/mingeo2) in the north of the country.
When analyzing the impact of external gravitational effects on Ukrainian 
oblasts, two of Ukraine’s most important economic partners, that is, Russia 
and Poland, were taken into account.5
The external gravitational effects flowing from Russia are illustrated in 
Map 8.7. The following conclusions can be drawn from this map: First of 
all, Kyiv had by far the highest level of these effects (1.437 million UAH2/ 
mingeo2). Second, a very high level of these effects was recorded in the 
Kharkiv (0.781 million UAH2/mingeo2), Donetsk (0.685 million UAH2/
mingeo2), Poltava (0.661 million UAH2/mingeo2) and Dnipropetrovsk (0.625 
million UAH2/mingeo2) oblasts, located in eastern and central Ukraine. 
Third, the lowest value of this feature was observed in the oblasts located in 
the west of Ukraine, in particular in the Zakarpattia (0.059 million UAH2/
mingeo2), Ternopil (0.093 million UAH2/mingeo2), Chernivtsi (0.104 million 
UAH2/mingeo2), Ivano-Frankivsk (0.105 million UAH2/mingeo2) and Volyn 
(0.109 million UAH2/mingeo2) oblasts. Fourth, the external gravitational 
effects flowing from Russia had a much stronger impact on the Left-bank 
Ukraine and the Odesa and Mykolayiv coastal regions than on the rest of 
the country. This was due to historical (stronger economic links of the Left-
bank of Ukraine with the rest of the Romanov Empire before World War I 
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Map 8.7 E xternal gravitational effects from Russia in oblasts in the years 2004–
2017 (million UAH2/mingeo2, according to 2016 prices).
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
and with the other Soviet republics after the October Revolution in Russia), 
geographical (these oblasts are closer to Russia) and economic connections 
(they are usually characterized by a higher level of economic development 
than from the Right-bank of Ukraine).
Considering the external gravitational effects flowing from Poland 
(Map 8.8), the following conclusions can be drawn: These effects had the 
strongest impact on the Lviv (1.584 million UAH2/mingeo2), Zakarpattia 
(1.073 million UAH2/mingeo2), Volyn (0.884 million UAH2/mingeo2) and 
Ivano- Frankivsk (0.866 million UAH2/mingeo2) oblasts in western Ukraine 
and on the City of Kyiv (1,166 million UAH2/mingeo2). The impact of these 
effects on the Lviv, Volyn and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts (but also on the 
Rivne 0.688 million UAH2/mingeo2 and Ternopil 0.574 million UAH2/
mingeo2) resulted both from historical reasons (these regions belonged to 
 Poland in the interwar period) and geographical causes (their close proxim-
ity to the Polish border). The substantial impact of gravitational effects in 
the Zakarpattia Oblast was due to a geographical factor (although it seems 
that this oblast, for historical reasons, is more strongly influenced by Hun-
gary, Slovakia or Czechia than Poland), and in Kyiv due to its economic 
potential. The weakest external gravitational effects flowing from Poland 
affected the eastern oblasts of Luhansk (0.086 million UAH2/mingeo2) 
and Kharkiv (0.109 million UAH2/mingeo2) in the east of Ukraine, in the 
south the Kherson Oblast (0.098 million UAH2/mingeo2) and the Auton-
omous Republic of Crimea 0.099 million UAH2/mingeo2) and the Sumy 
Oblast located in northern Ukraine (0.087 million UAH2/mingeo2). Thus, 
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Map 8.8  External gravitational effects from Poland in oblasts in the years 2004–
2017 (million UAH2/mingeo2, according to 2016 prices).
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
Map 8.9 T he investment rates in Ukrainian oblasts in 2004–2017 (%).
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
due to both geographical and historical factors, the external gravitational 
effects flowing from Poland had a significantly greater impact on western 
Ukraine than on other oblasts.
The average investment rates in the oblasts in 2004–2017 are illustrated on 
Map 8.9. This map shows that the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (30.9%) 
and Sevastopol (20.9%) had the highest level of this value in the south of 
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Ukraine, while the Kyiv Oblast (30.5%) and the City of Kyiv (23.8%) had the 
highest value of this feature in northern, and the Lviv Oblast (21.3%) in west-
ern Ukraine. The lowest shares of investment in GDP were recorded in the 
Sumy (13.7%), Chernihiv (14.0%) and Zhytomyr (14.2%) oblasts in northern 
Ukraine as well as the Zaporizhzhya (14.2%) and Donetsk (14.3%) oblasts in 
the east of Ukraine. 
8.4 Calibration of model parameters
The parameters of the gravitational model of economic growth were cal-
ibrated based on historical data for voivodeships from 2004 to 2015 or 
oblasts from 2004 to 2017. The labor productivity function includes both 
domestic gravitational effects and foreign gravitational effects related to the 
impact of the German or Russian or Polish economy. In the case of Poland, 
this function is described by the following equation:
y ait = ( () )α βk g Nit it (git )γ
or after log in:
ln y ait = +ln α βln k git + +ln it γ ln gNit , (8.8)
where: a > 0 means total factor productivity, kit is capital-labor ratio in the 
i-this region in year t, git is the total national gravitational effects in the 
i-this region in year t, Nit  is the foreign gravitational effects from Germany 
in the i-this region in the year t. The parameters of this Eq. (8.8) were esti-
mated by two methods – the ordinary least squares (OLS) method and the 
generalized method of moments (GMM). The results of the estimates are 
presented in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1 E stimates of the parameters of Eq. (8.1) for Poland
























Source: Our own calculations based on https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/
Student’s t-statistics are given in brackets under the estimates. ***  statisti-
cally significant variables were determined at a 1% level of significance, ** at 
a 5% level, * at a 10% level. In the estimates of the generalized method of 
moments, instrumental variables are dependent and independent variables 
delayed by a year.
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All estimated parameters of Eq. (8.8) were statistically noteworthy at least 
at a significance level of 10%. In the numerical simulations the labor produc-
tivity function was adopted; the parameters of which were obtained by aver-
aging the values of the parameters obtained OLS and GMM. This function 
has the following form:
0,0197
y k1,623 0,793g g0,114 Nit = it it ( )it . (8.9)
Function parameters (8.9) can be given the following economic interpreta-
tion: Capital-labor ratio (i.e., the internal potential of that province) had the 
strongest impact on labor productivity in a given voivodeship, the national 
gravitational effects were much weaker, and the external gravitational effects 
exerted the least influence. The impact of national effects was more than five 
times stronger than external effects related to the German economy.
Similar estimates of equation parameters (8.8) for Ukrainian regions are 
given in Table 8.2.
The estimates of equation parameters (8.8) presented in Table 8.2 for 
Ukraine show that all independent variables in this equation had a statis-
tically substantial effect on the dependent variable at least at a 5% signifi-
cance level.
After averaging the parameter estimates, we get the equation:
0,239 0,0663
y k= 32,346 0,341g g0,0649 ( )Rit ( )gPit it it it . (8.10)
The calibrated parameters of the Eq. (8.10) for Ukraine show that the level 
of labor productivity in the Ukrainian oblasts was most strongly affected 
Table 8.2  Estimates of the parameters of Eq. (8.1) for Ukraine
Explanatory variables OLS GMM


























Source: Our own calculations based on www.ukrstat.gov.ua
Student’s t-statistics are given in brackets under the estimates. *** Statis-
tically significant variables were determined at a 1% level of significance, 
** at a 5% level, * at a 10% level. In the estimates of the generalized method 
of moments, instrumental variables are dependent and independent varia-
bles delayed by a year. gP, gR means external gravitational effects flowing 
(respectively) from Poland and Russia.
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by peripheral capital-labor ratio, followed by gravitational effects flowing 
from Russia, next from Poland, and finally, by the national gravitational 
effects. It can be assumed that this is due to the fact that what is happening 
in eastern Ukraine is more strongly influenced by the economic situation of 
Russia, and in the west by Poland.
Comparing the calibrated parameters of the labor productivity function 
(8.8) for Poland (8.9) and Ukraine (8.10), it turns out that in Poland, labor 
productivity was much more strongly influenced by the amount of capital 
per employee and national gravitational effects than in Ukraine.
When simulating the trajectory of labor productivity, a system of difference 
equations was used, analogous to the systems of Eq. (8.6). It looks like this:
k kα β+ −∏ β /(N 1)it jt
∀ ∆ = j ≠1i k 2 ( γi is a g kFit ) − µi it−1 (8.11)βdi
where the subscript t refer to subsequent years, gFit  means foreign gravita-
tional effects, while the other designations as in the case of a system of Eq. 
(8.6) parameters α, β, γ were calibrated as in Eqs. (8.9) and (8.10). Using the 
system of Eq. (8.11), capital-labor ratio was calculated in subsequent regions 
in subsequent years, which allowed for the calculation of total gravitational 
effects and levels of labor productivity in regions and years.
8.5 Simulation of labor productivity trajectories
8.5.1 Poland
It seems that before presenting the results of simulations of labor produc-
tivity until 2050, it is necessary, at least briefly, to describe the diversity of 
labor productivity in the last year in which regional statistical data on this 
macroeconomic variable are available. Spatial diversity of labor productiv-
ity in Poland in 2015 is shown on Map 8.10.
In 2015, the Mazowieckie (145,900 PLN), Wielkopolskie (135,300 PLN) 
and Dolnośląskie (134,000 PLN) voivodeships were characterized by the 
highest labor productivity. Labor productivity over 120,000 PLN was also 
found in the Śląskie (126,500 PLN) and Zachodniopomorskie (122,200 
PLN) voivodeships. The lowest levels of labor productivity were found in 
the Świętokrzyskie (72,500 PLN) and Lubelskie (67,000 PLN) voivodships. 
Labor productivity below 90 thousand was also found in the following 
voivodeships, that is, the Podkarpackie (88,600 PLN), Łódzkie (88,300 
PLN), Warmińsko-Mazurskie (86,100 PLN) and Podlaskie (82,200 PLN) 
voivodeships.
Using the gravitational model of economic growth, labor productivity simu-
lations up to 2050 were carried out in eight alternative development scenarios. 
The scenarios differed in assumptions regarding investment rates, rate of capi-
tal depreciation per employee in voivodeships and German GDP growth rates.
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Map 8.10  Diversification of labor productivity in voivodeships in 2015 (thousand 
PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
The considered scenarios are as follows (see also Filipowicz 2019):
 I In the following years, the investment rate in all voivodeships will be 
at a level of 20.3% (equal to the average investment rate in Poland in 
2004–2015), and the rate of decrement of capital-labor ratio will be 
equal to 7%. In addition, Germany’s GDP will change at a pace equal 
to the average dynamics of this variable in 2004–2015.
 II In scenario II, the assumption that the same rate of decrement of cap-
ital per employee was the same in all voivodeships was rescinded. This 
variable was dependent on the growth rates of people of working age 
forecast by the Central Statistical Office (GUS) (i.e., it was assumed that 
the growth rate of the number of employed will coincide with the growth 
rate of the number of people of working age forecast by the GUS).
 III Scenario III assumes that voivodeships are characterized by constant, 
over a given timeframe, investment rates as well as capital decrement 
rates per employee. In addition, it is assumed that the German econ-
omy will develop at the same pace as in the years 2009–2015. This sce-
nario differs from scenario I, only under the assumption regarding the 
GDP growth rate of the German economy.
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 IV In the next scenario, it is assumed that investment rates are the same in 
all voivodeships, the German economy’s GDP growth rates are equal 
to the average for 2009–2015, and the rate of decrement of capital- labor 
ratio is based on data on the projections of the number of people of 
working age. Scenario IV differs from scenario II only by an assump-
tion regarding the pace of GDP changes in the German economy.
 V Investment rates in voivodeships will be at a level equal to the average 
for individual voivodeships from 2004 to 2015. In this scenario (as in 
scenario I) it is assumed that the capital decrement rates per employee 
are the same for all voivodeships and that the German economy is 
growing at an average pace of that of 2004–2015.
 VI In the next scenario, it is assumed that not only investment rates are 
different in individual voivodeships, but also capital decrement rates 
per employee are different (based on projected GUS data on the num-
ber of people of working age). In addition, the scenario under consid-
eration assumes that the German economy will develop economically 
at a rate equal to the average from 2004 to 2015.
 VII Scenario VII adopts the same assumptions as in scenario V with one 
exception; in other words, it is assumed that the German economy will 
develop at a slightly faster pace, that is, at a level of the average from 
2009 to 2015.
 VIII  In this scenario, it is assumed that the spatial structure of investment 
rates is shaped as it was in 2004–2015; in addition, the rate of capital 
loss per employee (based on forecasts regarding the number of people 
of working age) also varies and the average GDP growth rate of the 
German economy is at the average level of 2009–2015.
Table 8.3 presents data on the level of labor productivity in 2015 both in 
individual voivodeships and groups of voivodeships, as well as the results 
of numerical simulations of this macroeconomic variable in 2050 in subse-
quent, previously characterized scenarios. Table 8.3, however, presents the 
average levels of average annual growth rates of labor productivity in vari-
ous simulations.6
Tables 8.3 and 8.4 draw the following conclusions:
• In scenario I, with the same investment rates and rate of decrement of 
capital-labor ratio in all voivodeships, the highest (exceeding 650,000 
PLN) level of labor productivity in 2050 should be characterized by 
the Wielkopolskie, Dolnośląskie and Opolskie voivodeships located in 
the west of Poland, and the Mazowieckie Voivodeship and the Śląskie 
Voivodeship in central Poland. The group of voivodeships with the 
lowest level of labor productivity will be composed of the Pomorskie 
Voivodeship and four out of the five voivodeships of eastern Poland, that 
is, the Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Podkarpackie, Lubelskie and Podlaskie 
(see: Map 8.12 in the annex) voivodeships. The fact that the Pomorskie 
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Voivodeship (with the very robust Tri-City agglomeration of Gdańsk, 
Gdynia and Sopot) will be found in this group of voivodeships results 
from the fact that in this scenario, investment rates in all voivodeships 
will be at 20.3%, that is, 2 percentage points lower than the investment 
rate that was recorded in the Pomorskie Voivodeship in 2004–2015.
• In this scenario, those voivodeships located quite close to Warsaw 
should develop the fastest in 2016–2050, that is, the Łódzkie (5.7% av-
erage annual average), Świętokrzyskie (5.7%), Kujawsko-Pomorskie 
(5.4%) and Opolskie (5.6%) voivodeships. The lowest average annual 
growth rates of labor productivity should be found in the Mazowieckie 
(4.5%), Zachodniopomorskie (4.4%) and Podlaskie (4.3%) voivodeships.
• This scenario should also lead to a convergence of labor productivity, 
as the coefficient of the variability of labor productivity should decrease 
from 0.229 in 2015 to 0.200 in 2050.
• In Scenario I, labor productivity in the central Poland Voivodeship 
group should increase from 73.8% of labor productivity in the Ma-
zowieckie Voivodeship in 2015 to 93.5% in 2050, in the voivodeships of 
western Poland from 85.5% to 99.8%, and in eastern Poland from 53.5% 
to 64.3%.
Table 8.4  Average annual growth rates of labor productivity in 2016–2050 in 
subsequent scenarios (%)
Voivodeship Scenario
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Dolnośląskie 4.8 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.9 4.8 4.9 4.8
Kujawsko-Pomorskie 5.4 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.3 5.2
Lubelskie 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.8 4.9 4.8 4.9
Lubuskie 5.3 5.2 5.3 5.2 5.9 5.8 5.9 5.8
Łódzkie 5.7 5.8 5.7 5.8 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.4
Małopolskie 4.9 4.4 4.9 4.5 4.9 4.5 4.9 4.5
Mazowieckie 4.5 4.0 4.5 4.1 4.6 4.1 4.6 4.1
Opolskie 5.6 5.9 5.6 5.9 5.2 5.5 5.2 5.5
Podkarpackie 4.6 4.5 4.7 4.5 5.6 5.4 5.6 5.5
Podlaskie 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
Pomorskie 4.6 4.1 4.6 4.2 5.5 5.0 5.5 5.1
Śląskie 4.9 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.2
Świętokrzyskie 5.7 5.8 5.7 5.9 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.4
Warmińsko-Mazurskie 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8
Wielkopolskie 4.8 4.4 4.8 4.5 4.6 4.3 4.6 4.3
Zachodniopomorskie 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.8 4.7 4.8 4.8
Group of voivodeships
Central Poland 5.2 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.3 5.1 5.3 5.2
Western Poland 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 5.1 4.9 5.1 5.0
Eastern Poland 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.6
Source: Our own estimates.
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• In scenario II (the same investment rates, different rate of decrement of 
capital-labor ratio), the quartile group with the highest labor produc-
tivity in 2050 should be composed of the following voivodeships: the 
Opolskie and Dolnośląskie in western Poland as well as the Łódzkie and 
Śląskie in central Poland. In contrast, the quartile group with the lowest 
labor productivity in 2050 coincides with the one obtained in scenario I 
(Map 8.13 in the annex).
• In the scenario considered here, the highest growth rate of labor pro-
ductivity should be recorded in the Łódzkie (5.9%), Opolskie (5.9%) and 
Świętokrzyskie (5.8%) voivodeships, and the lowest in the Podlaskie 
(4.3%), Pomorskie (4.1%) and Mazowieckie (4.0%) voivodeships.
• This scenario will also lead to a convergence of labor productivity, as 
the coefficient of variation of this variable should fall to 0.204.
• In 2050, the level of labor productivity in the group of voivodeships 
from western Poland should be 12.9% higher than in the Mazowieckie 
Voivodeship, and 5.2% higher in central Poland, and 13.5% lower in 
eastern Poland than in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship. In this scenario, 
in the group of western Poland voivodeships, the level of labor pro-
ductivity should be higher than in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship from 
around 2025, while in central Poland from approximately 2045 (see Fig-
ure 8.2 in the Annex).
• In scenario III, which differs from scenario I only by the assumption 
concerning the growth rate of the German economy (in scenario I a 
1.5% yearly average, in scenario III 1.7%), the spatial diversity of labor 
productivity in 2050 should be very similar to that which was obtained 
in scenario I (see Map 8.14 in the annex). Labor productivity in voivode-
ships of central Poland should increase to 93.5% of the value of this var-
iable in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, in western Poland to 99.9% and 
in eastern Poland to 64.4%. The coefficients of variation of this variable, 
similar to variant I, should drop to 0.200.
• In scenario IV, which differs from scenario II only by assuming the 
growth rate of the German economy, performance simulations were ob-
tained that were very similar to those obtained in scenario II (Map 8.15 
in the annex).
• In scenario V, in which it is assumed that the investment rates will be 
different between voivodeships, the rates of capital deprecation – the 
same in all voivodeships – and the German economy will develop as on 
average in 2004–2015; these simulations indicate that the highest level 
labor productivity in Poland in 2050 should be recorded in the follow-
ing voivodeships: Łódzkie (almost 750,000 PLN), Lubuskie and Dol-
nośląskie (about 710,000 PLN) and Mazowieckie (almost 700,000 PLN). 
At the same time, the lowest level of this macroeconomic variable should 
be characterized by three voivodeships of eastern Poland: the Podlaskie 
(approx. 500,000 PLN), Świętokrzyskie (approx. 440,000 PLN) and 
Lubelskie (just below 350,000 PLN, see Map 8.16 in the annex).
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• In this variant the Łódzkie Voivodeship should develop the fastest (the 
average annual labor productivity growth rate should be 6.3%), followed 
by the Lubuskie (5.9%) and Warmińsko-Mazurskie (5.8%) voivodeships. 
The lowest rates of growth in labor productivity should be recorded 
in the Wielkopolskie (4.6%), Mazowieckie (4.6%) and Śląskie (4.1%) 
voivodeships.
• Labor productivity in the voivodeships of central Poland should increase 
to 92.5% of the value of this variable in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, 
in western Poland to 100.3% and in eastern Poland to 73.0%. In this 
scenario, there would also be a stronger convergence than in scenarios 
I–IV, as the coefficient of this variation would drop to 0.180.
• In scenario VI (varied investment rates and the varied rate of decrement 
of capital-labor ratio), as in scenario V, the highest value of labor pro-
ductivity in 2050 should be in the Łódzkie Voivodeship (about 760,000 
PLN) and three voivodeships in western Poland: Lubuskie (around 
690,000 PLN), Dolnośląskie (690,000 PLN) and Opolskie (around 
630,000 PLN). At the same time, the lowest level of this macroeconomic 
variable should be characterized by three voivodeships of eastern Po-
land: the Podlaskie (approx. 500,000 PLN), Świętokrzyskie (approx. 
460,000 PLN) and Lubelskie (just below 350,000 PLN see Map 8.17 in 
the annex).
• Under these conditions, the highest rates of growth in labor produc-
tivity, as in scenario V, should be found in the following voivodeships: 
Łódzkie (6.3%), Lubuskie (5.8%) and Warmińsko-Mazurskie (5.8%). At 
the same time, the lowest growth rates of this macroeconomic varia-
ble should occur in the following voivodeships: the Mazowieckie (4.1%), 
Śląskie (4.2%) and Wielkopolskie (4.3%).
• In the VI scenario, the GDP for people working in the group of western 
Polish voivodeships should be higher than in the Mazowieckie Voivode-
ship starting from around 2025, while in central Poland from 2045. In 
2050, the labor productivity in western Poland should be higher than 
the value of this variable in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship by 13.4%, in 
central Poland by 4.4%, while in eastern Poland by 13.1%.
• In this scenario, a more rapid convergence should occur than in sce-
nario V (the coefficient of the variation in labor productivity should fall 
to 0.167).
• Scenarios VII and VIII differ from (respectively) scenarios V and VI 
only by their assumption about the growth rate of the German econ-
omy. Therefore, these scenarios lead to simulations of the spatial differ-
entiation of production per employee analogous to that which occurs in 
scenarios V and VI.
8.5.2 Ukraine
Map 8.11 presents the spatial differentiation of labor productivity in the 
oblasts of Ukraine in 2017.
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Map 8.11  Diversification of labor productivity in oblasts in 2017 (thousand UAH, 
according to 2016 prices).
In the case of the ARC and Sevastopol in 2004–2013.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
We can reach the following conclusions from this map: In 2017, the high-
est level of labor productivity was recorded in the City of Kyiv (442,600 
UAH). Next in order were the Poltava Oblast (193,700 UAH) in central 
Ukraine, the Kyiv Oblast (182,600 UAH) in northern Ukraine, and the Dni-
propetrovsk (181,200 UAH) in central Ukraine and the Donetsk (173,200 
UAH) Oblast in eastern Ukraine. The quartile group with the lowest value 
of this feature was composed of the Chernivtsi (56,200 UAH), Zakarpattia 
(64,900 UAH), Ternopil (80,700 UAH) and Rivne (86,200 UAH) oblasts in 
the west of Ukraine and the Kherson (88,100 UAH) Oblast in the south of 
the country. Thus, as in the case of many other macroeconomic variables, 
labor productivity in the Left-bank Ukraine and on the Black Sea, that 
is, the Odesa and Mykolayiv oblasts in 2017, was (generally) much higher 
than in the Right-bank Ukraine (including – in particular – the western 
Ukrainian oblasts).
Simulations of trajectories of labor productivity in the oblasts of Ukraine 
in 2018–2050 were carried out using the following eight scenarios:7
 I Investment rates in all oblasts will be equal to the average investment 
rate in Ukraine in the years 2004–2017 (19%), the Russian and Pol-
ish economies will develop as in the years 2004–2017 (i.e., at an 
annual rate of 2.4% in Russia and 3.9% in Poland), the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol would remain under Russian 
occupation.
 II Investment rates in individual oblasts are at the same level as they were 
in 2004–2017, other assumptions as in scenario I.
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 III Investment rates in all regions are 19%, the Russian and Polish econ-
omies are developing as in scenarios I–II, the Crimean Peninsula is 
returned to Ukraine.
 IV Investment rates vary in subsequent circuits, other assumptions as in 
scenario III.
 V The same investment rates in all regions, the Russian economy is grow-
ing at an average annual rate of 1%, Poland 3.3%, the Autonomous Re-
public of Crimea and Sevastopol remain under Russian occupation.
 VI Different investment rates in subsequent circuits, other assumptions 
as in scenario V.
 VII The same investment rates in all oblasts, the Russian and Polish econ-
omies are developing as in scenario VI, the Crimean Peninsula is re-
turned to Ukraine.
 VIII Different investment rates in subsequent regions, the Russian and Pol-
ish economies are developing as in the assumptions V–VII, the Auton-
omous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol are returned to Ukraine.
Table 8.5 presents data on the level of labor productivity in 2017 both in indi-
vidual oblasts and groups of oblasts as well as the results of numerical sim-
ulations of this macroeconomic variable in 2050 in subsequent, previously 
characterized scenarios. Table 8.6, however, presents the average levels of 
the average annual growth rates of labor productivity in various simulations 
in oblasts and groups of oblasts.
Tables 8.5 and 8.6 draw the following conclusions:
• In scenario I, the highest level of labor productivity in 2050 should be 
in the Sumy Oblast (about 400,000 UAH), Kyiv (over 370,000 UAH) 
and the Chernihiv Oblast (over 310,000 UAH) in the north of Ukraine, 
the Kharkiv Oblast (around 360,000 UAH) in the east and the Poltava 
Oblast (around 350,000 UAH) in central Ukraine. The lowest value of 
this feature should be found in the west of the country, in the Zakar-
pattia Oblast (about 120,000 UAH), and the Chernivtsi (almost 160,000 
UAH), Ivano-Frankivsk (over 160,000 UAH) and Lviv (over 170,000 
UAH) oblasts, and in the Odesa Oblast, located on the Black Sea (al-
most 180,000 UAH, see also Map 8.20 in the annex).
• In this scenario, the highest, exceeding 3%, average annual growth rates 
should be found in the Sumy Oblast (northern Ukraine, 4.3%), and the 
Chernihiv (northern Ukraine, 3.5%), Kharkiv (eastern Ukraine, 3.3%) 
and Chernivtsi (western Ukraine, 3.2%) oblasts. In Kyiv, the average an-
nual growth rates should be negative (−0.5%), while in the Odesa (south-
ern Ukraine), Donetsk (eastern Ukraine) and Lviv (western Ukraine) 
oblasts, they should not exceed 1.5%. The negative projected growth 
rates in Kyiv result from the fact that scenario I assumes a 19% invest-
ment rate in all oblasts, while in Kyiv in 2004–2017 this rate was 23.8%.
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Table 8.6  Average annual growth rates of labor productivity in 2018–2050 in 
subsequent scenarios (%)
Oblast I II III IV V VI VI VIII
Autonomous Republic of Crimea – – 1.6 4.4 – – 0.7 3.5
Kharkiv Oblast 3.3 2.3 3.3 2.3 2.4 1.4 2.3 1.4
Kherson Oblast 2.2 1.0 2.3 1.1 1.3 0.1 1.3 0.2
Khmelnytskiy Oblast 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
Cherkasy 2.7 2.2 2.7 2.3 1.8 1.3 1.8 1.3
Chernihiv Oblast 3.5 1.5 3.4 1.5 2.5 0.6 2.5 0.6
Chernivtsi Oblast 3.2 3.6 3.1 3.6 2.2 2.6 2.2 2.6
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast 1.5 0.3 1.5 0.4 0.6 −0.5 0.6 −0.5
Donetsk Oblast 1.3 −0.4 1.3 −0.3 0.4 −1.2 0.4 −1.1
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.8 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8
Kyiv Oblast 1.5 4.2 1.4 4.2 0.6 3.2 0.5 3.2
Kyiv −0.5 0.6 −0.5 0.6 −1.3 −0.3 −1.4 −0.3
Kirovohrad Oblast 2.4 1.9 2.4 1.9 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.0
Lviv Oblast 1.4 1.9 1.3 1.9 0.5 1.0 0.4 1.0
Luhansk Oblast 3.0 2.2 3.0 2.2 2.1 1.3 2.1 1.3
Mykolayiv Oblast 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7
Odesa Oblast 0.9 1.3 1.0 1.3 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4
Poltava Oblast 1.8 1.2 1.8 1.2 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.3
Rivne Oblast 2.6 1.9 2.5 1.9 1.6 1.0 1.5 1.0
Sevastopol – – 0.9 1.4 – – 0.1 0.5
Sumy Oblast 4.3 2.2 4.3 2.2 3.3 1.3 3.3 1.3
Ternopil Oblast 2.5 1.8 2.4 1.8 1.5 0.9 1.5 0.9
Vinnytsya Oblast 1.8 0.9 1.7 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.8 −0.1
Volyn Oblast 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9
Zakarpattia Oblast 1.9 1.1 1.8 1.1 1.0 0.2 0.9 0.2
Zaporizhzhya Oblast 1.5 −0.2 1.5 −0.2 0.6 −1.1 0.6 −1.1
Zhytomyr Oblast 2.6 0.8 2.5 0.8 1.7 −0.1 1.6 −0.1
Group of oblasts I II III IV V VI VII VIII
North Ukraine 0.9 1.6 0.8 1.6 0.0 0.7 −0.1 0.7
Central Ukraine 1.8 1.0 1.8 1.0 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1
Eastern Ukraine 2.3 1.1 2.1 0.9 1.4 0.2 1.2 0.0
South Ukraine 1.4 1.3 1.2 2.2 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.3
Western Ukraine 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Source: Our own estimates.
• As a result of these changes, the relation of labor productivity in the 
oblasts of central Ukraine in comparison to northern Ukraine should 
increase from 62.0% to 84.4%, in eastern Ukraine from 56.1% to 89.3%, 
in southern Ukraine from 46.8% to 55.2% and in western Ukraine from 
36.7% to 51.8%. As the coefficient of variability of labor productivity 
also drops from 0.568 in 2017 to 0.311 in 2050, (with the same investment 
rates in all regions) in Ukraine there should be a process of spatial con-
vergence of labor productivity (see also Figure 8.9 in the Annex).
• In the second scenario (varying investment rates in the oblasts, the 
Crimean peninsula still under Russian occupation), the highest level of 
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labor productivity in 2050 should be recorded in the Kyiv Oblast (north-
ern Ukraine, over 700,000 UAH), then in the City of Kyiv (over 540,000 
UAH), in the Poltava (almost 290,000 UAH) and Cherkasy (over 230,000 
UAH) oblasts in central Ukraine and the Kharkiv (around 260,000 
UAH) Oblast in the east of Ukraine. The lowest value of this variable 
should be found in the Zakarpattia (over 90,000 UAH) and Ternopil 
oblasts (nearly 150,000 UAH) in the west of the country, in the Kherson 
(around 120,000 UAH) Oblast in the south, and the Zhytomyr (almost 
130,000 UAH) Oblast in north and the Zaporizhzhya (about 140,000 
UAH) Oblast in the east of Ukraine (see Map 8.21).
• In this variant, the Kyiv Oblast (4.2%) in northern Ukraine and the 
Chernivtsi (3.6%) Oblast in western Ukraine should definitely have the 
highest average annual productivity growth rates. In the Donetsk and 
Zaporizhzhya oblasts (in the east of Ukraine), the average annual la-
bor productivity growth rates may be negative (−0.4% and −0.2%, re-
spectively), while in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (central Ukraine), in 
Kyiv and in the Zhytomyr (northern Ukraine) and Vinnytsya (central 
Ukraine) oblasts, these growth rates will be lower than 1%.
• In this scenario, labor productivity in central Ukraine should fall to 
around 50% of this variable in northern Ukraine, in eastern Ukraine to 
46.6%, in southern Ukraine to 42.1%, while in the west to 40.5% of the 
labor productivity in the northern Ukrainian oblasts. Moreover, in this 
scenario, the oblasts of southern Ukraine should outperform the east 
and the center of Ukraine in terms of labor productivity between 2030 
and 2035.
• As in this scenario the coefficient of the variability of labor productivity 
will increase from 0.568 to 0.606, scenario II (as opposed to scenario I) 
will lead to a divergence of labor productivity. This divergence will most 
strongly affect the most industrialized oblasts of eastern Ukraine, in 
which investment rates (also in the highly developed heavy and mining 
industries) were low.
• In scenario III (in which we assume the same investment rates in all 
oblasts, but we also assume that the Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
and Sevastopol have been returned to Ukraine), the highest labor pro-
ductivity in 2050 should be in the Sumy (northern Ukraine approx. 
400,000 UAH), Kyiv (almost 370,000 UAH) and Kharkiv oblasts (east-
ern Ukraine, almost 360,000 UAH), and in the Poltava (central Ukraine, 
almost 350,000 UAH) and Chernihiv oblasts (northern Ukraine, almost 
310,000 UAH). The lowest labor productivity should then be recorded 
by the Zakarpattia Oblast (less than 120,000 UAH) in the west, Sevas-
topol and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the south, as well as 
the Chernivtsi and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts in the west (approx. 150–
160,000 UAH, see Map 8.22 in the annex).
• In Scenario III, labor productivity should increase the fastest in the 
Sumy Oblast (4.3%) in northern Ukraine, then in the Chernihiv oblasts 
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in the north, then the Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts in the east and in 
Chernivtsi Oblast in the west (an average annual increase in labor pro-
ductivity of approx. 3–3.5%). In Kyiv, as in option I, the growth rate of 
production per employee may be, at this time, negative (around -0.5%), 
while in Sevastopol and the Odesa Oblast (southern Ukraine) no more 
than 1%.
• In scenario III, labor productivity relationships in the oblasts of central, 
southern, eastern and western Ukraine (compared to the value of this 
variable in northern Ukraine) would be at levels similar to those ob-
tained in Option I. Also, the coefficient of the variation in labor produc-
tivity would fall to 0.324, and therefore there would be a convergence of 
the spatial differentiation of labor productivity in Ukraine.
• In Scenario IV, we differentiate investment rates of the oblasts, main-
taining the assumption that the Crimean Peninsula has been returned to 
Ukraine. In this scenario, as in scenario II, the Kyiv Oblast in the north 
of Ukraine (about 700,000 UAH) should have the highest labor produc-
tivity in 2050. Next in line should be the City of Kyiv (about 540,000 
UAH), the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (about 390,000 UAH) in the 
south and the Poltava region (about 290,000 UAH) in central Ukraine. 
The group of regions with the lowest labor productivity (below 150,000 
UAH) should be composed of the following oblasts: Zakarpattia and 
Ternopil in the west of Ukraine, Zhytomyr in the north, Kherson in the 
south and Zaporizhzhya in the east (see Map 8.23 in the annex).
• In this scenario, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (4.4%) as well 
as the Kyiv (northern Ukraine, 4.2%) and Chernivtsi (western Ukraine 
4.6%) oblasts should enjoy the highest rates of labor productivity growth.
• As a result of these changes, labor productivity in central Ukraine in 
2050 should constitute 51.7% of the value of this variable in northern 
Ukraine, eastern Ukraine only 45.1%, southern 57.5% and western 
Ukraine 40.9%. Moreover, in this scenario between 2030 and 2035, the 
southern oblasts of Ukraine should overtake, in terms of labor produc-
tivity, the central and eastern oblasts of this country, while the currently 
poorest oblasts, that is, those of western Ukraine, will have results ap-
proximating the eastern oblasts, which are presently the most developed 
industrially.
• In the scenario considered here, the coefficient of variation in labor pro-
ductivity will increase from 0.568 to 0.586, which means that the diver-
gence of this macroeconomic variable will slightly increase.
• Scenarios V–VIII are identical to scenarios I–IV when it comes to the 
differentiation or non-differentiation of investment rates and further 
Russian occupation or the return of Crimea to Ukraine. However, they 
differ in their assumptions about the growth rates of the Russian and 
Polish economies. We assume here that Russia’s economic growth will 
slow down from 2.4% to 1.1%, while in Poland from 3.9% to 3.3%.
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• This modification of the assumption about the slowdown in the eco-
nomic growth rate of Ukraine’s most important neighbors will not af-
fect the simulations of spatial differentiation of labor productivity in 
this country (compared to the simulations obtained in Scenarios I–IV). 
However, the economic slowdown in Russia and Poland may lead to 
the fact that the level of labor productivity in Ukrainian oblasts will be 
about 25% lower than what could have been achieved, with a more rapid 
development of the Polish and Russian economies.
• Comparing the results of the simulation of labor productivity in Poland 
and Ukraine, we note that the Polish regions should develop much faster 
than the Ukrainian ones. This means that without deep, thorough, 
market- oriented reforms and further integration of Ukraine (mainly) 
with the EU countries, development disparities between this country 
and Poland and other EU countries may be constantly increasing.
8.6 Annex
Simulations of spatial differentiation of labor productivity in 2050 in 
voivodeships and oblasts and trajectories of simulations of labor productiv-
ity up to 2050 in voivodeship and oblast groups.
Map 8.12  Diversification of labor productivity in voivodeships in scenario I (thou-
sand PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
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Figure 8.1  Simulation of trajectories of labor productivity in groups of voivode-
ships in scenario I (thousand PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
Map 8.13 L abor productivity in 2050 in voivodeships in scenario II (thousand 
PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
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Figure 8.2  Simulation of trajectories of labor productivity in groups of voivode-
ships in scenario II (thousand PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
Map 8.14 L abor productivity in 2050 in voivodeships in scenario III (thousand 
PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
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Figure 8.3  Simulation of trajectories of labor productivity in groups of voivode-
ships in scenario III (thousand PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
Map 8.15  Labor productivity in 2050 in voivodeships in scenario IV (thousand 
PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
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Figure 8.4 S imulation of trajectories of labor productivity in groups of voivode-
ships in scenario IV (thousand PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
Map 8.16  Labor productivity in 2050 in voivodeships in scenario V (thousand 
PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
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Figure 8.5 S imulation of trajectories of labor productivity in groups of voivode-
ships in scenario V (thousand PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
Map 8.17  Labor productivity in 2050 in voivodeships in scenario VI (thousand 
PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
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Figure 8.6 S imulation of trajectories of labor productivity in groups of voivode-
ships in scenario VI (thousand PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
Map 8.18  Labor productivity in 2050 in voivodeships in scenario VII (thousand 
PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
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Figure 8.7  Simulation of trajectories of labor productivity in groups of voivode-
ships in scenario VII (thousand PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
Map 8.19  Labor productivity in 2050 in voivodeships in scenario VIII (thousand 
PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
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Figure 8.8 S imulation of trajectories of labor productivity in groups of voivode-
ships in scenario VIII (thousand PLN, according to 2014 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
Map 8.20 D iversification of labor productivity in oblasts in scenario I (thousand 
UAH, according to 2016 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
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Figure 8.9  Simulation of trajectories of labor productivity in groups of oblasts in 
scenario I (thousand UAH, according to 2016 prices).













2017 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Figure 8.10 S imulation of trajectories of labor productivity in groups of oblasts in 
scenario II (thousand UAH, according to 2016 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
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Map 8.22 D iversification of labor productivity in 2050 in oblasts in scenario III 
(thousand UAH, according to 2016 prices).
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Figure 8.11 S imulation of trajectories of labor productivity in groups of oblasts in 
scenario III (thousand UAH, according to 2016 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
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Map 8.23 D iversification of labor productivity in 2050 in oblasts in scenario IV 
(thousand UAH, according to 2016 prices).
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Figure 8.12 S imulation of trajectories of labor productivity in group of oblasts in 
scenario IV (thousand UAH, according to 2016 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
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Map 8.24 L abor productivity in 2050 in voivodeships in scenario V (thousand PLN, 
according to 2016 prices).
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Figure 8.13  Simulation of trajectories of labor productivity in groups of oblasts in 
scenario V (thousand UAH, according to 2016 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
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Map 8.25  Labor productivity in 2050 in oblasts in scenario VI (thousand UAH, 
according to 2016 prices).
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Figure 8.14  Simulation of trajectories of labor productivity in group of oblasts in 
scenario VI (thousand UAH, according to 2016 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
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Map 8.26 L abor productivity in 2050 in oblasts in scenario VII (thousand UAH, 
according to 2016 prices).
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Figure 8.15 S imulation of trajectories of labor productivity in groups of oblasts in 
scenario VII (thousand PLN, according to 2016 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
Simulations of voivodeship and oblast 197
Map 8.27 L abor productivity in 2050 in oblasts in scenario VIII (thousand UAH, 
according to 2016 prices).
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Figure 8.16 S imulation of trajectories of labor productivity in groups of oblasts in 
scenario VIII (thousand PLN, according to 2016 prices).
Source: Our own estimates.
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Notes
 1 The notation ∀i will mean ∀ =i N1,2,..., , where N>2 is the number of regions 
analyzed. The entries will be read in the same way in ∑ and ∏. In addition, 
i i
about all macroeconomic variables analyzed at this point, we assume that they 
are functions differentiable with respect to time t, and the record x t ( ) = dx / dt
will mean the derivative of the variable x after time t (i.e., economically speak-
ing, the increase in the value of the variable x at time t).
 2 This is due to the fact that in the following considerations, labor productivity is 
expressed in thousand PLN, and the distance between provincial capitals in geo-
graphical minutes (mingeo), so the gravitational effects are expressed in million 
PLN2/mingeo2. The gravity effects in Ukraine are calculated similarly.
 3 The external gravitational effects connecting voivodeships with other countries 
neighboring Poland were also counted. However, they turned out to be much 
weaker than those that connect these voivodeships with Germany. That is why 
they were omitted in the simulation analyzes.
 4 When calculating the gravitational effects of the Kyiv oblast, the distance be-
tween the largest city of this oblast (Bila Tserkva) and the capitals of the other 
oblasts was taken into account.
 5 Gravity effects from the other Ukrainian neighbors turned out to be much 
weaker than those from Poland or Russia. That is why they were omitted in 
simulation analyzes.
 6 Simulations of labor productivity trajectories in groups of voivodeships or 
oblasts and their spatial diversity in 2050 in various scenarios are included in the 
annex.
 7 In all scenarios, it was also assumed that the rate of depreciation of capital-labor 
ratio would be 14% (as it was historically).
9 The spatial differentiation 
of migration in Poland and 
Ukraine
Nataliia Chugaievska and Daniela Szczepaniak
9.1 Introduction
It is difficult to single out one reason that forces people to leave their place 
of residence and migrate to another country. Everything depends on the 
specific set of motives of a person who has the desire and right to choose an 
optimal place of residence and work for himself, and thus meet his material, 
professional and spiritual needs.
Homoncik et al. (2017) emphasize that foreign migrations are a socio- 
economic phenomenon that has become permanently engrained in Poland’s 
contemporary history. The Poles’ Migration for Work report (2016) indi-
cates that 78.8% of migrants indicate higher earnings as the main reason for 
emigration. Other important motives are a higher standard of living (58.9%), 
the opportunity to travel and explore the world (44.0%), better social condi-
tions (37.3%) and better career prospects (35.7%).
In the second decade of the 21st century, Poland became for Ukraine’s 
citizens one of the leading labor markets among all other countries of the 
European Union. This is favored primarily by liberal procedures for le-
galizing one’s stay, obtaining employment, geographical and cultural 
proximity, as well as the extremely attractive human potential of Ukraine 
(Zubik, 2014).
This chapter is part of the problem of migration research in a regional and 
local perspective. The analyses conducted here relate to the spatial differen-
tiation of the rates of migration inflows and outflows as well as their deter-
minants. Relative wages and relative unemployment rates are considered to 
be the main determinants of these flows.1 The chapter estimates the impact 
of relative wages and relative unemployment rates on migration flows, by 
using regression methods.
Statistical data on the characteristics (variables) used are taken from 
the Local Data Bank of the Central Statistical Office and the Ukrainian 
Statistical Office2 (Державна Cлужба Cтатистики України)3 and refer to 
the period of 2004–2017. The choice of this time frame is determined by 
the availability of relevant time series at the voivodeship or peripheral 
level.
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9.2  Spatial diversity of migration inflows and outflows rates 
and their determinants in Poland
9.2.1 Inflow rates
Figure 9.1 presents the evolution of annual rates of migration inflows in 
groups of voivodeships in the years 2004–2017. These rates are defined as 
the ratio of the size of migration inflows to a given group of voivodeships in 
relation to the population in this group of voivodeships. Figure 9.1 shows 
that:
• The highest migration inflow rates in the entire analyzed period were 
recorded in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, and were significantly lower 
in western Poland than in central Poland, and the lowest rates were in 
eastern Poland.
• At the beginning of this research period (2004–2007), migration inflow 
rates were characterized by an upward trend. The highest inflow rate 
was recorded in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship (0.5%), followed by west-
ern Poland (0.3%), central Poland (0.25%) and eastern Poland (0.2%).
• In 2008, a sharp decline in migration inflow rates could be observed 
in all groups of voivodeships. In the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, the 
rates fell from 0.5% to below 0.4%, in western Poland from 0.32% to 
about 0.27%, in central Poland from 0.27% to 0.23%, while in eastern 
Poland from 0.24% to 0.2%. This was due to the fact that European Un-
ion countries opened their labor markets to those countries admitted in 
2004. Therefore, migration trends have shifted to other countries.
• Since 2009, the rate of migration inflows to the Mazowieckie Voivode-
ship has oscillated around 0.4%; nevertheless, this voivodeship was 
characterized by the largest fluctuations of these inflows. In other re-
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Figure 9.1 Migration inflow rates in voivodship groups in 2004–2017.
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
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Map 9.1 Spatial differentiation of migration inflow rates in Poland in 2004–2017.
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
Map 9.1 presents the spatial differentiation of migration inflow rates, on av-
erage in 2004–2017. The following conclusions can be drawn from this fact:
• These inflows were characterized by the highest rates in the Mazowieckie 
(0.42%), Pomorskie (0.35%) and Dolnośląskie (0.28%) voivodeships.
• The lowest inflow rates, however, were found in the Lubelskie (0.16%), 
Podkarpackie (0.16%) and Śląskie (0.17%) voivodeships.
• It is worth noting that in the Śląskie Voivodeship, exceptionally low 
rates of migration inflows were observed. This phenomenon is quite 
surprising, as the analyzed region has relatively high relative wages and 
a low unemployment rate.
9.2.2 Drainage rates
Figure 9.2 presents the evolution of migration outflows in voivodeship 
groups (these rates are defined analogously to the inflow rates). The follow-
ing conclusions can be drawn:
• In the entire analyzed period, eastern Poland was characterized by the 
highest outflow rates, followed by western and central Poland, and the 
lowest outflow rates were recorded in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship.
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Figure 9.2 Rates of migration outflows in groups of voivodeships in 2004–2017.
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
• At the beginning of the period under review, that is, in the years 2004–
2007, an increase in migration outflow rates can be observed in each 
group of voivodeships. In eastern Poland from approximately 0.37% in 
2004, these outflows increased to 0.47% in 2007, in western Poland from 
0.33% to 0.37%, in central Poland from 0.3% to 0.33%, while in the Ma-
zowieckie Voivodeship from 0.29% to 0.32%. 
• In 2008, a sudden drop in migration outflow rates could be observed to 
as high as 0.33% in eastern Poland, 0.31% in central Poland, 0.28% in 
western Poland and 0.28% in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship. Such large 
changes, as in the case of inflow rates, were influenced by the opening of 
the EU labor markets to the Poles.
• Fluctuations in outflow rates have not changed so radically since 2009. 
For each group of voivodeships, slight declines could be observed 
from 2013 to 2016, followed by another increase in 2017. At the end of 
the audited period, the outflow rates for eastern Poland were at 0.4%, 
western Poland 0.28%, central Poland 0.27% and the Mazowieckie 
Voivodeship 0.21%.
Map 9.2 presents the spatial diversity of migration outflow rates in the 
voivodeship. On this basis it can be concluded that:
• The Warmińsko-Mazurskie (0.46%) Voivodeship, followed by the 
Świętokrzyskie (0.41%) and Lubelskie (0.38%) voivodeships, had the 
highest rates of migration outflows. 
• The lowest rates are found in the following voivodeships: Małopolskie 
(0.17%), Mazowieckie (0.18%) and Wielkopolskie (0.19%).
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Map 9.2 Sp atial differentiation of rates of migration outflows in Poland in 
2004–2017.
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
9.2.3 Net inflow rates
Figure 9.3 shows the trajectories of net migration rates (understood as dif-
ferences between inflow rates and outflow rates) in groups of voivodeships 
in 2004–2017. From this figure it can be concluded that:
• Over the entire period under review, the highest net migration rates were 
recorded in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, while the lowest were in the 
voivodeships of eastern Poland. Central Poland and western Poland were 
characterized by similar migration balances, while in the first half of the 
analyzed period, that is, 2004–2010, central Poland had a higher migra-
tion balance, while from 2011 on, western Poland had higher net rates.
• The voivodeships of eastern Poland were characterized by the largest 
diversification of net migration inflows. In 2006, the migration balance 
was the lowest and amounted to about −0.9% for this part of the coun-
try. In 2008, the largest increase was observed to be around −0.7%.
• In central and western Poland, net inflow rates were not characterized 
by large fluctuations. Throughout the entire research period, these 
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Figure 9.3 Migration balance rates in voivodeship groups in 2004–2017.
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
fluctuations ranged from −0.07% to 0.01%. It can be seen that since 2011, 
net migration rates for central Poland have stabilized at around −0.05%, 
and for western Poland at 0%.
• Net inflow rates in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship fluctuated around 
0.25% in the whole research period with slight fluctuations. It is worth 
noting that at the beginning (2004–2007) net migration rates were the 
highest, while in 2008 there was the largest decrease, and that since 
then, there have been no major changes.
The spatial differentiation of migration balances was presented on Map 9.3. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from this map:
• The following voivodeships had the highest net migration rates: Ma-
zowieckie (0.25%), Pomorskie (0.12%) and Małopolskie (0.10%). It is 
worth noting that the difference between the Mazowieckie Voivodeship 
and the others is substantial.
• However, the lowest levels of migration balances were found in the Lubel-
skie (−0.22%), followed by Świętokrzyskie (−0.19%) and Warmińsko- 
Mazurskie (-0.18%) voivodeships.
• Negative migration balances were also evident in the following voivode-
ships: Podlaskie (−0.15%), Podkarpackie (−0.10%), Śląskie (−0.07%), 
Kujawsko-Pomorskie (−0.07%), Łódzkie (−0.07%), Opolskie (0.07%) 
Lubuskie (−0.06%) and Zachodniopomorskie (−0.06%).
• Apart from the voivodeships mentioned at the beginning, only two 
voivodeships have positive migration balances, the Wielkopolskie 
(0.05%) and Dolnośląskie (0.05%), hence the conclusion that the Ma-
zowieckie Voivodeship is dominant and absorbs the population of other 
voivodeships.
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Map 9.3 Spatial diversity of migration balances in Poland.
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
9.2.4 Relative wages
Figure 9.4 presents the relative wages in voivodeship groups. The following 
conclusions can be drawn from this figure:
• The Mazowieckie Voivodeship was characterized by the highest relative 
wages throughout the entire research period. It is worth noting that only 
in this case, did we observe a downward trend in relative wages from 
around 1.33 in 2004 to approximately 1.25 in 2017. Nevertheless, despite 
the downward trend in relative wages, the gap between the Mazowieckie 
Voivodeship and other groups of voivodeships is quite significant.
• Central Poland came in second in terms of wages. During the whole 
period under review, this part of the country was characterized by a 
relative wage stability of around 0.98 of the national average.
• Slightly lower levels of relative wages were recorded in western Poland. In 
the analyzed period this variable oscillated at around 0.95 of the average 
value. It is worth noting that in 2017 there was a noteworthy alignment be-
tween wages in western Poland and wages in the central part of the country.
• Eastern Poland had the lowest relative wages. In this group of voivode-
ships, wages were around 0.88 of the national average. Similarly, to cen-
tral and western Poland, this variable, except for slight fluctuations, was 
constant over time.
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Figure 9.4 Relative wages in voivodeship groups in 2004–2017.
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
Map 9.4 The spatial differentiation of relative wages in Poland.
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
The spatial differentiation of relative wages is presented on Map 9.4. The 
following conclusions can be drawn from this map:
• The highest relative wages were recorded in the Mazowieckie (1.29), 
Śląskie (1.05) and Dolnośląskie (1.03) voivodeships. It is notable that 
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there was a substantial difference – over 20% points – between the Ma-
zowieckie Voivodeship and the remaining ones.
• The lowest wages were recorded in the Podkarpackie (0.86), then in 
the Warmińsko-Mazurskie (0.86) and finally in the Lubuskie (0.88) 
voivodeships.
• It is also important that apart from the three voivodeships with the 
highest relative wages, only the Pomorskie Voivodeship had wages 
above the national average (1.02). Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
Mazowieckie Voivodeship surpassed the other voivodeships in terms of 
wages and significantly increases the national average. 
9.2.5 Relative unemployment rates
Figure 9.5 presents the relative unemployment rate in voivodeship groups. 
The following conclusions can be drawn:
• The relative variation in the unemployment rate was large. At the be-
ginning of the period under review (i.e., 2004–2008), a downward trend 
in the relative unemployment rate can be seen for western and central 
Poland and the Mazowieckie Voivodeship. However, in the case of east-
ern Poland, a clear increase in the analyzed variable can be observed 
during the same period.
• Since 2009, an increase in the relative unemployment rate can be observed 
in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship and in central Poland. In the case of 
western Poland, a downward trend is still observed. In contrast, in eastern 
Poland there was a decrease in relative unemployment rates until 2013.
• At the end of the period under review, an increase in the relative unem-
ployment rate in eastern Poland can again be observed. In the case of 
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Figure 9.5 Relative unemployment rates in voivodeship groups in 2004–2017.
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
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9.3  A spatial differentiation of migration inflow and outflow 
rates and their determinants in Ukraine
9.3.1 Inflow rates
Figure 9.6 illustrates the rates of inflow in groups of oblasts of Ukraine in 
2004–2017. This shows that:
• Strong factors influencing internal migration include the political and 
social stability in a country. In particular, the observed decline in 2009 
was caused by the political crisis and the global financial crisis.
• Very substantial changes in the inflow rates were recorded in 2014–2016, 
which resulted from the military-political conflict in southern and east-
ern Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea.
• The group of northern Ukraine oblasts had the highest relative rates 
of migration inflows, in particular a very high rate was recorded in the 
Kyiv Oblast (1.82%) and the City of Kyiv (1.69%).
• The substantial decline in 2016 was caused by the underdevelopment in 
the new law of the procedure for transferring data from the State Migra-
tion Service to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine.
• In 2014, a sharp decline in migration inflow rates in eastern Ukraine 
could be observed.
The reason for this was that the war began in the Luhansk and Donetsk 
oblasts.
Map 9.5 presents the relative inflow rates in the oblasts of Ukraine. The 
following conclusions can be drawn:
• The highest inflow rates were recorded in the Kyiv Oblast (1.82%), the 
City of Kyiv (1.69%), the Sumy Oblast (1.63%), the Poltava Oblast (1.63%) 
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Figure 9.6 Rates of migration inflows in groups of oblasts in 2004–2017.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
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Map 9.5 Spatial differentiation of rates of migration inflows in Ukraine.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
• The lowest values of the analyzed variable were observed in the Zakar-
pattia (0.61%), Donetsk (0.97%), Chernivtsi (1.10%), Zaporizhzhya 
(1.10%) and Luhansk (1.05%) oblasts.
• In interregional migrations, the main beneficiary was the City of Kyiv 
and the Kyiv Oblast. In 2000, the increase in the capital’s population, at 
the expense of other regions, reached 20,000 people for the year. During 
the current migration crisis, growth has decreased (from 14.4 thousand 
people in 2014 to about 12,000 people in 2015), but it still remains the 
highest in Ukraine. It is worth noting that this data applies only to offi-
cially approved migrations, and does not include temporary and forced 
migrations.4
• The observed distribution of migration inflow rates can be explained 
by the fact that many of the population living in small underdeveloped 
areas decided to move to oblasts with larger cities, where it is easier to 
find a job, earn a higher salary and enjoy a better lifestyle.
9.3.2 Outflow rates
The general regularity of the impact of political and social stability on mi-
gration processes of the population is reflected in the dynamics of indicators 
of relative outflow rates in groups of oblasts of Ukraine, which is presented 
in Figure 9.7.
The following conclusions can be drawn:
• The trajectories of relative rates of migration outflows in groups of 
oblasts of Ukraine were similar.














2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Figure 9.7 Rates of migration outflows in circuit groups in 2004–2017.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
• In 2004, central Ukraine (1.78%) had the highest relative rates of out-
flows, while western Ukraine (1.45%) had the lowest. At the beginning 
of the period under review, a slight downward trend in migration out-
flows can be observed in all groups of oblasts.
• After slight increases in the years 2010–2013, a significant decrease of 
the analyzed variable can be detected in all parts of the country, es-
pecially in western Ukraine, to a level of 0.65% in 2016. Against the 
background of the economic and political crisis in Ukraine, starting 
from 2013, the material situation of those people with medium and low 
incomes had deteriorated. Many people were forced to look for a job 
which provided a higher income. For people from western Ukraine, it 
was more convenient and more profitable to travel abroad (to Europe) 
than looking for a job in other regions of Ukraine.
The average rates of migration outflows in the oblasts of Ukraine are shown 
on Map 9.6. This map shows that:
• The highest relative rates of outflows were recorded in the underdevel-
oped oblasts of Ukraine, that is, the Poltava (1.64%), Vinnytsya (1.65%), 
Zhytomyr (1.69%), Rivne (1.71%), and Sumy (1.75%) oblasts.
• The lowest rates of this variable were observed in the Zakarpattia 
(0.69%), Sevastopol (0.83%), Chernivtsi (1.05%), and Donetsk oblasts 
(1.09%) and the City of Kyiv (1.10%).
• Starting from 2014, strong internal migrations in Ukraine, of a man-
datory nature, were caused by the annexation of Crimea and mili-
tary operations in the Donbas. According to information from the 
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Map 9.6 Spatial differentiation of the rates of migration outflows in Ukraine.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
Inter-ministerial coordination of the staff for social security of dis-
placed persons (HVE), as of July 20, 2016 from areas outside the Gov-
ernment’s sphere of influence, 1,029,571 people were forced to move 
to other regions of Ukraine, mainly from the Donetsk and Luhansk 
Oblasts, who numbered 1,007,112 people; from the Autonomous Re-
public of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol 22,459 people. The grand 
total included 170,581 children and 495,093 who were either disabled 
or elderly.5 
9.3.3 Net inflow rates
Net inflow rates in 2004–2017 are presented in Figure 9.8. The following 
conclusions can be drawn from this figure:
• Net inflow rates in 2004–2017 were very diverse.
• Northern Ukrainian oblasts have become more attractive to the mi-
grant population. Over 14 years, this indicator for northern Ukraine in-
creased from 0.4% in 2004 to 1.56% in 2017. This situation was affected 
by the war and political conflict, as many people streamed into the City 
of Kyiv and to the Kyiv region from eastern Ukraine.
• In northern Ukraine, in the years 2004–2013 a weak upward trend in 
net migration could be detected. However, since 2014 a strong decrease 
may be observed, which was due to the fact that the State Statistics 
Service of Ukraine does not provide data on the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and in addition fewer, and fewer 
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Figure 9.8 Net migration inflow rates in groups of oblasts in 2004–2017.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
people want to live close to territories where military operations are 
taking place.
• Net inflow rates in central and western Ukraine were at a similar level. 
From 2004 to 2014, these parts of the country were characterized by 
negative migration balances, but an upward trend can be perceived dur-
ing this period. Then in 2016 it fell below zero again.
Net migration inflows in individual oblasts are presented on Map 9.7. This 
map shows that:
• The highest net inflow rates were recorded in the City of Kyiv (0.593%) 
and Sevastopol (0.431%), then in the Kyiv (0.391%), Kharkiv (0.137%) 
and Odesa (0.085%) oblasts.
• The lowest net inflow rates were recorded in the following oblasts: 
Kirovohrad (−0.248%), Luhansk (−0.220%), Kherson (−0.190%), Sumy 
(−0.117%) and Donetsk (−0.115%).
• In the period of 2004–2017, the directions of migration in Ukraine were 
caused by the hope in people that they could realize their full potential 
outside their then-current permanent place of residence. For most mi-
grants, the main motive for their trip was the desire to get a (better) job, 
improve their employment conditions and raise their standard of living. 
From 2014, migrations were caused by the desire to avoid participation 
in military activities, which could have posed a threat to life and health, 
also impediments to, or a lack of, business opportunities. 
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Map 9.7 Spatial differentiation of the rates of net migration inflows in Ukraine.














2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Figure 9.9 Relative wages in oblast groups in 2004–2017.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
9.3.4 Relative wages
Figure 9.9 illustrates the relative wages in groups of Ukrainian oblasts. The 
following conclusions can be drawn:
• The highest relative wages were recorded in northern Ukraine – in 2016 
they amounted to 1.25 of the average salary in Ukraine, this was mainly 
due to the relatively high wages in Kyiv.
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• Wages above the national average were also characteristic of eastern 
Ukraine, because this part of the country is largely associated with 
 industry – there are iron and steel mills and hard (anthracite) coal 
mines.
• In 2004, this analyzed variable remained at a similar level in eastern and 
northern Ukraine, but within 14 years the disparity between the wages 
of these parts of the country increased to 1% in eastern Ukraine and to 
1.2% in northern Ukraine in 2017.
• Relative wages below the national average were recorded in southern 
and western Ukraine. These are underdeveloped regions, from which 
many people leave in order to search for better living conditions.
• In central Ukraine, relative wages fluctuated around zero with slight 
changes.
Map 9.8 presents the spatial differentiation of relative wages in Ukraine. 
This map shows that:
• The highest relative wages were recorded in the City of Kyiv (1.67) and 
the Donetsk (1.19), Dnipropetrovsk (1.09), Kyiv (1.06) and Zaporizhzhya 
oblasts (1.05).
• The lowest indicators of this variable were recorded in the Volyn (0.79), 
Chernivtsi (0.80), Chernihiv (0.80), Kherson (0.80) and Ivano-Frankivsk 
(0.88) oblasts.
Map 9.8 Spatial differentiation of relative wages in Ukraine.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
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9.3.5 Relative unemployment rates
The dynamics of the relative unemployment rate in Ukraine in 2004–
2017  are presented in Figure 9.10. The following conclusions can be 
drawn:
• The dynamics of the relative unemployment rates in Ukraine in 2004–
2017 varied widely.
• With the start of the armed conflict with Russia in 2014, in eastern 
Ukraine, the relative unemployment rate increased sharply to 1.19 in 
2017.
• A strong downward trend in the unemployment rate can be observed 
in western Ukraine. However, these charts may be misleading, be-
cause people go abroad and remain registered as unemployed in 
Ukraine.
• Since 2011, the relative unemployment rate in northern Ukraine has 
been decreasing, which indicates the creation of new jobs.
At the end of 2017, 354,400 people were registered in the State Employment 
Service as unemployed citizens. Seven people applied for every job vacancy. 
However, according to national analysts, the information provided by the 
State Statistical Service reduces the actual level of unemployment by about 
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Figure 9.10 Relative unemployment rate in oblast groups in 2004–2017.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
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9.4  A statistical analysis of the impact of relative wages and 
relative unemployment rates on migration flows
In order to examine the impact of relative wages and relative unemployment 
rates on migration flows, the parameters of the equations of the linear (9.1) 
and logistic (9.2) functions were estimated as:
w u
m Fit = +α αE + +it itw αU , (9.1)wt ut
mit =
1 , (9.2)
 wit uit  1 e+ +xp α αFE + +w αU  
 wt ut  
where mit is the inflow rate, outflow rate or migration balance in a voivode-
ship/oblast i and in year t, FE is the individual effects, wit is the wages in a 
voivodeship/oblast i in year t, wt  is the average wage in the country in year t. 
uit is the unemployment rate in a voivodeship/region i and in year t, and ut is 
the unemployment rate in the country in the year t.
The parameters of Eqs. (9.1) and (9.2) were estimated by the following 
estimation methods: ordinary least squares (OLS), OLS with fixed effects 
in space, OLS with fixed effects in space and time, generalized method 
of moments (GMM), GMM with fixed effects in space, GMM with indi-
vidual effects in space and time, a logistic model, a logistic model with 
individual effects in space, a logistic model with individual effects in space 
and time.
Estimates of the parameters of Eqs. (9.1) and (9.2) for Poland are pre-
sented in Table 9.1. The following conclusions can be drawn:
• In estimations in which the rate of migration inflows is the explained 
variable, the relative wages in most cases had a statistically significant 
and positive impact on these inflows. Only in the logistic model with 
individual effects was this interaction not significant.7
• The impact of the relative unemployment rate on the analyzed variable 
was no longer so unambiguous. In models without individual effects, 
this impact was positive and statistically significant. Only in the equa-
tion of the logistic function with the effects in space and time was the 
impact of the relative unemployment rate statistically significant and 
negative. Other models indicated the insignificance of this variable.
• Comparing the absolute values of Student’s t statistics with the explan-
atory variables, it can be noticed that relative wages significantly influ-
enced the rate of migration inflows.
• Comparing corrected coefficients of determination for models with-
out individual effects, it can be seen that the variability of the depend-
ent variable was best explained with the Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
method in approx. 39.3%, then the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) 38.6% and the logistics model (logit model) 29.0%.
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• In the estimations of Eqs. (9.1) and (9.2), when the dependent variable 
was the rate of migration outflows, the impact of relative wages on this 
variable was not unequivocal. In the estimations of models without in-
dividual effects, the impact was statistically significant and negative. 
Only in the case of the GMM model with effects in space and time 
and the logistic model with effects in space and time was the impact 
of relative wages positive and statistically significant. Other estima-
tion methods indicated the statistical insignificance of the variable in 
question.
• The impact of relative unemployment rate on migration outflows in all 
estimation methods turned out to be statistically positive. Only in the 
OLS model with effects in space and GMM with effects in space was 
this variable insignificant. In other cases, the relative rate had a statisti-
cally significant effect.
• Comparing the absolute values of Student’s t statistics for independent 
variables, it should be stated that it was the relative unemployment rate 
that had a significant impact on migration outflows.
• Analyzing the corrected coefficients of determination (without individ-
ual effects), it can be seen that the variability of the dependent variable 
is best described by the logistics model (60.0%), then GMM (57.8%) and 
OLS (57.6%).
• Estimations of Eqs. (9.1) and (9.2), in which the dependent variable was 
the net migration rate [A2] [A2], relative wages had a positive and sta-
tistically significant effect on the net migration rate for each estimation 
method.
• The impact of the relative unemployment rate was negative and statisti-
cally significant in OLS estimations with and without fixed effects, the 
logistic model (with and without effects) and GMM without fixed ef-
fects. Only in the case of GMM models with individual effects did this 
variable turn out to be statistically insignificant.
• Comparing the absolute values of t statistics with independent varia-
bles, it should be stated that relative wages were the more significant 
variable.
• Analyzing the values of the adjusted coefficient of determination, it can 
be seen that the variability of the dependent variable was best explained 
by the GMM model at about 61.7%, for the OLS and the logistic model, 
it was 61.2%.
Estimates of the parameters of Eqs. (9.1) and (9.2) for Ukraine are pre-
sented in Table 9.2. For Ukraine, only those equations are analyzed, in 
which the dependent variable is the rate of migration balances, because in 
other cases the results were not satisfactory and their interpretation would 
not make sense. The following conclusions can be drawn from the esti-
mates in Table 9.2:
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• Relative wages had a positive and statistically significant effect8 on the 
examined dependent variable in OLS estimations (with and without ef-
fects), the logistic model (with and without effects) and GMM. In GMM 
estimations with individual effects, this variable turned out to be statis-
tically insignificant.
• The impact of the relative unemployment rate was negative and statisti-
cally significant in each estimation method.
• Comparing the absolute values of Student’s t statistics, it turned out 
that relative unemployment was a more significant variable.
• Analyzing the corrected coefficients of determination (in models with-
out individual effects), it can be seen that the variability of the depend-
ent variable was best explained by the OLS and logistics model in about 
45.9%, while the GMM model 44.2%.
For Poland, the authors also estimated the parameters of the following 
equations:
Mijt w u= +α αFE + +jtW α α
jt
U + D ilnP w u (d j ), (9.3)it it it
Mijt 1= , (9.4)
Pit  w u  




where Mijt  is the number of people migrating from and to the voivodeship j 
in year t, Pit  is the number of people living in the voivodeship i and in year 
t, w wit ,  jt is the wages in voivodeships i and j in year t, u uit ,  jt  is the unem-
ployment rate in a voivodeship i and j in year t, and dij  is the distance (in a 
straight line) between voivodeships i and j.
The estimation of the parameters of Eqs. (9.3) and (9.4) was made using the 
following estimation methods: OLS, OLS with effects over time, GMM, GMM 
with effects over time, logistics model and logistics model with effects over 
time. Models with individual effects in space were not analyzed, as distances 
between voivodeship capitals are a linear combination of effects in space. In 
addition, due to a lack of data, it was impossible to create models for Ukraine.
Estimates of the parameters of Eqs. (9.3) and (9.4) are presented in 
 Table 9.3. The following conclusions can be drawn from these estimates:
• The ratio of wages in the voivodeship j to wages in the voivodeship had 
a positive and statistically significant effect9 on migration flows between 
these voivodeships,
• The relation of the unemployment rate in the voivodeship j to the un-
employment rate in the voivodeship j had a negative and statistically 
significant effect on the dependent variable,
• The distance between the capitals of individual voivodeships had a neg-
ative, statistically significant impact on migration flows between those 
voivodeships,
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R2 0.401 0.404 0.395 0.398 0.401 0.436
Adjusted R2 (0.401) (0.401) (0.394) (0.395) (0.401) (0.433)
Number of 
observations 3,360 3,120 3,360
Source: Our own estimates.
• When comparing the absolute values of these statistics, it should be 
stated that the distance between voivodeship capitals and the pay ratio 
were more significant variables than the unemployment rate ratio.
• Analyzing the corrected coefficient of determination (in models without 
individual effects) it can be seen that the variability of the dependent 
variable was best explained by the logistics model and OLS in about 
40.1%, while GMM 39.4%.
9.5 Summary
 i In Poland, the rate of migration inflows was statistically significantly 
positive on relative wages, while the impact of the relative unemploy-
ment rate was not so clear. Hence, one can conclude that the factor 
attracting migrants to a given voivodeship was the desire to find a 
better-paying job.
 ii In the case of the migration outflow rate, the relative unemployment 
rate was a variable that had a positive, statistically significant effect on 
these outflows, while it is difficult to discern the clear impact of relative 
wages. This means that the factor determining migration from a given 
province was the inability to find a job.
 iii In the net migration balance, both the relative wages and the relative 
unemployment rate were statistically significant. In the case of wages, 
the impact was positive, while unemployment was negative. It is worth 
noting that wages were a more important variable.
 iv In the case of Ukraine, the net migration balance was negatively affected 
by the relative statistical rate of unemployment. The impact of relative 
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wages was positive, but not always statistically significant, which means 
that the population decided to migrate because of being unable to find 
a job.
 v The model describing inter-voivodeship migrations in Poland shows 
that the most important factor negatively and statistically significant for 
these migrations is the distance between voivodeship capitals. The ratio 
of wages between pairs of provinces had a slightly weaker but positive 
impact on migration. However, the ratio of unemployment rates had the 
weakest impact on the dependent variable. This means that people who 
decide to migrate are more likely to choose voivodeships that are closer 
to their current place of residence, and at the same time those where 
wages are higher. 
Notes
 1 Relative wages (the relative unemployment rate) are understood to be the quo-
tient of wages (unemployment rates) in a given province or region and wages 
(unemployment rates) in the entire economy.
 2 https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
 3 http://www.UKRSTAT.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
 4 International Organization for Migration, Mihratsiia yak chynnyk rozvytku 
v Ukraini (Міграція як чинник розвитку в Україні), 2016. Access: http://www.
iom.org.ua/sites/default/files/mom_migraciya_yak_chynnyk_rozvytku_v_ 
ukrayini.pdf.
 5 Mihratsiia v Ukraini: fakty i tsyfry 2016. Access: http://iom.org.ua/sites/default/
files/ff_ukr_21_10_press.pdf.
 6 Sirochuk N.A. (2014), Mizhnarodna trudova mihratsiia ukraintsiv do krain yev-
ropeiskoho soiuzu: faktory vplyvu. Access: http://economy.kpi.ua/files/files/12_
kpi_2014.doc.
 7 The variable can be considered statistically significant at a level of 5% when the 
absolute value of the statistics given in brackets is greater than the critical value 
of Student’s t-distribution (1.65).
 8 The variable should be considered statistically significant at the level of 5% when 
the absolute value of the statistics given in brackets is greater than 1.65.
 9 The variable should be considered statistically significant at the level of 5% when 
the absolute value of the statistics given in brackets is greater than 1.645.
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10.1 Introduction
Economic growth depends on many factors. One of them is the economic 
development of the regions. In turn, diversification of the economic devel-
opment of regions may have a direct impact on the economic development 
of a country (Gurgul, Lach 2011).
A statistical and taxonomic analysis of the spatial diversity of economic 
development of the regions of Poland and Ukraine in 2004–2016 is the main 
goal of this chapter. Taxonomic indicators of economic development based 
on five macroeconomic variables were used in the study of oblasts and 
voivodeships: four stimulants (GDP per capita, investment rate, wages, net 
migration) and one deterrent (unemployment rate).
There are many studies dealing with the spatial differentiation of de-
velopment of both the Polish and Ukrainian economies, on a local as well 
as on a regional level. But, comparative research on these two economies 
is extremely rare. To a large extent they concern relations between Pol-
ish and Ukrainian regions, which are directly adjacent to each other. It 
is worth mentioning Kowerski’s work here (2017), which uses taxonomic 
indicators and econometric methods to study the socio-economic develop-
ment of cross-border regions. In his considerations the author dealt with 
the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands. The conducted research shows that 
both taxonomy and econometric methods are a good tool for studying the 
socio-economic development of these economies, and the provinces and 
border regions of Poland and Ukraine (except the Lviv Oblast) are not 
the most developed in socio-economic terms in their respective countries 
(Kowerski 2017).
Among the works in this area, we can see those that show a positive im-
pact on trade and investment between border regions. One such work is a 
study by Mikhel (2016), which researched the impact of Poland on the de-
velopment of western Ukraine. These studies show significant links between 
Polish and Ukrainian entrepreneurs. Mikhel (2016) also points out that the 
share of exports of goods from regions such as Volyn, Lviv or Ternopil to 
Poland is increasing every year, which fortifies the development of trade re-
lations between the economies in question.
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Based on the review of empirical research on the impact of immigrants 
on economic growth and development as well as the development of human 
capital, it may be concluded that immigrants exert a significant positive im-
pact on these aspects in the host country. Koshulko and Koshulko (2016) 
were involved in research on the influence of the Ukrainian migration in 
Poland. In their research, they proved that most of the money earned by 
Ukrainians is spent mainly on living expenses in Poland, and only a small 
amount of the money earned in Poland is sent by wire transfer to Ukraine 
(Koshulko, Koshulko 2016).
The Polish and Ukrainian economies are compared not only because of 
their proximity to each other, nor solely due to their cultural similarity, but 
also because of the comparable level of GDP per capita in the 1990s. In Po-
land since the 1990s, an economic transformation has been taking place and 
since then the GDP per capita has been steadily rising, while Ukraine is still 
struggling with a low level of this value compared to Poland. Adarov et al. 
(2015) ascertain that Poland’s success is not due to the change of the centrally 
planned economy to a free market economy that occurred in Poland at the 
turn of the 1980s and 1990s, but from a long-term systemic transformation 
process, whose echo was present until the first decade of the 20th century. In 
addition, the authors emphasize that the experience of the Polish economy 
cannot be directly implemented in the Ukrainian economy, but only part of 
the experience, especially that which is related to trade and openness of the 
economy (Adarov et al. 2015).
The chapter structure is as follows: Section 10.2 presents the methodology 
for constructing taxonomic indicators. Section 10.3 contains an analysis of 
the spatial differentiation of taxonomic indicators of the economic develop-
ment of Polish voivodeships, while Section 10.4 presents the spatial differen-
tiation of taxonomic indicators of the economic development of Ukraine’s 
oblasts. Section 10.5 contains a comparative analysis of the spatial differen-
tiation of the taxonomic indicators of the economic development of Polish 
voivodeships and Ukrainian oblasts. Chapter 10 closes with a summary and 
conclusions of the conducted considerations.
10.2 Taxonomic methods employed
The level of development of a voivodeship or an oblast can be characterized 
by many methods; one of them are taxonomic methods, which allow the clas-
sification of regions using metric measures. These measures transform the 
n-dimensional space of variables describing the level of development of the 
region into a one-dimensional real space. The need to use taxonomic meas-
ures is mainly due to the fact that there is no good order in n-dimensional
spaces (n ≥ 2), so we are not able to compare any feature vectors.
Taxonomic methods have the form of a universal algorithm and are based 
on the following stages (for more on the stages of building development 
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indicators see, e.g., in Willmott and Grimshaw 1969; Wishart 1969; Grabiński 
et al. 1989; Zeliaś 2000):
1  the selection of diagnostic variables describing the development of a 
given region (diagnostic variables);
2  the determination of the nature of variables in relation to the examined 
properties of the structure (a division into stimulants, destimulants and 
nominants);
3  selection of methods for estimating values of variables and units;
4  normalization of diagnostic variables aimed at freeing them from la-
bels, so that they are mutually comparable;
5  determination of the synthetic variable value based on the chosen 
method of aggregation of diagnostic variables.
The selection of diagnostic variables was based on the availability of mac-
roeconomic variables, which were listed on the Statistics Poland (GUS)1 and 
the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (ДCCУ)2 websites.
Synthetic variables (first) allow for the ordering and comparison of units 
(voivodeships and oblasts) and (second) these variables also allow a classi-
fication of regions into groups with a similar degree of development. In this 
study, the authors based their research on synthetic variables, and grouped 
voivodeships and oblasts into quintile groups. The next quintiles contain 
regions with the highest, high, medium, low and the lowest level of economic 
development.
At the next stage, stimulants and destimulants of economic development 
should be distinguished from diagnostic variables. These concepts were in-
troduced in Hellwig’s work in 1968.
A stimulant of economic development is understood as being a variable 
whose high values are desirable from the point of view of the characteristics 
of the structure under study, while low values are undesirable. A destim-
ulants, on the other hand, is such a macroeconomic variable whose high 
values cause an undesirable state of the studied structure, while an increase 
in the value of this variable deepens this state.
Among the macroeconomic variables discussed in previous chapters, the 
GDP per capita, investment rates, wages and migrations were accepted as 
stimulants of economic development, and the destimulants were the unem-
ployment rates.
Destimulants can become stimulants and vice versa, which allows consid-
ering a set of diagnostic variables as a stimulant or deterrent syndrome. In 
the subsequent analyses, this destimulants is transformed into a stimulant 
based on the relationship:
1
sijt = , (10.1)
dijt
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where indexes i = 1, 2,…, 16 (27), j = 1, 2,…, 5) and t = 2004, 2003,…, 2016 
mean, respectively: voivodeships (oblasts), years and stimulants (s) (destim-
ulants (d)) of economic development (see: Dykas 2009, 2017).
In the next step, the stimulants are standardized to unity, dividing the 
value of the j-th stimulant by its maximum value and thus excluding their 
labels:
i
i ss jtjt = , 
max ( ) (10.2)sijt
it
where s ijt means a standardized stimulant. The values s ijt are at the same 
time not greater than 1 and not less than 0, which allows one to compare any 
standardized stimulant values.
In addition, the value of a stimulant equal to 1 is interpreted in such a way 
that in the i-th region in a given year t, the j-th stimulant assumed the max-
imum value in the group of regions studied. It also follows from this that 
the closer/further from 1 the value a standardized stimulant (s ijt) attains, 
in a given region, the more the region was characterized by a higher/lower 
degree of development in terms of the variable that the stimulant represents.
The study adopts a taxonomic method based on the highest value of the 
sum of Pearson’s linear correlation coefficients between the taxonomic in-
dicator ( )SKit , and standardized stimulants of economic development (see: 
Dykas et al. 2013 or Dykas 2017).
Let’s suppose it’s a D =   dij    matrix of variables representing stimulants, 
where dij is equal to the value of the j-th stimulant in region number k, where 
i = k (modulo) 16 (27), therefore i = +k p ⋅ r (r = 0 for 2004, r = 1 for 2005,…, 
r = 12 for 2016 and p = 16 (27)).
Let X be a normalized matrix D, where the normalization is accomplished 
utilizing the following transformation3 (see: Bolińska at al. 2018):
D
= •X , j•, j ( ) ,max D•, j




• j = −
• ,
max ( )D•, j
when the j-column of the matrix D is a destimulant.
The taxonomic indicator SKi of the development of the k-th (i = k (modulo) 
16 (27)) of the territorial unit is the following convex linear combination of 
normalized features:
SK Xi i= ω1 ,⋅ +1 2ω ⋅ X Xi,2 + + ω ⋅5 ,5,i




F X( )ω ω=∑ cor ,( •, j X * ,)  (10.3)
j=1
takes the largest value.
We interpret the indicators SKi (for i = 1, 2,…, 16 (27)) in such a way 
that the closer (further) one they are, the better (worse) is the i-region. 
The value vector ω is determined based on distributed evolutionary al-
gorithms. In addition, the individual coordinates ωi (i = 1,2,3,…, 5) are 
as follows:
• in Poland: wages − 0.260, investment rates − 0.252, GDP per capita − 
0.199, unemployment rates − 0.189, migrations − 0.100,
• in Ukraine: wages − 0.244, investment rates − 0.181, GDP per capita − 
0.178, unemployment rates − 0.221, migrations − 0.176,
• jointly, both in Poland and in Ukraine: wages − 0.155, investment 
rates  − 0.240, GDP per capita − 0.168, unemployment rates − 0.230, 
migrations − 0.207.
10.3  Spatial differentiation of taxonomic indicators of 
economic development of voivodeships
Map 10.1 presents the development of the taxonomic indicator in Polish 
voivodeships in the years 2004–2016. We can draw the following conclusions 
from this map:
• The highest level of economic development in the research period was 
characterized by those voivodeships with a high level of GDP per capita, 
high wages and low unemployment rates. These were the Mazowieckie 
(index value of 0.722), Pomorskie (0.550) and Wielkopolskie voivode-
ships (0.546).
• Voivodeships with high wages and a high level of GDP were in the group 
of voivodeships with a high level of economic development. This group 
includes the following voivodeships: Dolnośląskie (0.545), Małopolskie 
(0.532) and Śląskie (0.518).
• The group of voivodeships with an average value of the taxonomic 
index included the voivodeships of Łódzkie (0.495), Opolskie (0.475), 
Lubuskie (0.473) and Zachodniopomorskie (0.467).
• Low values of the taxonomic indicator were recorded in voivodeships 
in which low wages occurred during the research period. These were 
the Podlaskie (0.462), Podkarpackie (0.451) and Kujawsko-Pomorskie 
(0.442) voivodeships.
• The group of voivodeships with the lowest value of the taxonomic index 
was composed of three voivodeships of eastern Poland: Świętokrzyskie 
(0.431), Warmińsko-Mazurskie (0.425) and Lubelskie (0.421).
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Map 10.1 Sp atial differentiation of taxonomic indicators of economic development 
of voivodeships.
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
Table 10.1 summarizes the data on the development of taxonomic indicators 
in Polish voivodeships from specific years. This table also presents the coef-
ficients of variation (understood as the relation of the standard deviation to 
the unconsidered average) of these indicators in the selected years and the 
correlation coefficients between the values of these indicators in subsequent 
years. The following conclusions can be drawn from the data contained in 
the table (see also Bolińska 2017):
• In all of the years singled out, the Mazowieckie Voivodeship had the 
highest value of the taxonomic indicator. In 2004, 2008 and 2016, the 
Wielkopolskie Voivodeship was in second place, while in 2013 the Dol-
nośląskie Voivodeship was in second place.
• The lowest value of this indicator in 2004 stood out in the Lubelskie 
and Warmińsko-Mazurskie voivodeships. The Warmińsko-Mazurskie 
Voivodeship also obtained the lowest value in 2008 and 2013. In addi-
tion, in 2013 the lowest value was also recorded in the Świętokrzyskie 
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Table 10.1 T axonomic indicators of economic development in voivodeships in 
selected years
Voivodeship Years
2004 2008 2013 2016
Dolnośląskie 0.42 0.57 0.56 0.65
Kujawsko-Pomorskie 0.35 0.48 0.43 0.47
Lubelskie 0.33 0.45 0.44 0.45
Lubuskie 0.37 0.47 0.46 0.54
Łódzkie 0.38 0.54 0.51 0.55
Małopolskie 0.43 0.57 0.52 0.61
Mazowieckie 0.61 0.77 0.71 0.81
Opolskie 0.36 0.48 0.47 0.63
Podkarpackie 0.36 0.45 0.48 0.49
Podlaskie 0.38 0.5 0.46 0.49
Pomorskie 0.42 0.61 0.54 0.64
Śląskie 0.4 0.58 0.51 0.6
Świętokrzyskie 0.35 0.46 0.42 0.46
Warmińsko-Mazurskie 0.33 0.44 0.42 0.47
Wielkopolskie 0.45 0.61 0.52 0.66
Zachodniopomorskie 0.38 0.51. 0.50 0.51
Coefficients of variation 0.170 0.163. 0.143 0.175
Correlation coefficients Years
2008 and 2013 and 2016 and 
2004 2008 2013
0.960 0.942 0.906
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
Voivodeship. In 2016, the lowest value of this indicator was recorded in 
the Lubelskie Voivodeship.
• Between 2004 and 2008 (i.e., before the global financial crisis) an in-
crease in the value of the taxonomic index was recorded in all Polish 
voivodeships, while the highest increase was noted in the Pomorskie, 
Śląskie and Łódzkie voivodeships. In these voivodeships, the increase 
was over 40%.
• In the period between 2008 and 2013 (i.e., the period in which the ef-
fects of the global financial crisis were most noticeable) a decrease in the 
taxonomic indicator was noted in 15 out of 16 voivodeships. The only 
voivodeship in which instead of a decrease an increase was recorded 
was the Podkarpackie Voivodeship. The highest decrease in the taxo-
nomic index (by over 10%) was recorded in the following voivodeships: 
Pomorskie, Wielkopolskie, Śląskie and Kujawsko-Pomorskie.
• The decrease in taxonomic indicators of economic development in the 
aforementioned period of time resulted mainly from an increase in the 
unemployment rates.
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• In the last analyzed period of time (i.e., in the years 2013–2016), an in-
crease in the taxonomic index was recorded in all voivodeships, with 
the highest increase recorded in Opolskie (by 34.3%) and Wielkopolskie 
(26.7%).
• Despite a decrease in the taxonomic indicator in earlier years, in the last 
of the years researched, the value of the discussed indicator was higher 
in all voivodeships, as compared to 2004. The most rapid increases in 
the indicator were recorded in the Opolskie (by 72.7%) and Dolnośląskie 
(55.3%) voivodeships.
• The conclusion of the coefficients of variation in Table 10.1 is that in 
the years 2004–2013 a process of convergence of taxonomic indicators 
of economic development took place, and after 2013 there was a clear 
divergence of these indicators. On the other hand, high correlation co-
efficients in subsequent years suggest a significant stability of spatial 
diversity of those voivodeships in undergoing economic development.
Figure 10.1 presents the trajectories of changes in economic development 
indicators in 2004–2016 in groups of Polish voivodeships and in the Polish 
economy as a whole. This figure shows the following:
• Over the entire research period, the value of the taxonomic indicator 
followed the same trend. In 2004, the lowest values of the taxonomic in-
dicator in groups of voivodeships were recorded in the group of voivode-
ships of eastern Poland and they were 1.22 times lower than the values 
of these indicators for the group of voivodeships of central Poland.
• In the years 2004–2008, the average annual growth rate of the taxonomic 
index was 7.6%. The highest average annual growth rate of the taxo-
nomic indicator in 2004–2008 occurred in the group of voivodeships 
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Figure 10.1  Taxonomic indicators of economic development in groups of voivode-
ships in 2004–2016.
Source: Our own estimates based on: https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
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• Between 2006 and 2007, the largest increase in the taxonomic index was 
recorded throughout the entire period considered (13%). This increase 
was recorded in the group of voivodeships of central Poland. The largest 
decrease of this indicator was recorded in the years 2008–2009 (5.5%). 
The voivodeships of western Poland were characterized by this decrease. 
• The years 2009–2013 manifest minor changes in the taxonomic indica-
tor in the groups of Polish voivodeships. In central Poland, this ratio fell 
by 5.1%, while in western Poland it increased by 0.7%.
• The value of the taxonomic indicator in the years 2014–2016 increased 
in all the discussed groups, with the highest (annual average) growth re-
corded in western Poland (6.2%), while the lowest growth rate occurred 
in eastern Poland (0.6%).
• The average annual growth rate of the analyzed indicators over the 
years 2004–2016 for the entire Polish economy was 3%, and was equal 
to the growth rate of this indicator in central Poland. In the same pe-
riod, the growth rate in eastern Poland was 2.5%, while in western it 
was 3.5%. The taxonomic indicator in 2016 compared to 2004 in western 
Poland increased by over 50%, while the lowest increase among all re-
spondents was in the least-developed group of voivodeships, that is, in 
eastern Poland (34.1%).
10.4 S patial differentiation of taxonomic indicators of 
economic development of oblasts
In this part of the chapter, we will focus on the spatial differentiation of 
taxonomic indicators of economic development in the oblasts of Ukraine. 
Taxonomic indicators of economic development were based on the same 
macroeconomic variables as in the case of Poland.
The spatial differentiation of the values of taxonomic indicators of oblasts 
is shown on Map 10.2 and Table 10.2.
Map 10.2 indicates a significant spatial diversity of taxonomic indicators 
of economic development of the oblasts.
One may perceive a decidedly weaker economic development of western 
Ukraine, compared to the rest of the country. What’s more, the oblasts in 
Left-bank Ukraine were characterized by a higher level of economic devel-
opment compared to those on the right side of the Dnieper river (see also 
Tokarski, Chugaievska 2018 or Tokarski at al. 2019).5
Throughout the research period, the cities with a special status, that is, 
Kyiv (0.712) and Sevastopol (0.407), the Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
(0.397) and the oblasts of Kyiv (0.443), Odesa (0.384), Dnipropetrovsk 
(0.377), Kharkiv (0.359), Poltava (0.333), Donetsk (0.332) and Zaporizhzhya 
(0.331), were characterized by the highest taxonomic economic development 
rate of this indicator. In turn, the least developed in relation to this indicator 
were the following oblasts: Rivne (0.273), Kirovohrad (0.268), Sumy (0.267), 
Chernivtsi (0.256), Kherson (0.254), Zhytomyr (0.249) and Ternopil (0.247).
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Table 10.2  Taxonomic indicators of economic development in oblasts in selected years
Oblast Years
2004 2008 2013 2016
Autonomous Republic of Crimea 0.33 0.43 0.42 –
Kharkiv 0.36 0.41 0.35 0.32
Kherson 0.21 0.32 0.25 0.23
Khmelnytskiy 0.25 0.34 0.28 0.27
Cherkasy 0.30 0.34 0.27 0.24
Chernihiv 0.24 0.31 0.26 0.24
Chernivtsi 0.23 0.38 0.30 0.24
Dnipropetrovsk 0.37 0.42 0.37 0.32
Donetsk 0.33 0.41 0.36 0.24
Ivano-Frankivsk 0.27 0.37 0.31 0.28
Kyiv 0.34 0.50 0.50 0.47
Kirovohrad 0.24 0.29 0.28 0.25
Luhansk 0.27 0.35 0.36 0.21
Lviv 0.28 0.36 0.32 0.34
Mykolayiv 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.29
Odesa 0.36 0.45 0.39 0.34
Poltava 0.32 0.40 0.34 0.29
Rivne 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.25
Sumy 0.23 0.31 0.28 0.27
Ternopil 0.20 0.30 0.26 0.23
Vinnytsya 0.23 0.33 0.30 0.25
Volyn 0.24 0.33 0.30 0.25
Zakarpattia 0.27 0.34 0.27 0.25
Zaporizhzhya 0.32 0.38 0.33 0.28
Zhytomyr 0.20 0.30 0.26 0.24
Kyiv 0.72 0.87 0.71 0.64
Sevastopol 0.36 0.47 0.41 –
Coefficients of variation 0.334 0.291 0.280 0.314
Correlation coefficients Years
2008 and 2004;  2013 and 2008; 2016 and 2013
0.9390.958 0.968
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
Table 10.2 presents the taxonomic indicators of economic development 
in oblasts in selected years. The selection of those years was conditioned by 
the political and economic crises in Ukraine. These crises had a significant 
impact on the economic development of the oblasts; therefore, the following 
years were chosen for a detailed analysis of the taxonomic indicators of the 
economic development of the Ukrainian oblasts: 2004 (the Orange Revolu-
tion, November–December 2004), 2008 (the global financial crisis and gas 
conflict with Russia 2008–2009), 2013 (the Euro-Maidan and annexation 
of the Crimean peninsula and military conflict with the Russian Federa-
tion) and at the end of 2016, as a year of some stabilization of the economic 
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Map 10.2 Sp atial differentiation of the taxonomic indicators of economic devel-
opment of oblasts.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
situation in Ukraine after the economic crisis caused by the military conflict 
with Russia.
The year 2004 was the beginning of a period of development for the 
Ukrainian economy. The Orange Revolution that took place in 2004 led 
to a change in the political scene of Ukraine, and the election of Vik-
tor Yushchenko as President of Ukraine (Golovko 2010). Analyzing the 
taxonomic indicator of the economic development of Ukrainian oblasts 
in 2004, we can see that by far the most developed oblasts were those of 
Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odesa, the city of Sevastopol and Kyiv, all of 
which had the highest level of this indicator. In turn, the lowest level of the 
taxonomic indicator of economic development of the Ukrainian oblasts 
was recorded in the following regions: Zhytomyr, Ternopil, Kherson, Vin-
nytsya and Sumy.
The policy of President Viktor Yushchenko had a positive impact on 
the economy of Ukraine. Generally, in 2004–2008 (i.e., during the Yush-
chenko presidency) the economic growth fluctuated around 7%, measured 
by the taxonomic development index. The year 2008 was difficult for the 
economic situation in Ukraine, because in addition to the global financial 
crisis (which significantly affected the Ukrainian economy), there was also 
a political conflict with the Russian Federation related to the signing of an 
agreement between Ukraine and Russia, concerning the supply of Russian 
gas to Ukraine. The main problems that occurred at the time of the signing 
of this agreement were the conditions for supplying natural gas, in particu-
lar the price of the gas (Rosenberger 2012).
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In 2008, the most developed with respect to the taxonomic index were 
the following oblasts: the City of Kyiv together with the oblast of Kyiv, 
 Sevastopol along with the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Odesa 
Oblast. The least developed were the Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Ternopil, 
Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts.
The period 2013–2014 was the most problematic period in Ukrainian pol-
itics and the economy, after the economic crisis of the 1990s. Following the 
Euro-Maidan (November 2013–February 2014), Ukraine was faced with an-
other conflict, this time of a military nature. The struggle began with the 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula (March 2014), after which military 
operations have continued from April 2014, until the present. This time, 
the conflict afflicted the two most industrially developed oblasts of east-
ern Ukraine, namely the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (Klotz 2017). The 
Ukrainian economic situation, which was linked with politics, reacted to 
the above conflict with an economic crisis in the form of a decline in GDP 
and wages, as well as an increase in the unemployment rate. The crisis natu-
rally contributed to a lowering of the taxonomic indicators of the economic 
development of the Ukrainian oblasts, in particular those directly affected 
by the war. The highest significance of this indicator in 2013 was recorded in 
the Kyiv, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea and in the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol. The lowest were recorded 
in the Zhytomyr, Ternopil, Chernihiv and Zakarpattia oblasts.
The year 2016 was distinguished by the fact that, for the first time after 
the economic crisis, an increase in the taxonomic indicators of economic 
development was recorded in most Ukrainian oblasts. During this period, 
the City of Kyiv and its oblast, together with the Lviv, and Kharkiv oblasts, 
stood out due to their significantly high taxonomic indicators. The Luhansk, 
Ternopil, Zhytomyr and Vinnytsya oblasts were distinguished by their low 
levels of taxonomic indicators.
Analyzing the coefficients of variation in Table 10.2, the following con-
clusions may be drawn: First, these coefficients are much higher in Ukraine 
than in Poland, which also means that the spatial diversity of the devel-
opment of the Ukrainian economy is greater than that of Poland. Second, 
just like in Poland, the levels of these coefficients dropped until 2013, before 
rising significantly.
Considering the values of correlation coefficients between successive 
years, it turns out that the spatial diversity of the economic development of 
oblasts (like voivodeships) is stable over time.
The dynamics of taxonomic indicators of economic development in 2004–
2008 once again indicate a high level of economic development over this 
time period. This period was characterized by an increase in taxonomic 
indicators in all oblasts, which proves that the economic policy at that time 
was rather effective. The average annual growth rate of these indicators 
fluctuated around 11% in the Chernivtsi, Ternopil, Kherson, Zhytomyr and 
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Kyiv oblasts. An approximately 8% increase was recorded in the Vinnytsya, 
Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, Khmelnytskiy and Luhansk oblasts. An increase 
of 3% was recorded in the following oblasts: Mykolayiv, Dnipropetrovsk, 
Kharkiv, Cherkasy and Rivne.
After the gas conflict and the global financial crisis, the situation in the 
Ukrainian economy deteriorated significantly. In the period of 2009–2014, 
the taxonomic decline rate of economic development fluctuated around 
3.5%. It is worth noting that the decline was an element of the armed con-
flict with Russia. The most noticeable destabilization in the years 2009–2014 
took place in the Donetsk, Chernivtsi, Luhansk, and Zakarpattia oblasts 
(the rate of decline in the taxonomic indicators of economic development 
in these oblasts fluctuated around 5%). The least noticeable decline in these 
indicators occurred in the following oblasts: Mykolayiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, 
Kirovohrad and Dnipropetrovsk (a decrease of approx. 2%).
After the most active phase of the military conflict in 2014, the economic 
situation in Ukraine stabilized somewhat in 2015–2016. Nevertheless, dur-
ing this period, a decrease in the taxonomic index of economic development 
was rated at about 1.7% on a scale of the economy as a whole. It should be 
noted, however, that in Lviv, Donetsk, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts, an in-
crease in the taxonomic indicator of economic development was perceived. 
At that time, the Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhya 
and Vinnytsya oblasts still manifested an approximate 6% drop in the above 
indicator. Comparing, in turn, the taxonomic indicators of the Ukrainian 
oblasts in 2004 and 2016, we can see that their values were very similar, 
which proves that after the political and economic crises, the indicators of 
the development of the Ukrainian economy returned to their 2004 levels.
As can be seen in Figure 10.2 during a period of economic growth in the 
Ukrainian economy (i.e., in 2004–2008), the trajectories of the taxonomic 
index of economic development of oblast groups were very similar to each 
other. An upward trend of this indicator in the aforementioned period is 
also noticeable. Then in 2009 the first crisis for the Ukrainian economy, 
associated with the global financial crisis and the gas conflict with Russia, 
appeared. Another critical moment shown on the figure is at the turn of 
2013–2014, and was related to the military conflict in eastern Ukraine and 
the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula.
In the research period, the lowest level of taxonomic indicator of economic 
development was recorded in the group of western Ukrainian oblasts.6 Such 
a level of this indicator is conditioned by the low level of GDP per capita and 
wages, and the high unemployment in these regions. Generally, most of the 
oblasts in this group do not have a well-developed industrial and service sec-
tor. The basic types of economic activity in the western Ukrainian oblasts 
are agriculture, construction and tourist services. Despite the fact that this 
group of oblasts is the largest in terms of the number of oblasts it contains, 
in terms of economic development we can only distinguish the Lviv Oblast 
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Figure 10.2  Taxonomic indicators of economic development in oblast groups in 
2004–2016.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
together with the city of Lviv, which is the largest and most developed city 
in the western part of Ukraine, as making noteworthy economic progress.
By far the most developed oblast of central Ukraine was the Dnipro-
petrovsk Oblast together with the city of Dnipro, which is one of the most 
important financial and service centers of Ukraine. The high level of eco-
nomic development of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast has a significant im-
pact on the level of economic development of the central Ukrainian oblast 
group. Among the less-developed oblasts of this group, we can distinguish 
Kirovohrad and Vinnytsya.
Northern Ukraine is the most developed part of the country. Despite 
the fact that three oblasts included in this group (Sumy, Chernihiv and 
Zhytomyr) in the research period were characterized by a rather low level 
of GDP per capita, and investment along with a rather high unemploy-
ment rate (which translated into a low level of economic development), the 
group had the highest level of the taxonomic indicator, mainly due to the 
capital City of Kyiv. Over 20% of the country’s GDP is generated in Kyiv, 
which, combined with a highly centralized system, distinguishes this part 
of the country regarding economic growth; in addition, it exerts a signif-
icant impact on the spatial diversity of the economic development of the 
Ukrainian oblasts.
Southern Ukraine also had a fairly high level of taxonomic economic 
development in the period under review. This indicator was largely influ-
enced by the very low level of unemployment in this part of the country, 
together with a high level of investment. Southern Ukraine having access to 
the Black and Azov Seas was also important in the framework of economic 
development, particularly with regard to the increase in tourism in this re-
gion, as well as the expansion of other commercial activities.
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Eastern Ukraine is the most economically advanced part of the country. 
Modern heavy industry together with access to a large amount of natural re-
sources, especially energy (gas, oil and to a great extent, coal), has caused the 
group of oblasts of eastern Ukraine to be one of the most developed oblasts 
of the country, as evidenced by the high level of the taxonomic indicator of 
economic development over the years 2004–2016. Precisely because of this 
high level of economic development, and greater integration with Russia, the 
oblasts of the eastern Ukrainian group were affected by the military conflict 
in 2014, which not only resulted in a destabilization of the region, but was the 
root of the economic crisis that extended throughout the country.
Analyzing the pace of economic development throughout the country, an 
average annual decrease of taxonomic indicators of economic development in 
the years 2004–2016 was noted to be approximately 0.3%. In turn, when bro-
ken down into groups of regions, we can see that the group of oblasts of west-
ern and northern Ukraine, in the analyzed period, manifested an increase 
in taxonomic indicators of 0.3% and 0.6%. A slowdown in economic growth 
in the form of declines in taxonomic indicators was recorded in the eastern, 
southern and central parts of the country (−1.7%, −0.6%, −0.7%, respectively).
A significant acceleration of the pace of economic development was re-
corded in the period of 2004–2008 in all groups of oblasts; on average in 
Ukraine as a whole, there was about a 7% increase in taxonomic indicators 
during this period. The highest increase in these indicators was noted in the 
western Ukrainian oblast group (7.7%), followed by the northern and south-
ern parts of the country (7.1% and 6.7%, respectively). The weakest growth 
rate in the years 2004–2008 was recorded in the groups of regions of eastern 
(5.0%) and central (4.8%) Ukraine.
The period 2012–2015 was distinguished by a lackluster economic devel-
opment rate throughout the country (approximately a 5.6% average annual 
decrease in taxonomic indicators). During this period, taxonomic indicators 
dropped in all oblast groups. A decrease of 5% was recorded in the western, 
northern and central Ukrainian oblast groups, while the highest decreases 
in these indicators were recorded in the eastern (11.8%) and southern (10.6%) 
parts of the country.
10.5  Spatial differentiation of taxonomic indicators of 
economic development of Polish voivodeships and 
Ukrainian oblasts
Map 10.3 presents the development of the taxonomic indicator of economic 
development jointly for the Polish and Ukrainian economies in 2004–2016. 
We can conclude from this map that (see also Bolińska, Gomółka 2018):
• Out of 43 analyzed regions, the most developed were regions in which 
high investments were recorded. These were the capital of Ukraine – 
Kyiv (0.589) and the Mazowieckie Voivodeship (0.510).
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Map 10.3 Sp atial differentiation of taxonomic indicators of economic development 
of voivodeships and oblasts.
In the case of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and in 2004–2013.
The group of the most developed regions in the research period also included 
the Kyiv Oblast (0.389) as the natural economic base of the Kyiv metropolis, 
as well as the Wielkopolskie Voivodeship (0.357), the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea (0.355), the voivodeships of Pomorskie (0.351), and Dolnośląskie 
(0.347) and the city with a special status, Sevastopol (0.347).
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• The group of regions with a high value of this analyzed indicator was 
made up of three oblasts, Odesa (0.321), Kharkiv (0.296) and Dnipro-
petrovsk (0.292), and six voivodeships, the Małopolskie (0.346), Śląskie 
(0.320), Łódzkie (0.302), Opolskie (0.292), Lubuskie (0.289) and Zachod-
niopomorskie (0.284).
• The group of underdeveloped regions was made up of two voivodeships 
of eastern Poland and seven oblasts in Ukraine. This group included the 
Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodeship (0.247), Chernivtsi Oblast (0.245), 
Lubelskie Voivodeship (0.244) and the following oblasts: (0.237), Volyn 
(0.234), Cherkasy (0.229), Khmelnytskiy (0.228), Zakarpattia (0.225) 
and Vinnytsya (0.223).
• The group with the lowest values of the taxonomic indexes was composed 
of only Ukrainian oblasts. This group was made up of the following 
oblasts: Luhansk (0.222), Rivne (0.215), Kirovohrad (0.214), Sumy (0.206), 
Ternopil (0.203), Kherson (0.201), Chernivtsi (0.201) and Zhytomyr (0.194).
Table 10.3 summarizes the data on the value of the analyzed variable in all 
voivodeships and oblasts in the years selected as before. From the data sum-
marized in this table, the following is evident:
• In 2004, 2008 and 2013, the highest value among all the discussed re-
gions was in Kyiv, while in 2016 the Ukrainian capital was overtaken 
by the Mazowieckie Voivodeship (previously occupying second place 
in this ranking).
• The lowest values in all the years discussed were in the Ukrainian 
oblasts. In 2004, it was the Zhytomyr Oblast, in 2008 the Kirovohrad 
Oblast, in 2013 the Kherson Oblast, and in the last analyzed year 2016 
the Luhansk Oblast.
• Between 2004 and 2008, in most of the regions analyzed (except for the 
Rivne and Chernivtsi oblasts in which this value remained unchanged), 
the level of the taxonomic index increased, while the highest increase, 
by 78.4%, was recorded in the Chernivtsi region. Another circuit with a 
high increase in this indicator was the region of Kherson (an increase of 
60.2%). In Polish voivodeships, this increase was lower, with the Śląskie 
(13%) and Wielkopolskie (12.2%) voivodeships standing out.
• The period between 2008 and 2013 resulted in a decrease in the value 
of the taxonomic indicator. The effects of the global financial crisis 
and the gas conflict between Ukraine and Russia were most felt in the 
oblast, in which this indicator fell by almost 34%, that is, the Kherson 
Oblast, which in the previous period recorded the largest increase in the 
taxonomic rate of economic development between 2008 and 2013, was 
among those regions with the most significant decrease (32.5%). During 
the aforementioned period of time, in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship, a 
slight (4.1%) increase of the analyzed indicator was recorded, while in 
the Dolnośląskie Voivodeship, no change was perceived.
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Table 10.3  Taxonomic indicators in Polish voivodeships and Ukrainian oblasts in 
selected years
Voivodeship or oblast Years Year 2016, (year  
2004 = 100)
2004 2008 2013 2016
Dolnośląskie 0.25 0.36 0.36 0.43 171.51
Kujawsko-Pomorskie 0.21 0.29 0.26 0.3 140.49
Lubelskie 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.28 147.94
Lubuskie 0.22 0.29 0.28 0.34 153.91
Łódzkie 0.23 0.33 0.31 0.35 152.88
Małopolskie 0.28 0.37 0.34 0.41 147.82
Mazowieckie 0.43 0.53 0.51 0.57 132.85
Opolskie 0.22 0.3 0.29 0.38 170.37
Podkarpackie 0.21 0.27 0.28 0.3 140.42
Podlaskie 0.23 0.3 0.27 0.3 135.21
Pomorskie 0.27 0.38 0.35 0.43 159.9
Śląskie 0.24 0.36 0.32 0.38 159.87
Świętokrzyskie 0.21 0.28 0.25 0.29 138.00
Warmińsko-Mazurskie 0.2 0.26 0.24 0.28 145.54
Wielkopolskie 0.29 0.39 0.35 0.45 155.00
Zachodniopomorskie 0.23 0.31 0.3 0.32 142.88
Autonomous Republic of Crimea 0.3 0.39 0.37 – 122.85a
Vinnytsya 0.2 0.28 0.23 0.18 92.39
Volyn 0.22 0.29 0.24 0.2 93.51
Dnipropetrovsk 0.31 0.33 0.27 0.24 76.33
Donetsk 0.26 0.32 0.25 0.14 55.91
Zhytomyr 0.16 0.25 0.19 0.18 112.62
Zakarpattia 0.23 0.29 0.21 0.19 82.86
Zaporizhzhya 0.26 0.3 0.25 0.2 77.54
Ivano-Frankivsk 0.23 0.32 0.25 0.22 96.91
Kyiv 0.31 0.46 0.43 0.41 134.33
Kirovohrad 0.2 0.24 0.21 0.19 95.98
Luhansk 0.21 0.28 0.27 0.14 67.72
Lviv 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.28 113.5
Mykolayiv 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.23 92.32
Odesa 0.32 0.4 0.32 0.28 85.83
Poltava 0.27 0.33 0.26 0.22 79.16
Rivne 0.27 0.27 0.2 0.18 66.67
Sumy 0.19 0.25 0.21 0.21 113.21
Ternopil 0.17 0.26 0.21 0.18 108.37
Kharkiv 0.33 0.34 0.26 0.25 76.14
Kherson 0.17 0.28 0.18 0.18 101.4
Khmelnytskiy 0.23 0.3 0.22 0.22 93.71
Cherkasy 0.29 0.29 0.2 0.18 61.94
Chernivtsi 0.2 0.36 0.24 0.19 95.48
Chernihiv 0.2 0.26 0.19 0.18 91.68
Kyiv 0.64 0.73 0.56 0.5 78.51
Sevastopol 0.31 0.42 0.34 – 108.73a




• As a result of the Euro-Maidan, there was a decrease in the value of 
the taxonomic indicator of economic development in 2013–2016 in most 
oblasts (the Khmelnytskiy region was the only one in which no change 
was recorded at that time). The highest decrease was recorded in the 
Donbas (Luhansk Oblast, a 47.2% decrease and in the Donetsk Oblast, 
a decrease of 42.8%).
• In 2013–2016, all voivodeships were characterized by an increase in 
this analyzed indicator. The highest increase of the indicator discussed 
here in the research period was recorded in the Opolskie (32.5%) and 
Wielkopolskie (29%) voivodeships.
Figure 10.3 presents the trajectories of the taxonomic indicator of economic 
development in groups of voivodeships, in the Polish economy as a whole, as 
well as in groups of oblasts and the entire Ukrainian economy in the years 
2004–2016. We can draw the following conclusions from this map:
• The highest level of economic development in the first year of the anal-
yses was recorded in the group of northern Ukrainian oblasts. The 
taxonomic index in the said group was 1.5 times higher than the least 
developed group of voivodeships in eastern Poland, at that time.
• Until 2007, all groups discussed had the same tendency to change. In 
2004–2007, the highest average annual growth of the analyzed indi-
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Figure 10.3  Taxonomic indicators of economic development in groups of voivode-
ships and groups of oblasts in 2004–2016.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ and https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/
BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
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was at a level of 9.3%. The group of oblasts of northern Ukraine (8.8%) 
and the group of voivodeships of central Poland (8.7%) also had a high 
growth rate.
• The effect of the global financial crisis and the Russian-Ukrainian gas 
conflict was a decrease in economic development in 2009 in all the re-
gions discussed. In Poland, the value of the taxonomic index decreased 
by about 5%, while in Ukraine this decrease was already over 25%.
• The years 2009–2014 increased the rate of economic development in Po-
land by 1.0% and in all voivodeship groups. In the same period, Ukraine 
saw a decline in economic development at a rate of 1.5%. The only group 
of Ukrainian oblasts in which the value of the analyzed taxonomic in-
dex (equal to 1.5%) increased in the discussed period of time was the 
group of oblasts of northern Ukraine.
• In the entire analyzed period, the taxonomic index for the Polish econ-
omy increased by 49.3%; the largest increase among voivodeship groups 
was recorded in western Poland (an increase of 58.8%). On the other 
hand, in the Ukrainian economy in the discussed period, a decrease 
in the taxonomic index of 13.5% was noted, with the highest decrease 
recorded in the group of eastern Ukrainian oblasts (by as much as 
30.2%), while the lowest decrease occurred in the northern Ukrainian 
oblasts (0.2%).
• The group of central Poland voivodeships had the highest value of the tax-
onomic index in 2016; this value was over 2.2 times higher than the value 
of the taxonomic index of the group of oblasts from eastern Ukraine, 
the country’s group of oblasts with the lowest economic progress, for this 
year. The value of the taxonomic index in Poland in the last year sub-
jected to our research (2016) was over 1.6 times higher than in Ukraine.
Figure 10.4 shows the trajectories of the taxonomic indicator of economic 
development in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, Kyiv Oblast and the City of 
Kyiv, as well as in the Polish and Ukrainian economies as a whole. We can 
draw the following conclusions from this map:
• In the first year of our analyses, in the City of Kyiv and in the Kyiv Oblast, 
the taxonomic index was 1.2 times higher than in the Mazowieckie 
Voivodeship. In addition, this indicator in the Ukrainian economy (equal 
to 0.26) was higher than in the Polish economy (equal to 0.24).
• From the first year of observation to 2008, the average annual growth 
rate of the taxonomic index in the City of Kyiv and the Kyiv Oblast 
(5.5%) and the Mazowieckie Voivodeship (5.3%) was at a similar level. 
However, for the Polish economy as a whole, this growth was 7.9%, and 
in Ukraine it was slightly lower and amounted to 6%.
• During the years 2008–2009 in the City of Kyiv and the Kyiv Oblast the 
taxonomic index fell by almost 34%, while in the Mazowieckie Voivode-
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Figure 10.4 T axonomic indicators of economic development in the Mazowieckie 
Voivodeship, Kyiv and the Kyiv Oblast, as well as in Poland in the years 
2004–2016.
Source: Our own estimates based on: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ and https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/
BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
• In the years 2009–2013, the value of the taxonomic index increased on 
average by about 0.1% in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship. This increase in 
the City of Kyiv and the Kyiv Oblast was much higher and amounted to 
5.5%. In Poland, this ratio between the discussed years did not fluctuate 
significantly (an average annual decrease of 0.3%), but in Ukraine the 
value of the discussed index increased by almost 2% on average, annually.
• The last years of observation (2014/2016) manifested a decrease in the 
average annual growth rate both in Ukraine (by 0.6%) as well as in Kyiv 
and the Kyiv Oblast (by 0.2%) and an increase of this indicator in Po-
land (by 5.0%) and the Mazowieckie Voivodeship (by 3.3%).
• Over the entire research period, the value of the taxonomic indicator 
increased in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship by almost 33%, while in the 
City of Kyiv together with the Kyiv Oblast, the value of this indicator 
decreased by 13.5%.
10.6 Summary
The considerations this chapter can be summarized as follows:
 i The economic development of the Polish and Ukrainian economies is 
heavily dependent on socio-political stability. In the analyzed period, 
fluctuations in the value of the taxonomic index of the economic de-
velopment of oblasts and voivodeships were associated with the global 
financial crisis and socio-political destabilization in Ukraine.
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 ii The best-developed Polish Voivodeship was the Mazowieckie Voivode-
ship, whereas the least-developed voivodeships were the three voivode-
ships of eastern Poland: the Świętokrzyskie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie 
and Lubelskie.
 iii During the research period (i.e., in the years 2004–2016), the value of 
the taxonomic indicator fluctuated significantly in all Polish voivode-
ships, despite a decrease in the value of the taxonomic indicator after 
the global financial crisis (in the years 2009–2013). In the last analyzed 
year, an increase in economic development was recorded in all the 
voivodeships, with the highest increase being noted in the Opolskie and 
Dolnośląskie voivodeships.
 iv In the discussed period, the most developed group of voivodeships was 
that of central Poland, whereas the lowest value of the taxonomic indi-
cator throughout the entire research period was characteristic for east-
ern Poland.
 v Decreases in the GDP per capita, wages and investment rates together 
with an increase in unemployment rates naturally contributed to the 
shaping of the taxonomic indicators of economic development of the 
oblasts. In the period under consideration, the cities of Kyiv and Sev-
astopol, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the oblasts of Kyiv, 
Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Zaporizhzhya were 
characterized by a high level of taxonomic indicators. This was in con-
trast to the less-developed oblasts, according to the taxonomic indexes 
of Rivne, Kirovohrad, Chernihiv, Kherson, Zhytomyr and Ternopil.
 vi This diversification of economic development is characteristic of the 
Ukrainian oblasts. In the years 2004–2016, significant differences were 
recorded in the shaping of taxonomic indicators of economic devel-
opment among Ukrainian oblasts. The western part of the country is 
definitely the least developed, while the groups of central and eastern 
Ukrainian oblasts are among those with high economic growth; the 
northern and southern parts of the country in the research period were 
characterized by the highest level of taxonomic indicators of economic 
expansion (0.387 on average within the group during the research pe-
riod). Moreover, the City of Kyiv (together with the Kyiv Oblast) at-
tained the highest value of this indicator. To a large extent, the level of 
economic development of the capital (Kyiv) was affected by the highest 
level of GDP per capita, and wages and investment, combined with low 
unemployment, as well as the highly centralized system of the Ukrain-
ian state. The regional economic policy of Ukraine, however, demands 
immediate change; it is necessary to emphasize a reduction of the dif-
ferentiation of economic growth in the oblasts, as well as a change in 
the approach to state management from centralization to decentraliza-
tion, which is important from the perspective of equalizing differences 
in economic expansion.
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 vii The most developed regions of all those discussed in this chapter were 
those of the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, and the Mazowieckie Voivode-
ship. The next places were occupied by the Kyiv Oblast and the Polish 
voivodeship with the lowest level of unemployment – Wielkopolskie. 
The lowest level of economic growth among all the regions discussed 
was found in two oblasts of northern Ukraine, the Chernihiv and Zhy-
tomyr oblasts.
 viii Between 2004 and 2016, two voivodeships of western Poland (Dol-
nośląskie and Opolskie) recorded the largest increase in the taxonomic 
index. However, the highest decrease in economic expansion in the ana-
lyzed period was recorded in the Donetsk (eastern Ukraine) and Cher-
kasy (central Ukraine) oblasts.
 ix Despite the fact that in the initial period of this analysis, the group 
of northern Ukrainian oblasts was achieving the most economic pro-
gress, in the final period, this group was overtaken by both the voivode-
ships of western and central Poland; only the group of voivodeships 
of eastern Poland (which in the first year of this analysis was the least 
developed) in 2016 was manifesting less growth than northern Ukraine. 
The remaining groups of oblasts in the last year of the analysis (2016) 
were making less progress than the least-developed group of Polish 
voivodeships.
 x Comparing the best developed voivodeship of Poland and Kyiv, to-
gether with the Kyiv Oblast, we can state that in the first year of the 
research, the analyzed region of Ukraine, that is, Kyiv, was economi-
cally advancing at a faster rate. As a result of the Euro-Maidan and the 
Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict in 2016, the level of the taxonomic index 
of the Mazowieckie Voivodeship was 1.2 times higher than in the City of 
Kyiv and the Kyiv Oblast.
Notes
 1 https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start (access: 2019-12-30).
 2 http://www.UKRSTAT.gov.ua/ (access: 2019-12-30).
 3 For a matrix M =   mij   , the notation M•, j means the j column of this matrix.
 4 For M =    mij   and N n=    ij   symbol M N∗  signify the multiplication of the 
matrices.
 5 Kyiv, which lies on both sides of the Dnieper, is an exception, as it attained the 
highest level of economic development.
 6 An exception was the year of 2015, when the lowest level of this indicator was 
recorded in the group of oblasts of eastern.
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In 1990, the level of GDP per capita in Poland and Ukraine was very close 
to each other and (according to the World Bank) oscillated around 9.5–10.0 
thousand USD (at PPP, at constant prices from 2010).
Poland was the first country in the former Soviet bloc to reject the domi-
nance of the communist party in the partially free elections of June 4, 1989, 
and to transform the political, social and economic system. In the second 
half of December 1989, in the conditions of then-hyperinflation and eco-
nomic collapse, the Polish parliament (Sejm) adopted 11 economic laws 
called the Leszek Balcerowicz Plan (Minister of Finance in the first post-
war, non-communist government in Poland, of Prime Minister Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki). The plan boiled down to balancing the budget, removing 
most price controls, freeing most prices, introducing a rigid exchange rate 
of the Polish zloty against hard currencies (thanks to a stabilization fund 
from the IMF to the amount of approx. USD one billion) and privatizing a 
significant part of the economy.
The direct effects of Balcerowicz’s plan seemed negative. In 1992, the 
GDP per capita in Poland was almost 7% lower than in 1990. Unemploy-
ment also increased, in 1993 the unemployment rate in Poland was already 
14% and until 2005 it was among the highest in Europe. On the other hand, 
Balcerowicz’s plan led to the stabilization of public finances and improved 
the overall macroeconomic stability of the economy, which resulted in a re-
duction of excessive employment (i.e., hidden unemployment) in some enter-
prises (mainly in the private sector) and an increase in the competitiveness 
of the economy. As a result of growing competitiveness and stabilization 
of the public finance sector, since 1993 Polish GDP and labor productivity 
began to grow rapidly. In 2000, GDP per capita in Poland was over 40% 
higher than in 1990.
Ukraine regained independence only in 1991, as a result of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. A reform of the country’s political, social and economic 
system was undertaken there as well.
However, it should be remembered that the existing Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, until 1991, was much more dependent both politically and 
economically on the state capital in Moscow. At that time, the Ukrainian 
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economy was more strongly influenced by economic interconnections 
( including supply chains) with other former republics of the Soviet Union 
( including the Russian Federation) than the Polish economy.
Also, the economic reforms undertaken after Ukraine regained inde-
pendence were much more conservative than in Poland. The process of 
ownership transformation is still far from being completed, which is widely 
recognized as a necessary stimulus for the development of a market-oriented 
political and economic system. A lack of proper control over the course of 
Ukrainian privatization, and corruption, caused a lot of dissatisfaction and 
a lack of general social consent for the continuation of this process, by the 
then current methods. Privatization in Ukraine is an unfinished process.
For the first two decades of the economic transformation in Ukraine, 
the implementation of an autonomous and transparent monetary policy 
in the central bank was not carried out. The central bank’s independence 
from political pressure was illusory. Special economic zones created in 
Ukraine resembled tax havens, rather than solutions for managing local 
and regional development. The lack of transparency of state institutions 
and the creation of legal provisions for specific interest groups led to the 
emergence of a “government of the few operating mainly in their own inter-
ests” (Aristotle). The result is the “oligarchization” of the most profitable 
sectors of the Ukrainian economy (natural gas and the steel industry). An 
oligarchic group has not developed in Poland, not only because of the lack 
of raw materials that offer special opportunities for profit. From the early 
1990s Poland has consistently pursued the goal of full EU membership. Pri-
vatization could not be inbred. It had to be open to foreign investors. The 
rules of privatization had to be clear. The low level of domestic savings that 
politicians were aware of resulted in an opening up to foreign investment 
capital, which the anticipated political and business stability and transpar-
ency were dependent on.
Ukrainian GDP per capita in the 1990s (as in many other post-Soviet 
economies) remained in a downward trend. In 1998, that is, at the beginning 
of the Russian financial crisis (which led, among others, to a stronger depre-
ciation of both the Russian ruble and the Ukrainian hryvnia), Ukrainian 
GDP per capita was almost 60% lower than in 1990 (while the value of this 
macroeconomic variable in Poland increased then by almost 30%).
However, the Russian financial crisis also had a positive impact on the 
Ukrainian economy. Significant depreciation of the hryvnia led to an in-
crease in the price of consumer products (but also semi-finished products 
and capital goods) imported from neighboring countries. Therefore, Ukrain-
ian buyers of imported products shifted their demand from more expensive 
imported products to domestic products. This, in turn, as a result of the 
Keynesian multiplier mechanism, led to a boom in the Ukrainian economy 
(which was not prevented even by the Orange Revolution of 2004/2005). In 
the years 1998–2008, the Ukrainian GDP per capita almost doubled, while 
the unemployment rate dropped from over 11% to around 6.5%.
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At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries in Poland, as a result of re-
strictive fiscal and monetary policy and the (partly) Russian financial crisis, 
economic growth slowed down until 2002. Per capita GDP growth rates fell 
from 5–6% in the second half of the 1990s to 1–2% in 2001 and 2002. The 
slowdown in economic growth led to a rapid increase in unemployment. In 
the years 2002–2003, the unemployment rate in Poland approached 20% and 
was one of the highest in Europe.
Poland’s accession to the European Union in 2004, the first years of full 
membership in the new institutional order, combined with efficient utili-
zation of EU funds, clearly improved the economic situation in the Polish 
economy. GDP growth rates increased again, which translated into an in-
crease in employment and a more than two-fold fall in unemployment rates. 
Another slowdown in Poland’s economic development was the result of the 
global financial crisis of 2008. At that time, the dynamics of Polish GDP 
decreased, which led to an increase in unemployment (in 2012 and 2013 un-
employment rates in Poland again exceeded 10%). Nevertheless, after 2013, 
Polish GDP growth rates increased again (to 3–5%), which resulted in a 
decrease in unemployment rates practically to the level of natural unem-
ployment (4–5%). Currently, unemployment rates in Poland are among the 
lowest in the European Union.
In 2009, as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict and (to a lesser 
extent) the global financial crisis, the Ukrainian economy was affected 
by another (this time one-year) recession. At that time, GDP fell by more 
than 10%, while the unemployment rate increased by more than 2% points. 
Then (similarly to the Russian financial crisis of 1998), Ukraine returned 
to the path of rapid economic growth, which lasted until the Euro-Maidan 
of 2013/2014. GDP per capita in 2013 was more than 11% higher than in 
2009, while the unemployment rate fell by 1.5% points. The result of the 
Euro-Maidan of 2013/2014 was the Russian annexation of the Crimean 
Peninsula (in 2014) and the fight against the pro-Russian separatists in the 
Donbas. This, in turn, led to another deep recession in Ukraine. In 2015, 
the GDP per capita in Ukraine was over 10% lower than in 2013, while the 
unemployment rate increased to 9–9.5%.
In the 21st century (to be more precise after 2004), the best-developed Pol-
ish voivodeship (measured by the per capita GDP or the labor productivity 
level) was the Mazowieckie Voivodeship. This province has the cities of both 
Warsaw and Płock, where the largest Polish oil concern (PKN Orlen) has its 
headquarters. Dolnośląskie, Wielkopolskie, Śląskie and Pomorskie were also 
among the best developed voivodeships. These are the voivodeships in which 
the largest and most economically thriving urban agglomerations (Wrocław, 
Poznań, Śląsko-Zagłębie and the Tri-City area) are located. The lowest level 
of economic development was recorded in voivodeships of eastern Poland.
***
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Moreover, with the passage of time, the development gap between the 
Mazowieckie Voivodeship and other groups of voivodeships, including (in 
particular) the group of voivodeships of eastern Poland, is increasing. For 
example, the GDP per capita in the group of the voivodeships of western 
and central Poland in 2016 was lower than in the Mazowieckie Voivode-
ship in 2005, while the value of this variable in the voivodeships of eastern 
Poland in 2016 was close to the level of this variable in western and central 
Polish voivodeships in 2007.
In general, the voivodeships east of the Vistula (Wisła) River (except for 
the right bank in Warsaw), due to the lack of larger and economically more 
prosperous urban centers, were characterized by a lower level of economic 
expansion than the voivodeships west of the river.
In Ukraine, the highest level of economic development was definitely in 
the capital city of Kyiv, where on average in the years 2004–2016, almost 
20% of the Ukrainian GDP was generated. The Kyiv Oblast, the Dnipropet-
rovsk Oblast (whose capital is the center of the Dnieper financial center in 
Ukraine) and the oblasts of eastern Ukraine, where the heavy industry and 
mining of this country were concentrated, were also characterized by a high 
level of economic growth.
In comparison to the oblasts of Left-bank Ukraine and the coastal oblasts 
of Odessa and Mykolaiv, the oblasts of Right-bank Ukraine are under- 
developed, including (in particular) the oblasts of western Ukraine. This 
is due to the fact that in the less-developed areas of western Ukraine, there 
are no major cities (except Lviv) and because these areas were, until 1991, 
peripherally located in relation to the countries to which they belonged dur-
ing the last 200 years (the Russian Empire, Austria-Hungary before World 
War I, the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia in the interwar period, and 
the USSR after World War II), their situation was not conducive to political- 
social stability nor their economic development.
Considering the dynamics of economic growth of the Ukrainian oblasts, 
it turns out that (mainly due to Kyiv and the Kyiv Oblast) the oblasts of 
northern Ukraine are developing faster than the other groups of oblasts. 
Moreover, since around 2011, there has been a deep recession in the most 
industrialized regions of eastern Ukraine, which was the result of both low 
investment rates (still in the first decade of the 20th century) and the armed 
conflict with pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas.
An equally important issue presented in this book containing our re-
search results is labor productivity, which is one of the most important fac-
tors of long-term economic growth. An increase in labor productivity is the 
result of the accumulation of productive capital, human capital and process 
innovations used. The novelty of the approach used in this book was to take 
into account the fourth determinant of labor productivity – domestic and 
foreign gravitational effects.
The spatial differentiation of labor productivity in Poland is most strongly 
influenced by the spatial differentiation of capital for the working person, 
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followed by national gravitational effects and foreign gravitational effects 
(flowing from Germany). The Lódzkie Voivodeship near Warsaw is the larg-
est beneficiary of national gravitational effects, while the foreign gravita-
tional effects are mainly of use to the voivodeships of western Poland.
In Ukraine, on the other hand, the level of product per employee (similar 
to Poland) is most strongly influenced by the amount of capital per employee. 
Then the value of this variable in Ukraine is influenced by gravitational ef-
fects flowing from Russia, national gravitational effects and (finally) grav-
itational effects flowing from Poland. Foreign gravitational effects from 
Russia mainly affect Kyiv and the regions of eastern, northern and central 
Ukraine, while foreign gravitational effects from Poland exert an influence 
on the regions of western Ukraine.
Since the voivodeships of eastern Poland and the neighboring oblasts of 
western Ukraine are among the poorest in these countries, further inte-
gration with the European Union (completed in the future with Ukraine’s 
membership in the EU) should lead to an increase in Polish-Ukrainian grav-
itational effects, which may in turn lead to an accelerated economic devel-
opment in both eastern Poland and western Ukraine.
The numerical simulations presented in Chapter 8 show that, assuming 
ceteris paribus, the Polish voivodeships should grow faster than the Ukrain-
ian oblasts in the coming decades. Therefore, if the Ukrainian authorities 
do not undertake significant and effective structural reforms of the econ-
omy, the development distance between Poland and Ukraine may continue 
to increase. This, however, is not in the interest of Ukraine or Poland.
Labor productivity is an important determinant of wage levels. Hence, 
the spatial diversity of wages, both in Poland and in Ukraine, is largely de-
termined by the spatial differentiation of labor productivity as well as by 
the spatial differentiation of unemployment rates. The higher the level of 
labor productivity, the higher ceteris paribus the (usually) level of wages, 
while the high unemployment rates of ceteris paribus are accompanied by 
lower wages.
In Poland, the differentiation of wages is much more strongly affected by 
the differentiation of unemployment rates than the differentiation in labor 
productivity, while in Ukraine the impact of these variables on wages is 
similar. This may be due to the fact that (in particular in the first decade of 
the 20th century) the diversity of regional unemployment rates was much 
larger than in Ukraine. This in turn meant that, in particular, in areas with 
high unemployment (including structural unemployment in some Polish 
voivodeships), the pressure on wage increases in the private sector (with in-
creasing labor productivity) was much less than in well-run areas with low 
unemployment.
Changes in unemployment rates in the regions of the two countries stud-
ied were affected by both GDP changes and past (one year delayed) unem-
ployment rates. GDP growth reduced unemployment rates, while in slump 
periods, unemployment rates rose the fastest in those regions where they 
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were the highest (but also in those regions, unemployment rates fell the fast-
est in slump periods).
Migration flows were the last process analyzed. Their size in the 21st cen-
tury in Poland was influenced by both relative wages (the average level of 
wages in a given voivodeship in relation to the average level of wages in 
Poland) and relative unemployment rates (defined analogously as relative 
wages). What’s more, relative wages influenced the size of migration flows 
more than relative unemployment rates. In the case of migration outflows, 
the opposite was true. This may be due to not only the economic but also 
psychological conditions of the nature of these migrations. People making 
migration decisions move from voivodeships with high unemployment to 
voivodeships with low wages. It’s better to have any job, than not to have one 
at all. Similar processes are also taking place in Ukraine.
As wages in Ukraine are among the lowest in Europe, so in the 21st cen-
tury there was a rapid decline in the population of both cities and rural 
areas. Rural areas are being depopulated faster than cities. This means 
that the best-educated and most enterprising Ukrainians, not seeing any 
opportunities for a rapid improvement in the economic situation in their 
immediate surroundings or in the country as a whole, decide to make eco-
nomic migrations from the countryside to the cities or to emigrate to foreign 
countries.
The presented results of comparative research on two neighboring coun-
tries and their economies seem to confirm the expected – on the basis of 
economic theory – effects of specific political and economic decisions, the 
adopted institutional order and geopolitical position. However, the current 
theoretical base of economics for creating the pillars of economic growth 
and development of Ukraine and Poland must take into account factors 
such as ecological security, digital security or structural adjustments result-
ing from the transformation of industry.
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